Opinion
Civil No. 3:04-CV-755-H.
August 17, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants City of Terrell and Michael Sterrett's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, filed June 14, 2004; Plaintiff's Response, filed July 19, 2004; and Defendants' Reply, filed July 28, 2004. Upon review of the pleadings, briefs, and relevant authorities, the Court is of the opinion for the reasons stated below that Defendants' motion should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Stephanie Earnheart filed the instant case in the Kaufman County Court at Law in January 2004 against Defendants City of Terrell and Michael Sterrett for negligence, false arrest and imprisonment, and invasion of privacy, all pursuant to state law. ( See Original Pet. at 5-7.) In March 2004, Plaintiff filed an amended Petition asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ( See Pl.'s First Am. Original Pet. at 9-11; Pl.'s Second Am. Original Pet. at 6-9.) Defendants City of Terrell and Michael Sterrett ("Defendants") removed the case to this Court on April 12, 2004. Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Original Complaint ("Complaint") on June 4, 2004.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims for "illegal search and seizure of Plaintiff's person, effects, and home"; "unlawful arrest, detention, and imprisonment"; violations of her "right to privacy of her home and person"; violations of her rights to due process, equal protection, freedom of speech, and freedom from the use of excessive force; and violations of her right to medical attention, all pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ( See Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that on January 22, 2002, four unknown officers, i.e., the four Jane Doe and John Doe Defendants, who were members of a drug task force unit acting as agents and representatives of the City of Terrell, entered her apartment without a warrant or probable cause. Plaintiff alleges that the officers were acting on a tip from Defendant Michael Sterrett ("Sterrett"), a Terrell Police Officer, claiming that Plaintiff was harboring a fugitive. Plaintiff claims Sterrett knew she was not harboring a fugitive because, as a resident of the same apartment complex, he knew that her neighbors had the same surname as the fugitive and a familial relationship with the fugitive. She claims that Sterrett told the task force officers that the fugitive was in her apartment as revenge because she had recently refused Sterrett's sexual advances.
Plaintiff claims that the task force officers pushed their way past her boyfriend and into her apartment without a warrant. According to Plaintiff, she was in her bedroom, naked and eight-months pregnant, when the officers barged into her room. Although Plaintiff demanded to see a search warrant, the officers ignored her request, demanded that she dress, and then refused her request that a female officer replace the male officers to watch Plaintiff dress. Plaintiff claims she "suffered great shame, embarrassment, indignity, and severe emotional distress because she was compelled to dress in the presence of strangers, male officers." (Compl. at 4-5.)
Then, Plaintiff claims, the officers searched her apartment and rummaged through her things. When the officers informed Plaintiff they were arresting her, Plaintiff claims that one officer had his hand on his gun in a threatening manner. She claims that she informed the officers that she had already served out her sentence for the charges the officers claimed to be arresting her for, and requested that they verify this information with the Administrative Sergeant at the Terrell Police Department. Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he officers contacted the Administrative Sergeant at Terrell, yet did not verify her claim of already serving her sentence and/or paying for the charge or other statements to the police." Plaintiff claims the Administrative Sergeant told the officers to arrest her.
Plaintiff claims that during the arrest, the officers handcuffed her hands behind her back, despite her request to be handcuffed in the front because of her high-risk pregnancy. She claims she told the officers that her two children would be returning from school to an empty house, but that they callously ignored her. Plaintiff claims that she informed the officers that she was suffering from an "rh factor" medical condition which could adversely affect the health of her unborn child, but that she was refused medical attention. After Plaintiff was taken to the police department and "booked in on previously-prosecuted charges which Terrell had failed to remove from its computer warrant system," Plaintiff claims that the City of Terrell learned that it had wrongfully arrested Plaintiff, dropped the charges, and released her. (Compl. at 5-6.)
Defendants City of Terrell and Michael Sterrett filed the instant motion to dismiss on June 14, 2004. Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims against the City of Terrell and Sterrett.
II. RULE 12(b)(6) STANDARD
In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept as true the non-movant's well-pleaded factual allegations and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, however, a plaintiff "must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations." Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court will not accept as true any conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact. Generally, the Court may not look beyond the pleadings, except in instances where public officials' qualified immunity is raised. Compare Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 936 (5th Cir. 1988) with Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 1994) [ and] Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) [ and] Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is not favored by the law. Mahone, 836 F.2d at 926. A plaintiff's "complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) ("The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims."); Heimann v. National Elevator Industry Pension Fund, 187 F.3d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 1999) (court may dismiss a claim under 12(b)(6) only if "it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.") (quoting Barrientos v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 911 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1990). However, "there are times when a court should exercise its power to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Mahone, 836 F.2d at 927 (emphasis in original).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants move the Court to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims, arguing that the case is barred by the statute of limitations and that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to overcome Defendants' right to qualified immunity.
1. Limitations
Defendants argue that this case is barred by the two year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions. Defendants claim that Plaintiff filed her Original Petition in state court on January 29, 2004, more than two years after the events she complains of occurred on January 22, 2002. Defendants also claim that Plaintiff did not assert her federal claims until March 19, 2004, and that the relation back doctrine should not apply. Plaintiff argues and presents evidence that she mailed the Original Petition on January 22, 2004, and that, under the Texas mailbox rule, the Original Petition is deemed filed the day it is mailed. Plaintiff also argues that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 allow for Plaintiff's federal claims to relate back to the date the Original Petition was filed. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that this case is not time-barred.
"Under Tex[as] R[ule of] Civ[il] P[rocedure] 5, a document is deemed timely filed if (1) it is sent to the proper clerk, (2) by first-class United States mail, (3) in a properly addressed and stamped envelope, (4) on or before the last day for filing, and (5) it is received not more than ten days tardily." Arnold v. Shuck, 24 S.W.3d 470, 472 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied). Plaintiff presents evidence that she mailed her Original Petition by certified United States mail to the clerk of Kaufman County on January 22, 2004, and that the clerk received it on January 29, 2004. ( See Pl.'s App. at 1-9.) Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) provides that "an amendment to a complaint will relate back to the date of the original complaint if the claim asserted in the amended pleading arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1385 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). After reviewing the Original Petition, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's federal claims in her Third Amended Complaint arise out of the same conduct and occurrence as the state law claims asserted in Plaintiff's Original Petition and that the federal claims should therefore relate back. The Court DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on this ground.
2. Qualified Immunity
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to defeat Defendants' defense of qualified immunity. "Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right." Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003). See also, Todd v. Hawk, 72 F.3d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1995). The Court conducts a two step analysis to determine if an officer is entitled to qualified immunity. See Mace, 333 F.3d at 623. The Court must determine first if the facts, as alleged, show that the officer's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. Id. If the facts do show that the officer's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right, then the Court determines if it "would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted." Id. at 624.
Plaintiff brings claims for "illegal search and seizure of Plaintiff's person, effects, and home"; "unlawful arrest, detention, and imprisonment"; violations of her "right to privacy of her home and person"; violations of her rights to due process, equal protection, freedom of speech, and freedom from the use of excessive force; and violations of her right to medical attention, all pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ( See Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff's Complaint alleges, in regard to Defendant Sterrett's action on January 22, 2002,
The [drug task force] officers were acting due to a call originating with Sterrett on behalf of Terrell, claiming that Plaintiff was harboring a fugitive. At the time Sterrett made the telephone call to the drug task force, he knew that persons living in the apartment across the hall from Earnheart had the same surname as the fugitive, and had a familial relationship, but directed the drug task force officers to Earnheart's residence instead. . . . On information and belief, Sterrett and/or others from the City were behind the call to the task force, the false claim of Plaintiff harboring a fugitive, and Plaintiff's false and illegal arrest.
(Compl. at 3-6.) Defendant argues that even were this true, it does not state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it "does not set forth facts which would establish that no reasonable officer could have believed the call was consistent with the preservation of Plaintiff's Constitutional rights." (Defs.'s Br. at 17.) Defendants also argue that merely providing such information does not result in improper or illegal actions by the officers receiving the information. ( Id.) Defendant, however, has cited no authority to support these arguments, other than the basic authorities as to what constitutes probable cause; such authority is not on point. The Court concludes that Defendant has failed to demonstrate that there is no possibility that Plaintiff can state a claim on these allegations for either her illegal search and seizure or her false arrest and detention claims and DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss on these grounds. See, e.g., Johnson v. Deep East Texas Regional Narcotics Trafficking Task Force (DETRNTTF), ___ F.3d ___, 2004 WL 1662515 (5th Cir. July 27, 2004); Estep v. Dallas County, 310 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2002); Bennett v. Grand Prairie, 883 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1989).
The Court notes that Plaintiff's arguments in her Response are also not on point. The issue is whether Plaintiff's allegations state a claim as to Defendant Sterrett, not as to the officers making the arrest; therefore, Defendants and Plaintiff did not need to argue whether the officers making the arrest had probable cause. It is clear that the Complaint states a cause of action against the arresting officers for illegal search and seizure and for false arrest.
As to Plaintiff's free speech claim, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has made no allegations "which would remotely relate to any claim for deprivation of free speech, retaliation, or any other First Amendment claim." (Defs.' Br. at 10.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff's only argument with respect to this claim is that she should be free to rebuff Sterrett's sexual advances. The Court concludes that this does not state a claim pursuant to the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's free speech claim.
As to Plaintiff's due process claim, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims arise under the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures rather than the due process clauses of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. The Court agrees that pretrial detainees' claims of unreasonable seizure arise under the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Except as noted directly below, however, Defendant does not address any other claims Plaintiff may be raising under due process, and the Court, accordingly, DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff's potential due process claims.
Defendants also address Plaintiff's claims for medical inattention brought pursuant to due process guaranteed in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and argue that she has failed to plead causation or damages. Plaintiff must allege that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious medical harm and that injuries resulted. See Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff argues that she alleges that she suffered "great emotional trauma, discomfort, and embarrassment, among other damages." (Pl.'s Br. at 18.) After reviewing the Complaint and Plaintiff's Rule 7(a) Reply, however, the Court concludes that Plaintiff does not allege that the trauma, discomfort, or embarrassment were caused by Defendants' deliberate inattention to her "rh factor" condition. The Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for medical inattention.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under equal protection because she does not identify herself as a member of a protected class and fails to allege disparate treatment motivated by such membership. Plaintiff argues that her right to rebuff Sterrett's sexual advances and her right to not be naked and not be forced to dress in front of male officers states a claim under equal protection. (Pl.'s Br. at 21.) The Court concludes that Plaintiff does not state a claim pursuant to equal protection and GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's equal protection claim.
Plaintiff's entire argument is, "Such actions violate her right to equal protection," with no further explanation. (Pl.'s Br. at 21.)
Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not state a claim for municipal liability. A municipality will not be liable pursuant to § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior alone. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Municipal liability requires that the alleged unconstitutional action be the result of municipal policy. See id. at 690-91.
Municipal policy for purposes of section 1983 liability may consist of 1. a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or 2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials, or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.DETRNTTF, ___ F.3d ___, 2004 WL 1662515 (quoting Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992)). In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges merely that the City of Terrell has "a policy, custom, practice and/or usage." (Compl. at 8-9.) Plaintiff argues in her Response that she believes this is sufficient to state a claim. (Pl.'s Br. at 23.) The Court disagrees. Plaintiff also states in her Response that she will be amending her Complaint to further specify her claims against the City. ( Id.) The Court, therefore, DENIES as moot Defendants' motion to dismiss the City of Terrell. Plaintiff may file an amended Complaint no later than noon, August 30, 2004, repleading her claims against the City of Terrell. Failure to file an amended Complaint adequately pleadings claims against the City of Terrell could result in the Court dismissing all claims against the City of Terrell.
IV. MOTION FOR RULE 7(a) REPLY
In their Reply, Defendants also move alternatively for a Rule 7(a) Reply or a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e). The Court previously granted Defendants' motion for a Rule 7(a) Reply, see Order, entered May 4, 2004, and Plaintiff filed such Reply on June 1, 2004. In the instant case, the Court concludes that a Rule 7(a) Reply would not assist the parties or the Court at this stage in the litigation. As discussed, the Court has concluded that the Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to overcome parts of Defendants' motion to dismiss or has agreed to replead certain claims. Additionally, the parties should be currently engaged in discovery on the issue of qualified immunity and Defendant Michael Sterrett's motion for summary judgment is currently pending. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion for a Rule 7(a) Reply or more definite statement.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's free speech and medical inattention claims. Plaintiff's free speech and medical inattention claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the City of Terrell is DENIED as moot and Plaintiff may file an amended Complaint no later than noon, August 30, 2004, if she wants to replead her claims against the City of Terrell. Failure to replead could result in the Court dismissing all claims against the City of Terrell. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to all other claims.
Defendants' Motion for Rule 7(a) Reply or for a More Definite Statement is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.