Opinion
NO. 03-17-00572-CV
12-01-2017
E. W. and A. M. R., Appellants v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 146TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 280,033-B, HONORABLE JACK WELDON JONES, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants E.W. ("Eli") and A.M.R. ("Amber") appeal from the trial court's order terminating their parental rights regarding the children A.W. ("Alice") and B.W. ("Brittany"). Each appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of his or her parental rights. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the trial court's order.
To preserve the parties' privacy and for convenience, we refer to the children, their parents, and other family members by fictitious names. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.
BACKGROUND
Eli is the father of both children, Amber is Brittany's mother, and Alice's mother is T.M. ("Tanya"). The Department of Family and Protective Services (Department) filed its Original Petition in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship seeking termination of appellants' parental rights on September 10, 2015. The petition concerned all parental rights for both children, but Tanya was later nonsuited because her parental rights had been terminated when Alice was six weeks old. On the same day the petition was filed, the trial court entered an emergency order for the protection of Alice and Brittany, then ages 13 and 4, respectively, naming the Department as temporary managing conservator of both children. Petitions in intervention were subsequently filed by Alice's maternal grandmother P.F. ("Patty") and Brittany's maternal grandparents R.A. ("Rachel") and J.A. ("John").
According to an affidavit filed with the petition, the Department's involvement began in December 2014, upon receipt of a report of neglectful supervision of Brittany by both parents. At that time, Alice was living with her paternal aunt due to conflict with Amber. Amber tested positive for marihuana in January of 2015 and for methamphetamine and marihuana in February of 2015. On February 10, 2015, Brittany was voluntarily placed out of the home with her maternal grandparents. One month later, Eli and Amber participated in a family team meeting with the Department, in which Amber disclosed that she had a diagnosis of bipolar disorder that she was self-medicating with illicit drugs. Both parents admitted that there was ongoing violence in the home and that Amber was the aggressor. Alice returned to the home that spring and in an interview with the Department, she confirmed that Amber and Eli "fought with their hands" and that she had seen Amber push Eli on occasion. On May 1, 2015, the Department received a second report of neglectful supervision, this time of Alice by Eli. Throughout May and June, a Department investigator reported that she attempted to communicate with Eli but found him uncooperative and evasive. On June 30, 2015, Eli tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine. The court subsequently ordered him to perform certain services with the Department, which he did not do.
At the initial show-cause hearing on October 6, 2015, the associate judge found that parental possession was not in the best interest of the children and ordered that Alice be placed with her maternal grandmother and that Brittany be placed with her maternal grandparents. He also ordered Eli and Amber to undergo weekly drug tests. A joint family service plan was prepared for Amber and Eli, which included recommendations that both parents: participate in individual and family counseling; complete a psychological evaluation; participate in supervised visits with the children; submit to drug and alcohol evaluations and weekly random drug testing; not use any illegal drugs; not participate in any criminal activities; pay child support; maintain a safe, clean and appropriate home; maintain employment; provide the Department with the children's birth certificates and social security cards; attend all court hearings for the case; complete a mental health assessment; and release medical records with a drug treatment facility. These recommendations were later adopted by the court and incorporated into a court order, with the modification that visitation with the children was prohibited until each parent completed in-patient drug rehabilitation.
The Department filed a status report with the court stating that Eli had tested positive for methamphetamine and marihuana on October 9 and 28, 2015. It also reported that Amber had tested positive for methamphetamine on October 6, 2015. Neither Eli nor Amber appeared at a November 17, 2015 status-review hearing.
The court held a permanency hearing on March 1, 2016. The permanency report indicated that Amber had completed a psychological evaluation, participated in individual counseling, submitted to an alcohol and drug evaluation, and maintained employment, but she had not completed any of the other court-ordered services, including weekly drug testing. It further indicated that Eli had completed a psychological evaluation, reported taking an Outreach, Screening, Assessment, and Referral assessment, and was employed, but he had not completed any of the other court-ordered services, including weekly drug testing. The associate judge ordered that the parents would be permitted visitation with Brittany upon the recommendation of the child's therapist.
On the same day as the permanency hearing, Amber tested negative for illegal substances. On March 8, 2016, Amber and Eli each tested positive for marihuana. On March 11, 2016, Amber tested positive for methamphetamine and marihuana. A temporary hearing was held on March 15, 2016, and the visitation terms were modified to require that visits take place in a supervised therapeutic setting. Temporary orders were entered that enjoined Eli from contacting any of the other parties of the suit except Amber and from interfering with any of the other parties' possession of the children.
The Department submitted a final report and counseling summaries for both parents in preparation for the final hearing before the associate judge. The report recommended termination of both parents' parental rights as to Brittany, and termination of Eli's parental rights as to Alice. The final hearing concluded on September 6, 2016, when the associate judge terminated both Amber's and Eli's parental rights on the same grounds, finding that termination was in the best interest of the children and that the parents: • knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the children; • engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children; and • failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the children who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the children's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the children; See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2). Each parent filed a timely request for a de novo trial. See id. § 201.015.
The de novo trial was held in four settings over the course of nine months, from September 27, 2016 through July 17, 2017. All parties testified. Evidence in the record will be discussed as pertinent below. The trial court ultimately found the associate judge's orders to be in the best interest of the children. It terminated Eli's parent-child relationship with Alice and appointed Tanya as permanent managing conservator. It also terminated the parental rights of both Eli and Amber with respect to Brittany and appointed the child's maternal grandparents as permanent managing conservators. Eli and Amber each timely perfected appeals to this court.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Eli asserts that the Department failed to present legally and factually sufficient evidence to show that Eli had met any of the statutory grounds for termination under the Texas Family Code. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). Amber contends the Department failed to present legally and factually sufficient evidence that termination of her parental rights was in Brittany's best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
Standard of Review
To terminate the parent-child relationship, the Family Code requires the factfinder to find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parent has engaged in conduct set out as statutory grounds for termination and (2) termination is in the child's best interest. Id. § 161.001(b)(1), (2); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. 2002). In a legal-sufficiency review, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, assuming that all disputed facts were resolved in favor of its finding if a reasonable person could do so, but disregarding disputed evidence that a reasonable person could have disbelieved. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We will conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient only if a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that both elements of Section 161.001 were met. See id. In a factual-sufficiency review, we review all of the evidence in a neutral light and give "due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing." Id. We may conclude that the evidence is factually insufficient only if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence disfavoring the finding is so significant that the court could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the Department's allegations. Id.
Sufficiency of the evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termination
In his only issue, Eli contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he committed actions corresponding to any of the statutory grounds for termination. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1). The trial court found Eli's conduct met the grounds set out in Subsections D, E, and O. See id. Only one ground under Section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment terminating parental rights. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); Spurck v. Texas Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 396 S.W.3d 205, 221 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.). Accordingly, we address Subsection E first. We will also address Subsections D and O in less detail.
Subsection E requires that the parent "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional wellbeing of the child." Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E). It requires proof of child endangerment, such as exposing a child to loss or injury or jeopardizing a child's emotional or physical well-being. Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). Endangerment does not need to be established independently but may be inferred from parental misconduct alone. Id. To constitute endangerment under Subsection E, the parent's conduct need not be directed at the child. Id.; see In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012).
The parent's actions and inactions, including evidence of drug usage, may be relevant when determining whether a parent has engaged in an endangering course of conduct. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). A finding that a parent has chosen to "engage in illegal drug use during the pendency of a termination suit, when the parent is at risk of losing a child, may support a finding that the parent engaged in conduct that endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being." D.G. v. Texas Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-17-00366-CV, 2017 WL 4899550, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 26, 2017, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 265 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.)); see In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.).
Here, the Department presented undisputed evidence that Eli had a history of drug use. As documented in his psychological evaluation, Eli self-reported starting to use methamphetamine at age 17 and using it as recently as one month before the date of the evaluation (November 18, 2015). He further self-reported first using marihuana at age 18, with continued use through the date of the evaluation. More importantly, the Department also presented evidence that Eli tested positive for marihuana and methamphetamine multiple times during the pendency of this case. Although Eli also had some negative tests, he missed many of his scheduled, court-ordered tests. In addition, at two of the four settings of the de novo trial—on September 27 and October 14, 2016—Eli admitted that he had used methamphetamine since the start of the case. He testified on September 27 that he had used marihuana since the start of the case but denied such use on October 14. On July 17, 2017, Amber testified that she and Eli had used marihuana within the preceding few months. The record thus reveals a long-term ongoing pattern of illegal drug use that did not cease during the pendency of the lawsuit, when Eli was at risk of losing his children. See D.G., 2017 WL 4899550, at *2.
Eli argues that the Department presented no evidence that Eli's use of illegal drugs exposed the children to loss or injury or jeopardized their emotional or physical health. He contends that the evidence actually preponderates against such a finding, pointing specifically to the following: • Eli testified at trial that he had passed all of his drug tests or that he could not remember the last date he used. • Eli's mother testified that to her knowledge her son never owned or operated a "meth lab" and that she had never seen any evidence of Eli using methamphetamine. • Eli testified that he observed a sample of his hair become contaminated and asserted that it could have caused a false positive on one of his drug tests. Eli further argues that no evidence was offered by any expert that illegal drug use was harmful or caused damage to either child. However, "endangering conduct is not limited to actions directed towards the child." In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533); see In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803. The Department is not required to show that a parent's illegal drug use was harmful or caused damage to a child. Conduct may endanger a child even if it does not cause the child to suffer actual injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 269.
Moreover, the record shows that upon removal, a Department caregiver reported multiple health issues for Alice, including "delinquent immunizations, severe dermatitis infection, extremely overweight, constipation, cavities, needs braces, athletes [sic] foot." Further, after the removal, Alice carved "Fuck you, Dad" into her arm, and she was temporarily committed to a mental hospital. Eli testified that Alice was not aware of his methamphetamine usage, so that could not have caused her to mutilate herself, and that she had never cut herself while living with him. However, Tanya, Alice's biological mother, testified that Alice was aware of Eli's drug use. The record also shows that after Brittany was removed from the home, Eli drank beer and took naps during some of the visits he and Amber had with Brittany. The Department's final report indicated that Brittany's therapist recommended transfer to a female therapist "due to trauma she experience [sic] while residing with her parents." The trial court could reasonably have determined based on this evidence that Eli's behavior was harmful and caused damage to the children.
Reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the termination findings, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Eli's drug use endangered the children. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Therefore, the evidence supporting the termination findings under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) is legally sufficient. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We further determine that the disputed evidence disfavoring the termination findings under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) is not so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of these findings, and therefore, the evidence is factually sufficient. See id. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the termination of Eli's parental rights under Subsection E.
Although the above conclusion suffices to support affirming the trial court's judgment, we note that evidence similarly supports the trial court's findings under Subsections D and O as well. Similar to E, Subsection D requires proof of endangerment, specifically that the parent "knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child." Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Although Subsection D focuses on the environment as the source of endangerment, parental conduct is relevant to the child's environment. Hanselman v. Texas Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-09-00485-CV, 2010 WL 5019549, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 9, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 83 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied)). "Domestic violence, lack of self control, and a propensity for violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment." Id. (citing In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)). Moreover, where a parent's conduct causes uncertainty and instability in a child's life, that conduct endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child. Id.
Eli argues that evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding under Subsection D because he testified that he had never threatened anyone involved with the case, the Department caseworker testified that she had not had a physical altercation with Eli, and Brittany's stepgrandfather, John, testified that he had never called the police because of Eli's behavior. However, at trial, multiple witnesses testified that Eli had threatened them and that those threats were the reason for the earlier order enjoining Eli from contacting the other parties. In addition, under Subsection D, the parent need not have certain knowledge that an actual injury is occurring; he must have been aware of the potential for danger to the child in such an environment and have disregarded that risk. Id. (citing In re C.L.C., 119 S.W.3d 382, 392 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.)). Eli and Amber both testified to a history of domestic violence, in which Amber was generally the aggressor. Amber's mother, Rachel, testified that prior to removal, the couple occasionally called upon her to "rescue" Brittany during Amber's violent episodes, apparently recognizing the danger inherent in such situations but repeatedly disregarding that risk by returning Brittany to the home where they occurred. After reviewing this evidence within the context of the entire record, we conclude that the evidence is also legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's termination findings under Subsection D.
Lastly, Subsection O requires a finding that the parent "failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the child's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child." Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O). Eli does not contest that he failed to comply with the provisions of a court order. Instead he contends that the evidence does not show that the children were removed from Eli due to abusive or neglectful conduct committed by Eli. However, "'abuse or neglect of the child' necessarily includes the risks or threats of the environment in which the child is placed. . . . If a parent has neglected, sexually abused, or otherwise endangered her child's physical health or safety, such that initial and continued removal are appropriate, the child has been 'remov[ed] from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child.'" In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 248 (Tex. 2013) (citing Tex. Fam. Code §§ 161.001(b)(1)(O), 262.101, .102, .104, .107, .201). The evidence of endangerment examined above with respect to Subsections D and E therefore also supports the trial court's finding that the children were removed because of Eli's neglectful conduct. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's termination findings under Section 161.001(1)(O). Having concluded that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's termination finding under three statutory grounds, we overrule Eli's sole issue.
Sufficiency of the evidence supporting the best-interest determination
Amber asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's determination that terminating her parental rights is in Brittany's best interest. In a parental-rights-termination case, the best interest of the children is assessed using a non-exhaustive list of factors. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). These factors include (1) the children's wishes, (2) their emotional and physical needs now and in the future, (3) emotional or physical danger to the children now and in the future, (4) the parenting abilities of the parties seeking custody, (5) programs available to help those parties, (6) plans for the children by the parties seeking custody, (7) the stability of the proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not proper, and (9) any excuses for the acts or omissions of the parent. See id. at 372. The Department need not prove all nine Holley factors as a "condition precedent" to termination, and the absence of some factors does not preclude the factfinder from finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children's best interest, especially when there is undisputed evidence that the parental relationship endangered the child. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27.
Amber contends that consideration of the Holley factors can not reasonably lead to the conclusion that terminating Amber's parental rights was in Brittany's best interest. Specifically, she argues that the Department presented insufficient evidence regarding (2) Brittany's emotional and physical needs now and in the future, (3) emotional or physical danger to Brittany now and in the future, (4) Amber's parenting abilities, (6) Amber's plans for Brittany, and (7) the stability of the proposed placement.
Emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future
First, Amber argues that evidence shows that Amber can meet the emotional and physical needs of her child. Her argument is based on her own testimony that her visitations with Brittany were going well during the time in which the final trial setting was being held, that Brittany asked about her mother, and that Amber's visits with Brittany had become a positive experience by the end of the de novo trial. However, Amber's mother, Rachel, testified that Amber was unreliable in arriving to visits on time and that Brittany occasionally did not want to talk to Amber.
Furthermore, it is uncontested that Amber has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, for which she self-medicates with illegal drugs rather than seeking effective medical treatment. Amber testified at trial that the medications she had tried were not helpful and that she did not plan to pursue medical treatment in the future. She testified that she had benefitted from the individual counseling that she participated in and that she probably needed more time with a counselor, but she discontinued the sessions nonetheless. Rachel testified that she favored the termination of parental rights based in part on her concerns regarding Amber's untreated mental health issues, particularly "the amount of anger and the physical abuse." She stated she felt termination was necessary for Brittany's protection. These facts indicate that Amber may be unable to meet Brittany's emotional and physical needs by virtue of her untreated mental health and substance abuse issues.
Emotional and physical danger to child now and in the future
Second, Amber argues that the only relevant evidence presented—showing Amber's history of drug use and unaddressed mental issues—is insufficient to show she presents emotional and physical danger to Brittany.
Undisputed evidence in the record shows that Amber has a history of using illegal drugs, both marihuana and methamphetamine. The problem was identified early on in the Department's involvement. The family services plan includes the following statement: "Neither parent has the ability to parent or protect the children until they address their issues with illegal drugs." Similarly, Amber's psychological evaluation report stated that she "failed to demonstrate the basic skills necessary to provide proper parental care to her children when she decided to maintain an abusive relationship as well as engage in drug use," and the psychologist recommended alternative placement "to protect the children's well-being and safety." Despite Amber's acknowledgment that it was "probably not the right thing to do," she continued to use drugs throughout the pendency of the case, at least through the first part of 2017. Amber testified that she had been willing to attend inpatient rehabilitation but could not afford it, and that she did attend outpatient treatment for a few months but that transportation difficulties prevented her from completing the program. When asked at the October 14, 2016 setting how often she had used marihuana since the start of the case, Amber stated, "You don't even want me to go into that situation of marijuana, believe me." She failed to take a number of the drug tests required by the court. Although she testified at the January 27, 2017 trial setting that she was sober and had been for three months, six months later she testified that she had used both marihuana and methamphetimine since then. The trial court could reasonably have credited the evidence of Amber's historical and ongoing drug use as indicative of a current and ongoing source of emotional and physical danger to Brittany. See In re M.M.M., No. 01-16-00998-CV, 2017 WL 2645435, at *14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 16, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); J.R. v. Texas Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-15-00108-CV, 2015 WL 4603943, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin July 30, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Evidence also shows that Amber admits to being the aggressor in reported instances of domestic violence, including occurrences when the children were home. "[D]omestic violence may constitute endangerment, even if the violence is not directed at the child." D.N. v. Texas Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-15-00658-CV, 2016 WL 1407808, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 8, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); see In re A.A., No. 06-14-00060-CV, 2014 WL 5421027, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). As noted above, Amber's mother expressed concern for Brittany's safety in a home environment that included physical abuse. "Abusive or violent conduct can produce a home environment that endangers a child's well-being." In re G.M.G., 444 S.W.3d 46, 59 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d at 845). Thus, the trial court could have reasonably considered the domestic violence as evidence of endangerment. See In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d at 845.
Parental abilities
With respect to her parenting abilities, Amber contends that she attempted to take the required parenting classes but the Department made it impossible for her to do so. She also claims that the original reason for the removal of her child—Amber's drug use—had been "addressed" by the time of the final de novo trial. However, as discussed, evidence shows Amber's drug use continued throughout the de novo trial.
When the children were removed from the parents' custody, the Department implemented a service plan to help Amber and Eli improve their parenting. Included in the plan were parenting classes, individual counseling, and family counseling. However, Amber did not complete the service plan or utilize resources provided, citing transportation issues or work obligations as preventing her from meeting her service plan goals. Although she acknowledged she was aware the return of her child was conditioned on completion of the service plan, she still did not complete it. The court could reasonably have concluded this indicated a failure to prioritize Brittany and therefore was evidence of Amber's parenting abilities. See In re A.H., No. 04-15-00416-CV, 2015 WL 7565569, at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 25, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Plans for the children by the parties seeking custody and stability of the proposed placement
Amber argues that the Department presented insufficient evidence of a continuing risk to the child with respect to Amber's plans for Brittany. She contends that although some evidence was presented at trial that Amber lacked proper and stable housing for Brittany, Amber had only moved once during the pendency of the case, and there was no evidence that the travel trailer in which she lived was not proper for a child.
Regarding Amber's capacity to provide stable housing, the record shows that Amber paid $40 of the $1100 she was required to pay to Brittany's conservators in child support. She testified that instead of paying child support, all the money she and Eli earned they reinvested into their towing and auto repair business. Over the course of the de novo trial settings, she estimated a range of two hundred to one thousand dollars in monthly profit from their business. Soon after their children were removed, the couple were evicted from the home they had occupied with the children. Amber testified that since that time and throughout the de novo trial, she and Eli lived together in a travel trailer behind their shop. The record shows that on March 6, 2017, Amber was arrested at the shop for assault causing bodily injury. She testified she was defending herself against one of her employees, who was living on the same property at the time and whom Amber had caught stealing her laundry. Also, Eli testified that the couple has a pit bull with a history of non-injurious biting and that the dog bit the employee during the altercation, this time causing injury. The trial court could have reasonably concluded from this evidence that Amber was not able to offer Brittany sufficiently stable housing, in addition to the challenges to stability caused by her drug use, untreated mental illness, and domestic violence history. See In re M.M.M., 2017 WL 2645435, at *14 ("A parent's drug use is a condition indicative of instability in the home environment because it exposes a child to the possibility that the parent may be impaired or imprisoned.") (citing In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 579 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)).
The Department planned to place Brittany with her maternal grandparents, who testified that they would seek adoption. She was voluntarily placed there in February of 2015 and has lived there since that time. A Department conservatorship worker testified that the placement was loving, the home was clean, and the grandparents responded quickly to some early signs of trouble with Brittany by providing her with counseling. Amber's mother testified that under her care Brittany was doing well in kindergarten and enjoying her extracurricular activities. Though Amber expressed unhappiness that her parents would not raise Brittany the way Amber would, she also agreed that if she could not raise Brittany, her parents were the best alternative.
Lastly, the children's guardian ad litem, the attorney ad litem, and Brittany's maternal grandmother and step-grandfather testified that it was in Brittany's best interest for Amber's parental rights to be terminated. Viewing the evidence related to these and the other Holley factors in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support a firm belief or conviction that termination of Amber's parental rights was in Brittany's best interest. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372. Having given due consideration to the disputed evidence in the case, we reach the same conclusion regarding the factual sufficiency of the evidence. Any evidence favoring a decision contrary to the trial court's decision "is not so significant that no reasonable juror could have formed a firm belief or conviction" that termination of Amber's parental rights is in the best interest of the children. See In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 117 (Tex. 2014); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We therefore overrule Amber's sole issue.
CONCLUSION
Having concluded that sufficient evidence supports the trial court's findings that Eli met at least one of the statutory requirements for termination and that terminating Amber's parental rights was in Brittany's best interest, we affirm the trial court's order of termination.
/s/_________
Cindy Olson Bourland, Justice Before Justices Puryear, Field, and Bourland Affirmed Filed: December 1, 2017