Opinion
File No. CN03-10990 CPI No(s) 14-26352
05-29-2018
E-------- A------- 22834 P---Road L----, DE ----- Petitioner v. P--- B----- 7 M------Drive L----, DE------ Respondent
Petitioner Attorney Clifford B. Hearn, Esq. Respondent Attorney Renee Duval, Esq.
CIVIL DISPOSITION
Petitioner Attorney
Clifford B. Hearn, Esq. Respondent Attorney
Renee Duval, Esq. Nature of Proceeding
Motion to Set Aside [ ] Announced in Court [ ] Decision Reserved ORDER
Before the HONORABLE JENNIFER B. RANJI, JUDGE of the Family Court of the State of Delaware:
This is the Court's decision on a Motion to Dismiss a Motion to Set Aside a stipulation signed by the parties on May 26, 2017 ("Stipulation"). E--------A-------("Wife") filed the Motion to Set Aside the stipulation, which purported to resolve ancillary matters between Wife and her former husband, P---B-----("Husband").
The parties had signed the Stipulation and submitted it to the Court for review and approval on May 30, 2017. Prior to the Court signing the Stipulation, however, the Court was contacted by Mr. Hearn raising concerns regarding Wife's competency at the time the Stipulation was signed. The current Motion raises competency as the basis for the Court to set aside the Stipulation. Husband opposes the Motion.
The Court held a hearing on Wife's Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation on April 5, 2018. Wife called two witnesses and rested without providing her own testimony. As the time set aside for the hearing had expired, Husband did not have the opportunity to provide evidence. Husband did, however, make a Motion to Dismiss following Wife resting her case.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties were divorced on November 20, 2014 and entered a stipulation dismissing ancillary matters on February 4, 2015, signed by this Court on February 5, 2015. On April 27, 2016, Wife filed a Motion to Reopen Ancillary Matters, alleging that she had not consulted with her attorney prior to signing that stipulation and that she was mentally incompetent at the time it was signed. Wife's Motion averred that she was "extremely depressed," being treated for "mood and depression disorders as well as being diagnosed as Bi-Polar," and had "suicidal thoughts and made one suicide attempt (overdose) . . . in December 2014."
The Court held a teleconference on December 14, 2016 regarding Wife's Motion to Reopen, during which the parties indicated they had reached an agreement to reopen the case and had resolved some of the pending ancillary matters. The Court ordered the parties to submit a stipulation and the Court signed the submitted Stipulation and Order on January 18, 2017, reopening the ancillary matters. The Court required Wife to update the Court by February 10, 2017 on the parties' progress in addressing the ancillary matters.
After several updates, the parties entered into a new stipulation regarding ancillary matters as noted above, which was received by the Court on May 30, 2017, one day prior to the scheduled ancillary hearing. That same day, however, the Court was contacted by Mr. Hearn with concerns regarding Wife's mental status. The Court then held a teleconference with counsel for both parties on May 31, 2017.
Based on the May 31, 2017 teleconference as well as information provided in letter updates from Mr. Hearn and a teleconference held October 10, 2017, Mr. Hearn represented that on May 21, 2017, Wife had overdosed on prescription drugs and alcohol and spent several days in Meadowwood. Wife was released from Meadowwood on May 25, 2017. The following day, on May 26, 2017, Wife met with Mr. Hearn to review and sign the stipulation that had been negotiated between the parties and their respective attorneys. She did in fact review and sign the stipulation and Mr. Hearn indicated that he saw nothing that led him to believe she was not competent to do so. Mr. Hearn only questioned Wife's competency in signing the document when, two days after its signing, Wife had a serious car accident, hitting a tree and totaling her vehicle. During the May 31st teleconference, Mr. Hearn stated that he did not know whether the car accident was a suicide attempt, but stated his understanding that Wife had overdosed on medication she had been taking for 20 years and crashed into a tree on a familiar road. Wife was severely injured in that accident and was in the hospital until late June 2017.
Following the May 31, 2017 teleconference, the Court Ordered Mr. Hearn to provide a written update to the Court by June 30, 2017, including Wife's physical status. The Court noted that the prudent course once Wife was physically able to do so would be to have her examined to ensure her competency and, if she is deemed competent at that time, for her to review and re-sign the stipulation.
Mr. Hearn indicated in a letter to the Court dated June 23, 2017 that he did not know Wife's prognosis, and that she was on a ventilator and could not breathe independently. Wife was released from the hospital in late June 2017, as indicated to the Court by letter dated June 30, 2017 from Mr. Hearn. During an October 10, 2017 teleconference, Mr. Hearn indicated that he had spoken with Wife a week prior, and that when he speaks with Wife about the stipulation, she simply indicates that he should do whatever he thinks is best. Mr. Hearn requested that Wife indicate her wishes in writing, but she said she could not because she did not have any stamps.
The Court then received a letter from Dr. B------- dated November 15, 2017 indicating that he had met with Wife on November 6, 2017, and while Wife was "chronically depressed," she was as of that date "mentally competent to proceed with her divorce property settlement issues." The letter did not address Wife's competence as of the date she signed the stipulation.
The Court issued a Letter Decision and Order on November 22, 2017 giving Wife 20 days to notify the Court and Husband if she opposed the Court signing the stipulation submitted on May 30, 2017, noting that absent such a pleading, the Court would make the May 30, 2017 stipulation an Order of the Court. The Court thereafter received Wife's Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation.
The Court held a case management conference on January 2, 2018, to get a better understanding of the evidence and testimony upon which Wife intended to rely. The Court issued an Order thereafter stating that a hearing would be scheduled and noting that the burden would be on Wife to prove her incompetency at the time of signing the stipulation.
At the hearing on April 5, 2018, the Court heard from Dr. N------- B-------, Wife's long-time physician, and D---- M--------, Wife's roommate during the period in question. Mr. Hearn represented that he had prepared Wife to testify, but upon conclusion of the witness testimony Wife indicated that she did not wish to do so.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Set Aside Stipulation
As noted above, this Opinion and Order addresses a Motion for Involuntary Dismissal made by Husband at the conclusion of Wife's case in chief. Rule 41 of the Family Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
After the petitioner has completed the presentation of evidence, the respondent, without waiving the right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the petitioner has shown no right to relief. The Court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the petitioner or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
Fam. Ct. R. Civ. Pro. R. 41.
The relief Wife seeks is for the Court to release her from the contract she entered with Husband. In making that request, Wife bears the burden of proving incapacity in entering the contract. "Adults are presumed to have contractual capacity and the burden of proving otherwise rests with the party alleging incapacity." If that burden is met, the contract may be declared void. A Court may, however, still refuse to declare the contract void despite a finding that one of the parties lacks capacity. "Where a contract has been entered into with a person mentally incompetent, in good faith, without fraud or imposition, for a fair consideration, without notice of the incompetency, and has been executed in whole or in part, the contract will not be set aside unless the parties can be restored to their original position."
McAllister v. Schettler, 521 A.2d 617, 621 (Del. Ch. 1986).
Bettis v. Premier Pool & Property Management, 2012 WL 4662225 (Del. Ch. 2012).
Poole v. Hudson, 83 A.2d 703, 704 (Del. Super. Ct. 1951).
Definition of Incapacity
Delaware courts have provided a number of definitions for incompetency. Based on those decisions, one claiming incompetence must show they were incapable of managing or protecting their property, unable to exercise reasonable judgment in making personal decisions, or unable to understand the nature of the pending actions. Family Court cases have stated that an individual is mentally incompetent if he/she is "temporarily or permanently impaired by mental illness [or] mental deficiency . . . to the extent that the person lacks sufficient understanding to make or communicate responsible personal decisions or to enter into contracts" and is "not capable of exercising reasonable judgment as to personal decisions, does not understand the nature of the divorce action and is unable to express unequivocally a desire to dissolve the marriage." In M.R. v. A.R., the Court found Wife impaired, holding that she "lacks the ability to make or communicate reasonable judgment as to personal decisions and does not understand the nature of the pending ancillary matters."
See McAllister v. Schettler, 521 A.2d 617, 621 (Del. Ch. 1986); G.A.S. v. S.I.S., 407 A.2d 253, 257 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1978); M.R. v. A.R., 2007 WL 4793915, at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2007) citing Black's Law Dictionary; Anderson v. Bd. Of Pension Trustees, 1995 WL 653491, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995) citing Syno v. Syno, 594 A.2d 307 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991 and citing In re Prince's Guardianship, 379 P.2d 845 (Okla. 1963) and citing In re Washam's Estate, 364 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1961); Northrop v. Northrop, 1996 WL 861489, at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1996).
M.R. v. A.R., 2007 WL 4793915, at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2007) citing Black's Law Dictionary.
M.R. v. A.R., 2007 WL 4793915, at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2007) citing Northrop v. Northrop, 1996 WL 861489, at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1996).
M.R. v. A.R., 2007 WL 4793915, at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2007).
The Court cannot find that Wife has proven under these definitions that she was incompetent on the date she signed the Stipulation.
HEARING TESTIMONY
The Court heard testimony from two witnesses at the April 5th hearing. The first was Dr. B-------, a board certified family physician who has been treating Wife since the late 1980s. Dr. B------- has diagnosed Wife with anxiety, bipolar disorder, and depression. He testified that Wife has suffered from chronic depression, insomnia, and anxiety since the age of 15, which has been impacted by her divorce, her mother's passing, her father's passing, and her son's incarceration.
Dr. B------- testified that he saw Wife on March 24, 2017, and then he did not see her again until July 5, 2017. He further testified to his understanding that Wife had attempted suicide on May 21, 2017, that she had a car accident on May 28, 2017, and that she signed a stipulation with Husband regarding ancillary matters between those two dates. He stated that in May 2017, Wife was taking Seroquel, another antidepressant, Zoloft, and Clonazepam, for anxiety and depression. Dr. B-------stated that Wife was competent when he saw her in March 2017 as well as when he next saw her in July 2017. Dr. B----- was presented with his records from those two appointments and agreed that the records indicate that Wife was "a/o *3," meaning that she was aware and oriented as to person, place, and time. Dr. B------- further testified that in all of his years of treating Wife, he has never seen her when she did not appear to be competent, despite the fact that Wife suffered from chronic depression and that she had attempted suicide on at least three occasions.
Dr. B------- was also presented with records from Meadowwood dated May 25, 2017. Dr. B------ agreed that Meadowwood staff had released Wife on that date, one day prior to signing the Stipulation, and permitted her to drive home. He further agreed that the Meadowwood records reflect that Wife was assessed by Meadowwood staff prior to her release on May 25th and those records indicate that Wife was oriented as to person, place and time.
Notwithstanding that Meadowwood had found Wife oriented and released her one day prior to signing the stipulation, and notwithstanding that he had not seen Wife in that timeframe, Dr. B------ testified that he had "questions" about whether Wife was competent when she signed the Stipulation. He stated that he felt it was "likely" that Wife was labial when released, slipping in and out of depression, "looking for relief" and could change "her mind at the drop of a hat." He further testified in a somewhat contradictory manner, stating, "[Wife] even admits to making a mistake by signing the papers, I don't know if she did that out of anger, incompetency, or what but I believe she was incompetent to make decisions during that period of time."
Dr. B------- gave several reasons for these questions and assertions. First, he testified that people who are depressed can have an impaired state of mind such that they do not care what is happening. This statement appeared to be a general assessment of what can happen to individuals suffering from depression, as opposed to one based on specific knowledge of Wife's mental health status in the relevant timeframe. Second, he noted that Wife had attempted suicide 5 days prior to signing the stipulation, and he questioned whether her car accident one day after signing it was another suicide attempt. Dr. B------ also testified, however, that Wife told him that the car accident was due to her running into a tree when she swerved to avoid a deer. He and Mother's roommate also testified that the accident occurred due to Mother driving under the influence, and Dr. B------ stated that Wife told him that she did not want to commit suicide. Although he agreed that he did not know whether the car accident was a suicide attempt, he stated, "If a week prior she tried to commit suicide and a week later ends up in a significant car accident with a DUI, questions in my mind whether or not she is competent enough to make accurate decisions..."
Third, Dr. B----- testified that he did not believe that Wife cared what happened to her at that time, she felt abandoned, and she felt "entitled to more than" what was in the stipulation. He testified that Wife had told him she signed a paper indicating "she didn't want anything," and he asserted that her decision to sign away everything would indicate a level of incompetence in his view. Specifically, he stated, "If I were to put myself in her shoes, after 30 some years of marriage ... to sign that over at the end would indicate to me some level of incompetence in my mind."
Wife's second witness was Ms. M-------, Mother's friend and former roommate. Ms. M--------- testified that she lived with Wife during the period in question, they had lived together for two years, and that she currently lives in the same residence, but Wife no longer lives with her. It was Ms. M---- ----'s view that Wife should not have signed the agreement, not only because she claims that Wife was incompetent but also because she believes that Wife should have pushed for receiving more of the marital property. In fact, Ms. M--------stated that she told Wife that she should "ask for everything."
Ms. M---- ----testified that Wife's emotional and mental state during the period in question and throughout the divorce was "really bad," that she was "emotionally depressed all the time" and "upset all the time." She stated that Wife "didn't function very well" and recalls Wife having hallucinations in the middle of the night.
For example, Ms. M------ testified that Wife would come into her room in the middle of the night asking where her mother was, despite the fact that her mother had passed away twenty years prior. She averred that Wife would say that her mother, father, and brother were in the residence. Ms. M--------would respond that no one was there, and then Wife would ask her where Tiffany, Ms. M--------'s deceased daughter, was. Ms. M---------testified that Wife would do this "a couple times a week."
Ms. M---------was at their home with Wife on May 21, 2017 when Wife overdosed. She testified that Wife attempted to stand up but fell over, and she ultimately helped Wife into the bedroom before contacting Husband, whom she alleges hung up on her, and then calling 911. Ms. M-------- testified that she visited Wife at Meadowwood following the incident.
Ms. M-------- also testified that Wife picks her up from work and on the day of the car accident, Wife never showed up. She stated that Wife's sister then called her and said Wife had been in an accident and flown to Christiana Hospital. Ms. M--------greed that it was her understanding that Wife was driving under the influence. Ms. M--------also stated that Wife has overdosed about three other times.
Ms. M---------testified that she and Wife discussed the stipulation "every day for months" prior to the signing. Ms. M-------stated that she believed the agreement was not fair and that she told Wife not to sign the document. She averred that Husband "played with [Wife's] emotions," and that Husband would occasionally pick Wife up and "get what he wanted," then bring her back to the house. She stated that Wife "felt there was a chance that if she gave him what he wanted, they would be a happy family again." Ms. M--------stated that she told Wife this would not happen.
Ms. M-------testified that she accompanied Wife to Mr. Hearn's office on May 26th to review and sign the stipulation. She stated that Mr. Hearn read through the agreement with Wife, and that he and Ms. M----- ---told her they did not believe that she ought to sign it, although that advice appears to have been based on concerns that Wife could negotiate a better deal as opposed to concerns regarding her lack of capacity. Ms. M---- ----testified that Wife responded by stating that she wanted to sign the agreement because she did not "want Paul mad" at her. Upon questioning by the Court, Ms. M---------stated that she does not believe Wife understood what she was doing and that she just wanted to get back with husband so bad she "would do whatever it took."
DISCUSSION
As the burden of showing incompetency is on Wife, it is important to consider this matter not only in light of the evidence that was presented, but also in light of the evidence that was not. One key piece of evidence that was not presented is Wife's own assertion that she was not competent at the time that the Stipulation was filed. Although Wife requested the hearing and filed the Motion asking that the Court reject the Stipulation, Wife chose not to offer any testimony on the date of the hearing. As noted above, Dr. B-------had determined Wife competent to participate in a trial, and there has been no argument otherwise. The Court therefore concludes that Wife made a knowing decision to not offer her testimony. There was no opportunity for the Court to hear from Wife regarding her assertion of incompetency, including what she understood when the Stipulation was signed, how aware or unaware she was of what was happening, and how and why she decided to sign the Stipulation. As a result, the only evidence presented to the Court was testimony from a physician who had not seen Wife anywhere near the time she is alleged to have been incompetent, and Wife's former roommate who, quite understandably, has neither legal nor clinical understanding of incompetency and whose focus was largely on her concerns with Wife's emotional distress since the divorce and with Wife giving up too much property in the agreement reached.
The Court also was not presented with any evidence or testimony from a medical or mental health professional who observed Wife on or near the date that the Stipulation was signed and could offer his/her opinion that Wife was not competent at that time. To the contrary, the evidence shows that the only mental health professional to have assessed Wife near the time that she signed the Stipulation was the mental health provider at Meadowwood, who released Wife and determined just one day prior to Wife signing the Stipulation that she was aware and oriented as to person, place, and time.
While Wife called Dr. B------ as a witness, he had not seen Wife for 2 months prior to her signing the Stipulation and he did not see her for another 1 ½ months after it was signed, and on both of those occasions he believed Wife to be competent. His testimony therefore quite fairly indicated that he could not conclude that Wife was incompetent at the time that the Stipulation was signed, stating only that he "questioned" whether she was competent and noting in one sentence that he did not know whether Wife signed the document because she was angry, incompetent, or something else, but then stating that he believed she was not competent. At another point when asked if he knew whether Wife understood the nature of the Stipulation, he stated that he did not believe that she understood it, but qualified that by stating, "[T]hat's the best I can answer without any data from that time seeing her a month or two later." Dr. B----- also noted that individuals suffering from depression can have an impaired state of mind.
The Court can appreciate the difficult position Dr. B-------was placed in when being asked about Wife's competency in the middle of a multi-month period when he had not seen her. Largely because of that, his opinion simply is not sufficiently definite, fact based, and proximate in time to the signing of the Stipulation to form the basis for a finding of incompetence.
While it is undisputed that Wife attempted suicide 5 days prior to signing the Stipulation, that fact in and of itself does not support a finding that Wife was incompetent five days later, after having been hospitalized and released with a finding of competency. The Court also notes that Dr. B------- testified that he has been treating Wife for depression for decades, yet he has never seen her in a state that he would consider incompetent, despite the fact that she has quite sadly attempted suicide on several occasions prior to this one.
Regarding the car accident, no evidence was presented that the accident was a suicide attempt. Dr. B------and Ms. M------ both testified that the car accident was alcohol related. While that fact would not foreclose the possibility that it was a suicide attempt, it certainly does not lead to a conclusion that it was such. While Wife is asking the Court to find her incompetent as of May 26th, she herself denied that this was a suicide attempt when speaking with Dr.--------. Furthermore, even if the accident was a suicide attempt, that does not lead to the conclusion that Wife was incompetent when she signed the Stipulation.
Dr. B-------'s statement that he believes Wife may have been incompetent because she signed a property division stipulation that gave her nothing appears to be an assumption that is not supported by any level of medical certainty, but it is also based on facts that are not accurate. The Court has reviewed the stipulation signed by the parties and while values are not provided to fully assess the agreement, it is certainly not true that Wife does not get any marital property. Under the agreement, Wife retains the L----- A---- Florida property with any and all debts, which Husband is required to assist her in preparing for rent or sale. Wife also retains the proceeds from the sale of the T------- property, which Husband is also to assist her in preparing for sale. Wife retains the 2011 Toyota Prius and several identified items of personal property. Husband retains the L---- property, the 2014 Kia Optima, 1999 Dodge Durango, 1999 World Cat, and 2001 Crest Pontoon, and some personal property. Husband also receives $31,251.00 via a QDRO from Wife's 401(k), which the Stipulation indicates is calculated after considering both parties' retirement accounts, dividing them equally, and crediting Husband for $130,000 that Wife received from his IRA in 2015.
Furthermore, parties to a stipulation reach their decisions for reasons that others may simply not appreciate or understand. While the Stipulation on its face is contrary to the assertion that Wife received "nothing," the Court would also consider it an insurmountable leap to go from knowing that a party agreed to give up their right to property to assuming that the party must have been incompetent to do so.
When the Court pointed out the definition of incompetence, Dr. B------ asserted his view that Wife was so depressed she did not care what was in the Stipulation at that point. Again, as noted above, without testimony from Wife to assess regarding her feelings and thoughts when the document was signed, and without Dr. B------- having seen or spoken with her at that time, the Court cannot assume this level of depression was present when Wife signed the agreement. In fact, if Wife truly was suffering from a level of depression that made her not care what was in the Stipulation, then it seems unlikely and illogical that she would travel to Mr. Hearn's office, review the Stipulation with him as testified to by Wife's roommate, and sign it such that it could be submitted to the Court. Without more evidence, the Court will not assume that Wife was incompetent due to depression from which she had suffered for decades and a suicide attempt 5 days prior, for which she had been treated and released.
The Court also considered the testimony of Ms. M---------. Although she testified somewhat vaguely that living with Wife was like living with a child, she offered no specifics nor was any other evidence offered to indicate that Wife was unable to manage her finances, property or personal life. Further, Ms. M--------'s concerns appeared to span the time since the parties' separation through to the present, yet it is clear from Dr. B-------'s testimony that he has never seen Wife incompetent in his many years of acting as her physician. The Court therefore finds it highly unlikely that Wife was incompetent for years, throughout the time that Ms. M-------- referenced, and it never came to anyone's attention other than Ms. M--------.
The evidence presented did not indicate that Wife did not understand the nature of the action taken - in this case, the signing of an ancillary stipulation - or that she was unable to communicate her wishes regarding same. In fact, the evidence presented indicates the opposite. Ms. M--------- testified that when signed, Mr. Hearn reviewed the stipulation with Wife, told her that he did not believe she should sign the stipulation, and Wife stated that she was going to go forward with it because she did not wish for Husband to be angry with her. Upon questioning by the Court, Ms. M--------- testified that she did not believe that Wife understood the agreement, but she offered no specifics for that assertion except her belief that Wife does not understand anything and her belief that Wife should have gotten "everything" from the agreement.
Wife's decision to meet with Mr. Hearn, her review of the contract with him, and her statements to Mr. Hearn and Ms. M-------- that she wished to sign the agreement because she did not want Husband to be angry with her, do not show incompetence. Perhaps, as Ms. M-------- asserts, they show bad decision making. But they do not show a lack of understanding of the nature of the document or what was contained in it, or the inability to make or communicate her decision. In fact, based on Ms. M---------'s own testimony, the reasoning Wife offered for her decision to sign the Stipulation on May 26th was exactly the reasoning that Ms. M-------- testified Wife had given her in all the months she claims they discussed the Stipulation leading up to that date. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Wife's decision to sign the Stipulation on May 26th was no different than it would have been for months prior to that date, during which there is no allegation from Wife that she was not competent.
In making its determination, the Court considers the evidence introduced at trial. The procedural history above notes information that was provided by Mr. Hearn in his appropriate attempts to keep the Court informed between the time of the signing of the document and the ultimate hearing on Wife's competency, such that this matter could be continued until Wife was able to be present. Beyond that, Mr. Hearn was not called as a witness and therefore his assertions are not considered as part of the substantive evidence in this matter. The Court does note, however, that Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14 indicates that had Mr. Hearn believed Wife had diminished capacity or was unable to act in her own interests, he is permitted to take action to protect her interests, which could reasonably have included not having her sign or not submitting the Stipulation to the Court, and possibly requesting a guardian ad litem appointment for Wife. The fact that Mr. Hearn did not do so and instead submitted the Stipulation to the Court certainly indicates that as of the date of Wife signing the Stipulation, Mr. Hearn did not assess Wife as incompetent.
DE LRPC R. 1.14 provides:
(a) When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and. in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.
(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.
CONCLUSION
The Court takes seriously an attempt to take one's life, and Wife's decades long struggle with depression is tragic. The Court will not assume, however, that one who suffers from chronic depression and has attempted suicide is mentally incompetent days later, after having received treatment, been released, and found aware as to person, place, and time by the mental health professionals treating her.
In summary, none of the facts to which Dr. B------- was able to testify from his direct observation or from reviewing medical records compels the conclusion that Wife was incompetent when she signed the stipulation. Further, while Ms. M--------'s testimony raises questions regarding whether the agreement was a good one for Wife to make, the testimony does not convince the Court that the agreement was entered by individuals who were not competent to do so.
The Court hereby enters the following ORDER:
1. Husband's Motion to Dismiss Wife's Motion to Set Aside the Order of May 30, 2017 on All Ancillary Matters is hereby GRANTED.
2. The Court has attached a signed copy of the stipulation submitted by the parties, concluding the pending ancillary matters.
3. Husband's request for fees and costs is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ _________
JENNIFER B. RANJI, Judge JBR/mmjr
xc: File, Parties
Date emailed/mailed: __________