Opinion
3:22-cv-00697-SB
10-03-2022
DAMIAN EARLEY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; PIONEER HUMAN SERVICES, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Damian Earley (“Earley”) filed this action against the United States Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and Pioneer Human Services (“Pioneer”), alleging state law negligence claims. Pioneer moves to dismiss Earley's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), but not all parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636. For the reasons explained below, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Pioneer's motion to dismiss.
The BOP has also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court should dismiss Earley's negligence claim against the BOP for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the BOP has not issued a final decision on Earley's administrative claim and thus Earley has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act. (BOP's Mot. Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. at 1-7, ECF No. 22.)
BACKGROUND
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In reviewing a . . . motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, ‘[courts] take as true all uncontroverted allegations in the complaint and resolve all genuine disputes in the plaintiff's favor.'” LNS Enters. LLC v. Cont'l Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Glob. Commodities Trading Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio de Arroz Choloma, S.A., 972 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2020)). Courts, however, “cannot ‘assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are contradicted by affidavit.'” Id. (quoting Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs.,Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977)). When the defendant and plaintiff “submit affidavits, then ‘[c]onflicts between the parties over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor.'” Id. (quoting Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008)).
The record before the Court includes: (1) Earley's complaint (Compl. at 1-4); (2) a declaration from Pioneer's chief executive officer, Anthony Wright (“Wright”), in support of Pioneer's motion to dismiss Earley's complaint (Decl. Anthony Wright Supp. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss (“Wright Decl.”) at 1-3, ECF No. 13-1); and (3) a declaration from Earley in support of his response to Pioneer's motion to dismiss (Decl. Damian Earley (“Earley Decl.”) at 1-2, ECF No. 17). Wright's declaration does not contravene Earley's allegations against Pioneer in the complaint, and the only conflict between the statements in Wright's and Earley's declarations is whether Pioneer had contact with the Federal Correctional Institution in Sheridan, Oregon (“FCI Sheridan”) about Earley's transfer (which Earley alleges based on his understanding and belief), or whether the only contact between Pioneer and FCI Sheridan was through the BOP (which Wright asserts based on his experience as Pioneer's interim chief executive officer). (Compare Wright Decl. at 1-3, with Compl. at 1-4, and Earley Decl. at 1-2.)
II. JURISDICTIONAL FACTS
This case stems from meniscus and anterior cruciate ligament (“ACL”) tears that Earley suffered in November 2019, when he was in custody at FCI Sheridan. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-5, 7.) The BOP manages FCI Sheridan and, at relevant times, was a party to a contract with Pioneer. (See id. ¶¶ 2-3; Wright Decl. ¶¶ 4-5).
“The [BOP], under the direction of the Attorney General, . . . [is] charg[ed] [with] the management and regulation of all [f]ederal penal and correctional institutions.” 18 U.S.C. § 4042.
Pioneer is a “nonprofit social enterprise” that operates fifty Washington-based programs, all of which are focused on Pioneer's “top priority” and “goal” of “eliminating housing discrimination.” (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) Pioneer's programs include residential reentry facilities in Spokane, Tacoma, and Seattle, Washington. (Id. ¶ 3.) Pursuant to the BOP's contract with Pioneer, the BOP may transfer individuals from federal correctional institutions like FCI Sheridan to one of Pioneer's residential reentry facilities if (1) the individual has a “release residence” (i.e., the individual's “home or the home of a family member or friend who the [individual] can stay with”) near the reentry facility, or (2) law enforcement apprehended the individual “in the area” and the individual has no release residence. (Id. ¶ 4.)
Unlike the BOP, Pioneer does not have a contract with FCI Sheridan. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) Nor does Pioneer operate or market any programs in Oregon, “hold itself out as supporting Oregon communities or individuals,” or have “direct contact with any agency, business, or individuals in Oregon.” (Id. ¶ 3.)
In April 2020, about five months after Earley tore his meniscus and ACL, the BOP transferred Earley from FCI Sheridan to one of Pioneer's reentry facilities in Spokane, Washington, because Earley's release residence was located nearby in Sandpoint, Idaho. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3; Earley Decl. ¶ 1; Wright Decl. ¶ 5.) Pioneer did not initiate Earley's transfer from FCI Sheridan, but it is Earley's “understanding and belief that Pioneer . . . was in contact with [FCI] Sheridan to arrange for [his] transfer[,] including [the] transfer of [his] medical records.” (Earley Decl. ¶ 3; Wright Decl. ¶ 5.) Notably, however, it is undisputed that Pioneer “was not responsible for [Earley's] wellbeing prior to his arrival at their facility in Washington.” (Id.)
In June 2020, two months after his transfer from FCI Sheridan, Earley submitted a request form to Pioneer's staff complaining that “he needed urgent medical treatment related to the knee injury he suffered more than six months prior,” and that “he still had not yet received an evaluation from an orthopedic surgeon.” (Compl. ¶ 4.) Earley underwent knee surgery about two and a half months later, in August 2020, at a hospital in Spokane near Pioneer's reentry facility. (Id. ¶ 5.)
In his complaint, Earley asserts negligence claims against Pioneer and the BOP related to the “delayed care and treatment” of his meniscus and ACL tears. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 6-7, 9.) Earley alleges that Pioneer was negligent in “failing to obtain a timely exchange of [his] historic medical records following a referral . . . to an orthopedic surgeon,” which “caused [him to suffer] permanent injuries[,] including ongoing weakness and stiffness in his left knee due to the prolonged period when he lacked full functionality, strength and flexibility of his left knee.” (Id. ¶ 7.)
DISCUSSION
Pioneer argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it, and therefore moves to dismiss Earley's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(2). (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss (“Def.'s Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 13.) Earley responds that Pioneer has sufficient contacts with the State of Oregon to be subject to personal jurisdiction, but also requests that the Court grant jurisdictional discovery. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.'s Resp.”) at 1-4, ECF No. 16.)
I. PIONEER'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Pioneer's motion to dismiss is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing. As a result, Earley bears the burden of making only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts. See Glob. Commodities, 972 F.3d at 1106 (“[W]here, as here, the motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.”) (citation omitted); LNS Enters. LLC, 22 F.4th at 862 (“If the court determines that it will receive only affidavits[,] . . . a plaintiff bears the burden of making only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts[.]”) (simplified). As explained below, because Earley fails to meet his burden to establish that Pioneer has sufficient minimum contacts with Oregon to subject it to jurisdiction in this forum, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Pioneer's motion.
A. Applicable Law
“An exercise of personal jurisdiction in federal court must comport with both the applicable state's long-arm statute and the federal Due Process Clause.” Burri Law PA v. Skurla, 35 F.4th 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 140405 (9th Cir. 1994)). Oregon's long-arm statute “authorizes personal jurisdiction over defendants to the full extent permitted by the United States Constitution.” Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing OR. R. CIV. P. 4(L)). Accordingly, the Court must inquire whether its exercise of jurisdiction over Pioneer would comport with the limits imposed by federal due process. See id. (“We therefore inquire whether the District of Oregon's exercise of jurisdiction over [the defendant] comports with the limits imposed by federal due process.”) (simplified).
“Federal due process permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if that defendant has ‘at least minimum contacts with the relevant forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'” Glob. Commodities, 972 F.3d at 1106 (quoting Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004)). The Ninth Circuit uses a three-prong “test to analyze ‘whether a [defendant's] minimum contacts meet the due process standard for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction[.]'” LNS Enters., 22 F.4th at 859 (quoting In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 741-42 (9th Cir. 2013)); Glob. Commodities, 972 F.3d at 1107 (“We use a three-prong test for analyzing claims of specific jurisdiction.”); see also Freestream Aircraft (Berm.) Ltd. v. Aero Law Grp., 905 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the three-prong inquiry is “commonly referred to as the minimum contacts test”).
Although there are two bases for personal jurisdiction (i.e., specific and general jurisdiction), the Court need engage only in a specific jurisdiction analysis here because Earley does not assert that Pioneer is subject to general jurisdiction in Oregon. Cf. Burri, 35 F.4th at 1213 n.4 (“Personal jurisdiction may be specific or general.... [The plaintiff] does not contend that the [d]efendants are subject to general personal jurisdiction in [the forum state], so we do not address the analytical framework applicable to general personal jurisdiction cases.”).
“First, ‘[t]he non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.'” Glob. Commodities, 972 F.3d at 1106 (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802). Second, the plaintiff's “claim must arise out of or relate to the defendant's forum-related activities.” id. (citing Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802). Third, the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant must be reasonable. id.
“All three prongs must be satisfied [for a court] to assert personal jurisdiction[.]” LNS Enters., 22 F.4th at 859. “If the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the defendant to present a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Glob. Commodities, 972 F.3d at 1107 (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802).
B. Analysis
Earley fails to meet his burden of satisfying the first prong of the minimum contacts test. As a result, the Court need not address whether Earley's lawsuit arises out of Pioneer's forum-related activities, or whether the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Pioneer would be reasonable. See, e.g., Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1213 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Because Picot has failed to establish that Weston purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in California, we need not address whether the suit arises out of Weston's forum-related activities, or whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable.”).
Earley asserts a tort claim (negligence) against Pioneer based on its allegedly delayed care and treatment of his ACL and meniscus tears while Earley was a resident of Pioneer's reentry facility in Spokane, Washington. (Compl. at 1-3.) Where, as here, the case sounds in tort and involves a tort committed outside the forum state, the first prong is satisfied if the defendant purposefully directed activities toward the forum state. See Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530, 537 (9th Cir. 1997) (“There is no doubt that the first claim, alleging negligence, is a tort claim.”); Burri, 35 F.4th at 1212 (explaining that “[f]or cases sounding in tort,” the first prong is met if “the defendant purposefully directs activities toward the forum state”) (citation omitted); Freestream, 905 F.3d at 603-06 (taking the “opportunity to clarify [circuit] case law,” and explaining a “purposeful direction analysis naturally applies in suits sounding in tort where the tort was committed outside the forum state”) (citation omitted); see also Strayer v. Idaho State Patrol, No. 21-35247, 2022 WL 685422, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2022) (“‘For claims sounding in tort' where the alleged conduct took place outside the forum state, . . . the Ninth Circuit ‘appl[ies] a purposeful direction test[.]'” (quoting Freestream, 905 F.3d at 603-05)).
“The Calder effects test governs [the] inquiry into whether a defendant has purposefully directed activities toward a forum state.” Burri, 35 F.4th at 1213 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984)). Under the Calder effects test, “if a defendant: (1) commits an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, that (3) causes harm the defendant knew was likely to be suffered in the forum state, then the defendant has purposefully directed conduct at the forum state.” id. (citing Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int'l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2017), Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002), and Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89). As explained below, the Court concludes that Earley cannot satisfy the Calder effects test.
Earley alleges that Pioneer negligently delayed the care and treatment of his ACL and meniscus tears while he was a resident of Pioneer's reentry facility in Washington, which he attributes to Pioneer's failure timely to obtain his medical records from FCI Sheridan. (Compl. at 1-3.) It is Earley's “understanding and belief” that Pioneer was “in contact” with FCI Sheridan to “arrange for [Earley's] transfer[,] including [the] transfer of [his] medical records.” (Wright Decl. ¶¶ 1-5; Earley Decl. ¶ 3.) Earley is also aware of “other [individuals] at Pioneer who were transferred from Oregon.” (Id. ¶ 4.)
Even accepting all of Earley's assertions as true, he cannot satisfy the Calder effects test. With respect to the first two requirements, Earley has not demonstrated that Pioneer committed any intentional acts that were expressly aimed at Oregon. Earley's declaration assumes unspecified “contact” between Pioneer and FCI Sheridan in arranging his transfer, but he has not specifically alleged that Pioneer had direct contact with FCI Sheridan (as opposed to indirect contact via the BOP), nor that Pioneer initiated any contact with FCI Sheridan. (Cf. Wright Decl. ¶¶ 1-5, stating that Pioneer did not initiate Earley's transfer, has “no direct contact with any agency, business, or individuals in Oregon,” and only has a contract with the BOP, not FCI Sheridan.) In addition, any past transfers of individuals from FCI Sheridan to a Pioneer facility in Washington pursuant to the BOP contract does not demonstrate Pioneer was engaged in any intentional acts expressly aimed at Oregon.
Further, it is undisputed that Pioneer “was not responsible for [Earley's] wellbeing prior to his arrival at their facility in Washington,” and that Pioneer only operates programs in Washington and does not market any programs in Oregon or “hold itself out as supporting Oregon communities or individuals.” (Compl. at 1-3; Earley Decl. ¶¶ 1-4; Wright Decl. ¶¶ 1-5.) Even assuming all of Earley's factual allegations are true, he has not demonstrated that Pioneer committed any intentional acts expressly aimed at Oregon. See, e.g., Strayer, 2022 WL 685422, at *1 (applying the purposeful direction test and explaining that even if the Washington-based defendants committed intentional acts, “[p]laintiffs alleged no facts suggesting that those acts were ‘expressly aimed' at Idaho” (quoting Picot, 780 F.3d at 1214)).
More fundamentally, as Earley's counsel conceded at oral argument, Earley cannot satisfy the third requirement of the Calder effects test because he cannot demonstrate that Pioneer caused any harm it knew Earley was likely to suffer in Oregon. See Burri, 35 F.4th at 1213 (discussing three prongs of Calder test). On the contrary, Earley alleges that Pioneer committed negligence in Washington that caused Earley to suffer harm in Washington (or perhaps Idaho), not Oregon. (See Compl. at 3, alleging pain and suffering during and/or after Earley's stay at Pioneer's facility in Washington, and “permanent” and “ongoing” injuries, such as weakness and stiffness, due to Pioneer's role in delaying care and treatment.) Thus, Earley's theory of negligence liability here will defeat any attempt to satisfy the Calder effects test.
For these reasons, Earley has failed to make a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction over Pioneer. The Court therefore recommends that the district judge grant Pioneer's motion to dismiss.
II. JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY
Earley asks the Court to allow jurisdictional discovery, arguing that “[j]urisdictional discovery would show how frequently [Pioneer] receives [A]ICs from Oregon.” (Pl.'s Resp. at 3.)
“Jurisdictional discovery ‘should ordinarily be granted where pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.'” LNS Enters. LLC, 22 F.4th at 864 (quoting Laub v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003)). However, “a mere ‘hunch that [discovery] might yield jurisdictionally relevant facts,' or ‘bare allegations in the face of specific denials,' are insufficient reasons for a court to grant jurisdictional discovery.” id. at 864-65 (quoting Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1020 and Terracom v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 562 (9th Cir. 1995)).
For the reasons discussed above, jurisdictional discovery is not warranted here. No discovery will enable Earley to demonstrate that Pioneer caused harm it knew Earley was likely to suffer in Oregon where Earley's negligence claim is based on allegations that Pioneer engaged in tortious conduct outside Oregon that caused Earley harm outside Oregon. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the district judge deny Earley's request for jurisdictional discovery.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court recommends that the district judge GRANT Pioneer's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13), DENY Earley's request for jurisdictional discovery, and DISMISS Earley's negligence claim against Pioneer without prejudice to refiling the claim in another jurisdiction.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendation to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen (14) days. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen (14) days. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.