Acting Justice KITTREDGE: We granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion in Eagle Container Co. v. County ofNewberry, 366 S.C. 611, 622 S.E.2d 733 (Ct.App. 2005). We are called upon to construe the effect of an amendment to the Newberry County Zoning Ordinance. The Newberry County Council amended the county zoning ordinance on December 11, 2002 by adding a single word — "landfill" — to a list of uses that may be allowed in what is classified as R-2 Rural District. It is undisputed that prior' to the amendment, a landfill was permitted in R-2 districts only as a "special exception.
David v. McLeod Reg'l Med. Ctr., 367 S.C. 242, 247, 626 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006); Miller v. Blumenthal Mills,Inc., 365 S.C. 204, 219, 616 S.E.2d 722, 729 (Ct.App. 2005). In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Law v. S.C.Dep't of Corrections, 368 S.C. 424, 434, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006); Eagle Container Co., LLC v. County ofNewberry, 366 S.C. 611, 620, 622 S.E.2d 733, 737 (Ct.App. 2005). If triable issues exist, those issues must go the jury.
David v. McLeod Reg'l Med. Ctr., 367 S.C. 242, 247, 626 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006); Miller v. Blumenthal Mills, Inc., 365 S.C. 204, 219, 616 S.E.2d 722, 729 (Ct.App. 2005). In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Law v. S.C.Dep't of Corrections, 368 S.C. 424, 434, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006); Eagle Container Co., LLC v. County ofNewberry, 366 S.C. 611, 620, 622 S.E.2d 733, 737 (Ct.App. 2005). If triable issues exist, those issues must go the jury.
See Eagle Container Co., LLC v. County of Newberry, 366 S.C. 611, 634, 622 S.E.2d 733, 745 (Ct. App. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 379 S.C. 564, 666 S.E.2d 892 (2008). Accordingly, we find this question is not yet ripe for review.
In some cases, legislative history may be probative in determining the legislature's intent. Eagle Container Co. v. Cnty. of Newberry, 366 S.C. 611, 630, 622 S.E.2d 733, 743 (Ct.App.2005), rev'd on other grounds,379 S.C. 564, 666 S.E.2d 892 (2008). Any mortgage or other instrument conveying an interest in or creating a lien on any real estate, securing existing indebtedness or future advances to be made, regardless of whether the advances are to be made at the option of the lender, are valid from the day and hour when recorded so as to affect the rights of subsequent creditors, whether lien creditors or simple contract creditors, or purchasers for valuable consideration without notice to the same extent as if the advances were made as of the date of the execution of the mortgage or other instrument for the total amount of advances made thereunder, together with all other indebtedness and sums secured thereby, the total amount of existing indebtedness and future advances outstanding at any one time may not exceed the maximum principal amount stated therein, plus interest thereon, attorney's fees and court costs.
In some cases, legislative history may be probative in determining the legislature's intent. Eagle Container Co. v. Cnty. of Newberry, 366 S.C. 611, 630, 622 S.E.2d 733, 743 (Ct. App. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 379 S.C. 564, 666 S.E.2d 892 (2008). Any mortgage or other instrument conveying an interest in or creating a lien on any real estate, securing existing indebtedness or future advances to be made, regardless of whether the advances are to be made at the option of the lender, are valid from the day and hour when recorded so as to affect the rights of subsequent creditors, whether lien creditors or simple contract creditors, or purchasers for valuable consideration without notice to the same extent as if the advances were made as of the date of the execution of the mortgage or other instrument for the total amount of advances made thereunder, together with all other indebtedness and sums secured thereby, the total amount of existing indebtedness and future advances outstanding at any one time may not exceed the maximum principal amount stated therein, plus interest thereon, attorney's fees and court costs.
In some cases, legislative history may be probative in determining the legislature's intent. Eagle Container Co. v. Cnty. of Newberry, 366 S.C. 611, 630, 622 S.E.2d 733, 743 (Ct.App.2005), rev'd on other grounds, 379 S.C. 564, 666 S.E.2d 892 (2008). The circuit court erred in affirming the magistrate's court's ruling that the ten-year statute of limitations applies.
Peake, 375 S.C. at 597, 654 S.E.2d at 289 (citing Wade v. Berkeley County, 348 S.C. 224, 229, 559 S.E.2d 586, 588 (2002); Eagle Container Co., L.L.C.v. County of Newberry, 366 S.C. 611, 622, 622 S.E.2d 733, 738 (Ct.App. 2005)). The legislative intent should be derived primarily from the plain language of the statute.
"In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, [an appellate court] applies the same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56, SCRCP: summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Pittman v.Grand Strand Entm't, Inc., 363 S.C. 531, 536, 611 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2005); Young v. South Carolina Dep't ofDisabilities Special Needs, 374 S.C. 360, 649 S.E.2d 488 (2007); Henderson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 373 S.C. 179, 644 S.E.2d 724 (2007); Eagle Container Co., LLC v.County of Newberry, 366 S.C. 611, 622 S.E.2d 733 (Ct.App. 2005); B B Liquors, Inc. v. O'Neil, 361 S.C. 267, 603 S.E.2d 629 (Ct.App. 2004). In determining whether any triable issue of fact exists, the evidence and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Joiner v.Rivas, 342 S.C. 102, 108, 536 S.E.2d 372, 375 (2000); Shealy v. Doe, 370 S.C. 194, 199, 634 S.E.2d 45, 48 (Ct.App. 2006); City of Camden v. Brassell, 326 S.C. 556, 560, 486 S.E.2d 492, 494 (Ct.App. 1997). The first inquiry is whether the statute's meaning is clear on its face. Wadev. Berkeley County, 348 S.C. 224, 229, 559 S.E.2d 586, 588 (2002); Eagle Container Co., L.L.C v. County ofNewberry, 366 S.C. 611, 622, 622 S.E.2d 733, 738 (Ct.App. 2005). With any question regarding statutory construction and application, the court must always look to legislative intent as determined from the plain language of the statute.