Opinion
Civil No. 1:17-CV-930
03-11-2019
WARREN EASLEY, Plaintiff, v. BRENDA TRITT, et al., Defendants.
(Judge Rambo)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
This is a civil rights action filed by the pro se plaintiff, Warren Easley, an inmate currently incarcerated in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") at the State Correctional Institution at Somerset. Easley brought this action against several correctional officers and medical staff at SCI Frackville, alleging claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights.
Easley's claims arise out of several incidents in which he claims he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment at Frackville. These incidents include Easley being placed in restraints that prohibited him from using the bathroom and resulted in him soiling himself (Doc. 11, ¶ 24); being sprayed with OC spray while he was restrained in his cell (Id., ¶ 29); being placed in a restraint chair and assaulted by one of the defendants (Id., ¶ 35); being left in a restraint chair for multiple hours without much clothing (Id., ¶¶ 37-38, 43-44, 60, 74, 93); and being placed in a "grind cell" where he was denied water, clothes, and a mattress. (Id., ¶ 51). He alleges that several defendants knew about the incidents but did nothing to protect him. (Id., ¶¶ 188, 192-194). Easley also contends that he was denied mental health treatment, even after he had attempted several times to commit suicide. (Id., ¶¶ 195-199, 208). Finally, the plaintiff alleges that, after he filed grievances against the staff at Frackville, he was prohibited from exhausting his administrative remedies and his legal paperwork was confiscated and thrown away. (Id., ¶¶ 223-224).
The plaintiff has now filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 98). In this motion, the plaintiff requests injunctive relief against several staff members at SCI Retreat, who allegedly denied him access to the courts when they confiscated and/or discarded some of the plaintiff's legal paperwork pertaining to the instant case. Easley requests that these individuals "stop using plaintiff[']s legal material as privilege [and] withholding such to punish and retaliate and ultimately injure plaintiff." (Doc. 98, at 2).
The defendants, in opposing this motion, argue that the plaintiff cannot obtain injunctive relief against individuals who are not a party to the instant litigation. Further, they contend that the plaintiff has not shown that he will suffer irreparable harm or that he will likely be successful on the merits of his claim. For the reasons set forth below, we agree, and recommend that this motion be denied.
II. Discussion
A. Preliminary Injunction Rule 65- The Legal Standard.
Inmate pro se pleadings, like those filed here, which seek extraordinary, or emergency relief, in the form of preliminary injunctions are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are judged against exacting legal standards. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
Four factors govern a district court's decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief, (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest.Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1373 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985)). See also Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2001); Emile v. SCI-Pittsburgh, No. 04-974, 2006 WL 2773261, *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2006) (denying inmate preliminary injunction).
A preliminary injunction is not granted as a matter of right. Kerschner v. Mazurkewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of prisoner motion for preliminary injunction seeking greater access to legal materials). It is an extraordinary remedy. Given the extraordinary nature of this form of relief, a motion for preliminary injunction places precise burdens on the moving party. As a threshold matter, "it is a movant's burden to show that the 'preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.'" Emile, 2006 WL 2773261, at * 6 (quoting Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F .2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992)). Thus, when considering such requests, courts are cautioned that:
"[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (emphasis deleted). Furthermore, the Court must recognize that an "[i]njunction is an equitable remedy which should not be lightly indulged in, but used sparingly and only in a clear and plain case." Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union # 53, 520 F.2d 1220, 1230 (6th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1977). As a corollary to the principle that preliminary injunctions should issue only in a clear and plain case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed that "upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny." Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir.1937).Emile, 2006 WL 2773261, at *6.
Accordingly, for an inmate to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction under Rule 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, and that he will be irreparably harmed if the requested relief is not granted. Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998); Kershner, 670 F.2d at 443. If the movant fails to carry this burden on either of these elements, the motion should be denied since a party seeking such relief must "demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted." Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original), (quoting Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1987)).
These limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are further underscored by statute. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the authority of courts to enjoin the exercise of discretion by prison officials, and provides that:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
With respect to preliminary injunctions sought by inmates, courts are also instructed that:
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity . . . in tailoring any preliminary relief.18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(2).
Furthermore, several other basic legal tenets guide our discretion in this particular case, where an inmate: (1) seeks to enjoin an array of non-parties; and (2) requests relief which goes beyond merely preserving the status quo in this litigation, but seeks to impose new, mandatory conditions on prison officials. Each of these aspects of Easley's prayer for injunctive relief presents separate problems and concerns.
For example, an injunction against non-parties, like the injunction sought here, requires a specific legal showing. To the extent that Easley seeks to enjoin non-parties in this litigation it is clear that: "[a] non-party cannot be bound by the terms of an injunction unless the non-party is found to be acting 'in active concert or participation' with the party against whom injunctive relief is sought." Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 56 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)).
Further, where the requested preliminary injunction "is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but...at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy." Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980). Mandatory injunctions should be used sparingly. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982). Thus, a request for some form of mandatory proactive injunctive relief in the prison context "must always be viewed with great caution because judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration." Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1995).
In addition, to the extent that the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction with some enduring effect, he must show that he will be irreparably injured by the denial of this extraordinary relief. With respect to this benchmark standard for a preliminary injunction, in this context it is clear that:
Irreparable injury is established by showing that Plaintiff will suffer harm that "cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following trial." Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir.1989) ("The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm"). Plaintiff bears this burden of showing irreparable injury. Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848, 110 S. Ct. 144, 107 L.Ed.2d 102 (1989). In fact, the Plaintiff must show immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm. ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987). The case law provides some assistance in determining that injury which is irreparable under this standard. "The word irreparable connotes 'that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again, atoned for ...'." Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir.1994) (citations omitted). Additionally, "the claimed injury cannot merely be possible, speculative or remote." Dice v. Clinicorp, Inc., 887 F.Supp. 803, 809 (W.D.Pa.1995). An injunction is not issued "simply to eliminate the possibility of a remote future injury ..." Acierno, 40 F.3d at 655 (citation omitted).Messner, 2009 WL 1406986, at *4.
In assessing a motion for preliminary injunction, the court must also consider the possible harm to other interested parties if the relief is granted. Kershner, 670 F.2d at 443. Finally, a party who seeks an injunction must show that the issuance of the injunctive relief would not be adverse to the public interest. Emile, 2006 WL 2773261, at * 6 (citing Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Corp., 269 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 2001)).
B. The Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Should Be Denied.
Judged against these benchmarks, Easley's motion for a preliminary injunction fails for at least three reasons.
First, it appears that Easley has filed this motion for preliminary relief against individuals who are not named as defendants in the instant action. On this score, this effort runs afoul of the:
"[G]eneral rule that a court may not enter an injunction against a person who has not been made a party to the case before it." Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 117, 17 S. Ct. 262, 41 L.Ed. 648 (1897) ("The decree is also objectionable because it enjoins persons not parties to the suit.")). Indeed, courts have refused to issue injunctions against non-parties. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Amaranth Advisors, LLC, 523 F.Supp.2d 328, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (the court denied the defendant's motion for a preliminary injunction against the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission because it was not a party to the suit and it was not an "officer, agent, servant, employee, or attorney" of any party); Williams v. Platt, Civ. No. 03-281-C, 2006 WL 149024 at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan.18, 2006) (unpublished) (the court denied the plaintiff's motion for an injunction noting that he had "not established a relationship between the preliminary injunction and the underlying civil rights claim, and he seeks to bind non-parties without any suggestion of active concert or participation by the named defendants"). Moreover, once a court has issued an injunction against a party, that injunction may only be enforced against non-parties that are officers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys of a party, or ones that are in active concert or participation with such non-parties or the party itself. Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(d)(2). To be bound by an injunction, a "non-party must have constructively had his day in court." Harris County, Tex. v. CarMax Auto Superstores Inc., 177 F.3d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1999) ("the relevant inquiry is ... whether [the non-party] had such a key role in the corporation's participation in the injunction proceedings that it can be fairly said that he has had his day in court in relation to the validity of the injunction.") (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).Banks v. Good, 2011 WL 2437061 (W.D. Pa. Apr.20, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 2418699 (W.D. Pa. June 14, 2011).
Moreover, Easley has not demonstrated that he is likely to be successful on the merits of his claims. Easley's motion asserts violations of his First Amendment right of access to the courts, as he alleges that certain individuals at SCI Retreat confiscated and/or disposed of his legal paperwork in this case. While Easley asserts an access-to-courts claim against the defendants in the instant action, the claims are completely separate from one another, as the claims in the instant case relate to confiscation of different legal material by individuals at SCI Frackville. Additionally, an access-to-courts claim requires a showing of an actual, concrete injury, in the form of direct prejudice to the plaintiff in the pursuit of some legal claim. See, e.g., Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1997); Demeter v. Buskirk, No. 03-1005, 2003 WL 22139780 (E.D. Pa. Aug.27, 2003); Castro v. Chesney, No. 97-4983, 1998 WL 150961 (E.D. Pa. March 31, 1998). Moreover, consistent with the Supreme Court's express view that "'we encourage local experimentation' in various methods of assuring access to the courts," Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 352, courts have long recognized that public officials can provide meaningful access to the courts through a wide variety of means.
Here, Easley has not shown that he has suffered any actual and concrete harm. He alleges that certain individuals at SCI Retreat confiscated his legal paperwork related to the instant case but has not demonstrated how he has been harmed by this action. Quite the contrary, since the plaintiff filed this motion on October 9, 2018, he has continued to submit numerous filings in this case, the most recent being filed on March 5, 2019. See Stilton v. Albino, 2010 WL 4916103, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2010) (dismissing an access-to-courts claim where the plaintiff "[did] not articulate how the alleged denial of access to his legal documents hindered his efforts to either pursue this claim or other court actions"). Thus, Easley has not shown any actual injury arising from the individuals' actions.
Finally, we must note that, while the motion seeks injunctive relief against several staff members at SCI Retreat, the plaintiff has been transferred to SCI Somerset. (Doc. 123). On this score, "where a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against prison officials whose control he is no longer subject to or against a prison he is no longer housed in, there is no longer a live controversy and a court cannot grant that injunctive relief." Fielder v. Fornelli, 2010 WL 3191841, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 30, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3186636 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2010) (citing Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir. 1993); Fortes v. Harding, 19 F.Supp.2d 323, 326 (M.D. Pa. 1998); Marrie v. Nickels, 70 F.Supp.2d 1252, 1259 (D. Kan. 1999) ("Generally, an inmate's transfer to another prison or release moots his request for declaratory or injunctive relief.")). Thus, because Easley is no longer incarcerated at SCI Retreat, and is no longer subject to the control of those who he claims were confiscating his legal property, the motion for preliminary injunction should be denied as moot.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 98) be DENIED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis
of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 11th day of March 2019.
S/ Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge