Opinion
No. 306 C.D. 2014
10-23-2014
East Union Township v. Schuylkill County Zoning Hearing Board v. Gladstone Partners, LLC, Appellant
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge (P.) HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
At oral argument, Judge McGinley determined that he has a conflict of interest and recused. The parties agreed that the matter could be heard by the two remaining judges on the panel. See Pa. R.A.P. 3102(b) ("If less than three members of a panel attend a session of the panel, another judge or judges shall be designated to complete the panel if reasonably possible, and if it is not reasonably possible to do so the presiding judge with the consent of the parties present may direct that the matter be heard and determined by a panel of two judges....").
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE PELLEGRINI
Gladstone Partners, LLC (Landowner) appeals the order of the Schuylkill County (County) Common Pleas Court (trial court) granting the appeal of East Union Township (Township) and Service Electric Cablevision, Inc. (Service Electric) that reversed the County's Zoning Hearing Board's (Board) decision to grant Landowner's special exception application to construct an international cargo airport. We affirm.
See Section 8.221 of the County's Zoning Ordinance ("Special Exceptions, as enumerated in Article III hereof, shall be permitted only upon authorization by the [Board]. The Board shall hear and decide requests for special exceptions in accordance with the standards and criteria set forth herein. In granting a special exception, the Board may attach such reasonable conditions and safeguards, in addition to those expressed in this ordinance, as it may deem necessary to implement the purposes of this zoning ordinance....") (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 944a); Section 912.1 of the Municipalities Planning Code, Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, added by Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. §10912.1 ("Where the governing body, in the zoning ordinance, has stated special exceptions to be granted or denied by the board pursuant to express standards and criteria, the board shall hear and decide requests for such special exceptions in accordance with such standards and criteria. In granting a special exception, the board may attach such reasonable conditions and safeguards, in addition to those expressed in the ordinance, as it may deem necessary to implement the purposes of this act and the zoning ordinance.").
Butler Enterprises, Inc. owns approximately 4,300 undeveloped acres in the Township's CR (Conservation Residential) and CM (Conservation Mining) zoning districts and a portion of Kline Township in Schuylkill County, and a portion of Hazle Township, Luzerne County. The property is located at Route T-0457, Route T-0455 and Interstate 81 (I-81). Landowner has an equitable interest in the property through an option to purchase it.
In June 2009, Landowner filed an application for a special exception with the County's Planning and Zoning Office to develop an international cargo airport and accessory facilities on the property. Ultimately, the Board held hearings on the application. Service Electric, a neighboring landowner that provides cable television services through satellite dishes, objected to the application based on concerns that interference from the airport will adversely affect the television signals that it receives and delivers to its customers.
Landowner filed the application one day before the Township adopted its first zoning ordinance. See Gladstone Partners, LP v. East Union Township, 26 A.3d 542 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). As a result, the County's Planning and Zoning Office returned the application and Landowner filed an action in mandamus in the trial court to compel the Board to act on the application. The trial court remanded the matter to the Board and, ultimately, the Board determined that the pending ordinance doctrine did not apply and it disposed of Landowner's application on the merits under the County Zoning Ordinance.
Section 3.1430 of the County's Zoning Ordinance states that an airport is a permitted special exception use in the CM zoning district. (R.R. at 921a). Section 3.330 states that an airport use is a permitted special exception use in the CR zoning district. (Id. at 908a). Finally, Section 8.222 states:
Review Criteria Approval of special exceptions shall be authorized only if they are found to comply with the following requirements and other applicable requirements set forth in this Ordinance.
a. That the use is a permitted Special Exception as set forth in Article III hereof.
b. That the use is so designed, located and proposed to be operated that the public health, safety, welfare and convenience will be protected.
c. That the use will not cause substantial injury to the value of other property in the neighborhood where it is to be located.
d. That the use shall be compatible with adjoining development and the character of the zon[ing] district where it is proposed to be located.
e. That adequate off-street parking is provided and ingress and egress is so designed as to cause minimum interference with traffic on abutting streets.
f. That the use conforms with all applicable regulations governing the district where located.
The original application also sought to build a business park, but the application was later amended to remove that request.
See Greth Development Group, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Lower Heidelberg Township, 918 A.2d 181, 186 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 929 A.2d 1163 (Pa. 2007) ("The applicant for a special exception has the burden of proving that the proposed special exception use satisfies the standards in the zoning ordinance. Once an applicant has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to any objectors to present sufficient evidence that the proposed use has a detrimental effect on the public health, safety, and welfare.") (citations omitted).
At the hearings, Steven Kohler (Kohler), a principal of Corporate Strategy and Growth for Ridge Global, testified that Landowner hired his firm to assess the viability of the cargo airport project and to help secure financing for the project. He stated that the airport will consist of two parallel 13,000 foot runways with supporting terminal facilities and structures totaling one million square feet. He opined that there is the possibility of constructing another 20 to 23 million square feet of accessory structures on the property. He identified Landowner's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 as 2007, 2009 and 2010 letters from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issuing a Conditional No Objection determination on the feasibility study for the proposed cargo airport that the proposal will not adversely affect the safe and efficient use of navigable airspace subject to a number of conditions, and extending that determination to September 2011. Kohler added, "The entire project is being designed to include egress, ingress avenues that would accommodate the full build-out development and plans and square feet over time. So to satisfy that particular element of [Section 8.222.e. of the County's Zoning Ordinance], there will be adequate off-street parking, egress and ingress." (R.R. at 86a-87a). He noted that the proposed plan anticipated that it will be its own designated road in and out of the project and he opined that "the use conform[s] with all regulations governing the district where it's located." (Id. at 87a).
The FAA's 2007 letter states, in relevant part:
This determination does not constitute FAA approval or disapproval of the physical development involved in the proposal. It is a determination with respect to the safe and efficient use of navigable airspace by aircraft and with respect to the safety of persons and properties on the ground.(R.R. at 29a, 30a, 31a).
* * *
In making this determination, the FAA has considered matters such as the effects the proposal would have on existing airspace structure and projected programs of the FAA, the effects it would have on the safety of persons and property on the ground, and the effects that existing or proposed manmade objects (on file with the FAA), and known natural objects within the affected area would have on the airport proposal.
* * *
This determination does not preempt or waive any ordinance, law, or regulation of any other governmental body or agency.
A general ordinance of the State of Pennsylvania provides that certain airport construction or alteration require written permits prior to construction. The permit may be obtained from the PA Department of Transportation [(PennDOT)].
William Schumacher (Schumacher), a registered professional engineer and land surveyor, testified that the property is approximately 4,300 acres of open wooded space, pre-strip mined areas and blighted land with coal strip pits. He stated that an industrial park borders the northern property boundary; I-81 borders the eastern boundary; undeveloped land borders the southern boundary; and open space maintained by hunting clubs borders the western boundary; and that the blighted area would be reclaimed if the property is developed as planned. Schumacher testified that "the plan of the proposed airport does show enough open space that [an] unlimited amount of parking could be provided." (R.R. at 315a). He conceded that ingress or egress to the airport and parking have not been actually designed or established, but that his review of the map indicated enough open space to accommodate the parking requirements. (Id. at 317a-318a). However, he opined that the application met all of "the applicable provisions and standards, criteria, and conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance for the granting of the requested special exception." (Id. at 316a, 317a). Finally, Schumacher also opined that due to the extensive local, county, state and federal regulatory requirements that the project must satisfy, it would ensure for the public health, safety, welfare and convenience. (Id. at 313a-314a).
Michael Marsicano (Marsicano), one of Landowner's principals, testified that the property would have its own on- and off-ramp and road. (R.R. at 210a). However, he acknowledged that there is no access to the property except for a haul road that goes over I-81, and that the plan that was submitted as Exhibit 7 merely depicted the runway layout and did not indicate any access points. (Id. at 401a-403a). He stated that he was unaware if any plan was submitted which indicated the access points, and that Kohler was the expert and testified regarding that issue. (Id. at 401a-402a).
Stanley Komosinsky, a licensed associate real estate broker and certified general real estate appraiser, identified a report that he prepared and testified that in his expert opinion, the proposed airport will have a positive impact and not a negative impact on residential properties in northern Schuylkill County and in the Township. (R.R. at 340a, 350a, 354a). He stated that the median property values in the area nearly doubled in this depressed market based only on the announcement that the proposed cargo airport was going to be built. (Id. at 340a-343a).
While a number of other witnesses testified for the parties and objectors, the Board either did not rely on their testimony or rejected it as not credible. The Board is free to accept or reject, in whole or part, the testimony of any witness. Domeisen v. Zoning Hearing Board, O'Hara Township, 814 A.2d 851, 858 n. 5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Because the Board is the ultimate finder of fact and judge of credibility and resolves all conflicts of evidence, Tu-Way Tower Co. v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Township of Salisbury, 688 A.2d 744, 748 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), its findings are binding on this Court for purposes of appellate review where they are based on substantial evidence. Eichlin v. Zoning Hearing Board of New Hope Borough, 671 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).
In August 2012, the Board granted the application because Landowner satisfied all the relevant criteria in the Zoning Ordinance including Section 8.222.e. because Schumacher testified that the property's size provides ample space to park all vehicles that would potentially use the airport. The Board found that the airport should have primary ingress and egress directly from I-81 and not the existing adjacent state or local highways, and that Landowner must provide secondary access points to be used for emergency purposes if the primary access points are blocked.
Specifically, the Board stated:
Mr. Schumacher testified that the size of the Property where the airport is located provides ample space to park all vehicles that would potentially utilize the airport. The Board finds that the cargo airport should have its primary ingress and egress directly from [I-81] by way of new on and off ramps and a roadway to be constructed specifically for the airport from [I-81]. The airport, upon becoming operational, should not use any of the existing state or local highways as its primary access. Furthermore, [Landowner] must provide secondary access points to the airport to be used for emergency purposes only to assure that access to and from the facility will never be compromised should the primary access point be blocked for some reason.(Board 8/3/12 Decision at 6).
The Board also found that the application satisfied Section 8222.f. of the Zoning Ordinance because Schumacher testified that in his expert opinion, there are expansive regulatory oversights that will adequately protect the health, safety and welfare and that the use conforms to all applicable regulations. The Board noted that while the Township and Service Electric presented expert testimony that Landowner should have provided more details regarding the project, the Zoning Ordinance does not require an engineering report or an environmental impact study or other such detail and that Landowner satisfied the Zoning Ordinance requirements. The Board also noted that the Township and Service Electric argued that Landowner did not obtain licensure by PennDOT as required by 67 Pa. Code §471.3. However, the Board found that Schumacher testified that Landowner satisfied all applicable regulations, including this requirement, and that the FAA's conditional approval preceded the special exception application.
Section 471.3(a) of PennDOT's regulations states, "[a] person may not establish, maintain or operate an airport, or permit flight operations at an airport, unless authorized by [PennDOT's] Bureau [of Aviation]. This does not apply to an airport approved or maintained by the government of the United States, or to infrequent operations by helicopters or aircraft with characteristics permitting operation from sites not specially prepared therefore." In addition, Section 471.3(h) states, "[i]ssuance of an airport license does not preempt requirements of local zoning authorities."
Specifically, the Board stated:
Mr. Schumacher testified that, in his expert opinion, there are expansive regulatory oversights of a project of this type that will adequately protect the health, safety and welfare and that the intended use conforms to all applicable regulations governing the district where the Property is to be located. [The] Township and Service Electric provided their own witnesses who were certified as experts and provided opinions as to whether or not [Landowner] should have provided more information to the Board, more details regarding the project, an engineering report, and an environmental impact study. While the Board does not contest the usefulness of such reports and information, the Ordinance upon which the Board is guided does not require such detail to make a determination. Indeed, the Board finds that [Landowner] has satisfied the requirements of the Ordinance to allow it to make a determination on the special exception request.(Board 8/3/12 Decision at 6) (emphasis in original).
Lastly, Service Electric and the Township have argued that [Landowner] did not conform with all applicable regulations specifically by not submitting to the Board proof of licensure with PennDOT Aviation consistent with PennDOT regulations. 67 Pa. Code §471.3. ... [Landowner]'s expert engineer, Mr. Schumacher, testified that [Landowner] has indeed satisfied all applicable regulations governing the district which would have include[d] such requirement. The Board also notes conditional approval having been granted by the FAA which is recognized as an agency of the government of the United States. The FAA's conditional approval preceded the application submitted to the Zoning Office.
The Township and Service Electric appealed the Board's decision to the trial court and Landowner intervened. Following oral argument but without taking additional evidence, the trial court issued an order granting the appeal, reversing the Board's decision, and denying Landowner's application. Regarding Section 8222.e., the trial court found that Landowner's witnesses and the plans submitted do not show that access has been designed from the property to I-81, and while Landowner promised to comply in the future with access, parking and the ingress and egress requirements, this is not sufficient because it was necessary to show compliance with all of the requirements at the time of application, and the grant of special exception cannot be supported by Landowner's promise to comply in the future or with the Board's conditions. The trial court held that there was no evidence of any plan of ingress and egress or for parking as required by Section 8.222.e., and that there is no access except for a minor road in violation of Section 8.223 regarding the standards applicable to special exceptions. The court also held that the Board erred in granting the special exception on the condition that ingress and egress originate directly from I-81, including the construction of on- and off-ramps and a connecting roadway.
Section 8.223.a. of the Zoning Ordinance states:
a. Traffic The proposed development shall not be located on a site where primary access to the site is from a minor street designed primarily to provide vehicular access to abutting properties. The development shall be designed in a manner, which will not be injurious to the safe and convenient flow of vehicular traffic. A traffic plan, with estimate[s] of the number of vehicles may be submitted to the County.(R.R. at 944a).
The trial court also held that the application did not satisfy the requirements of Section 8.222.f. because 67 Pa. Code §471.3 requires PennDOT approval. The court noted that PennDOT's approval was required and the FAA's no objection letter had expired at the time of hearing, and that even if approval was extended, it is not sufficient to comply with the Zoning Ordinance. The trial court quoted the FAA's no objection letter which stated that it "does not constitute FAA approval or disapproval of the physical development involved in the proposal," that "[t]his determination does not preempt any ordinance, law, or regulation of any other governmental body or agency," and that "[a] general ordinance of the State of Pennsylvania provides that certain airport construction ... require[s] written permits prior to construction [and t]he permit may be obtained from [PennDOT]." (R.R. at 30a, 31a). The court also cited the testimony of Service Electric's expert, Edward Nasuti, who stated that the FAA's no objection letter merely shows the safety of take-offs and landings and reserves the airspace and does not address the impacts from the airport construction on the ground. The trial court concluded that the Board erred in granting the special exception with conditions because Landowner must be licensed by PennDOT under Section 471.3 as a condition precedent to a special exception. Landowner then filed this appeal.
Where the trial court takes no additional evidence, our scope of review of the Board's grant of a special exception is limited to determining whether the Board abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or made findings of fact not supported by substantial evidence. Pittsburgh Trust for Cultural Resources v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 604 A.2d 298, 301 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992), appeal denied, 645 A.2d 1320 (Pa. 1994).
Landowner claims that the trial court erred in reversing the Board's grant of its special exception application because there is substantial record evidence showing that adequate off-street parking and ingress and egress via ramps directly from I-81 thereby satisfying the requirements of Section 8.222.e. of the Zoning Ordinance. In support, Landowner cites our Supreme Court's opinion in Broussard v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 907 A.2d 494 (Pa. 2006).
In Broussard, the applicant purchased a building in the City of Pittsburgh to conduct conferences and special events. Pursuant to the Pittsburgh Zoning Code, the applicant sought a special exception for off-site parking. The Zoning Code permitted off-site parking by special exception provided that where the off-site parking area was not under the same ownership as the primary use served, a written agreement between the owners be submitted to the county recorder's office for recordation prior to the issuance of a building permit. The applicant had submitted to the board a letter from a nearby parking garage confirming that it had sufficient parking spaces available and would provide the spaces to the applicant's patrons. The board granted the special exception subject to a condition that the applicant submit the required recorded agreement. On appeal, both the court of common pleas and a divided panel of this Court affirmed.
On further appeal, our Supreme Court affirmed. After reviewing several of this Court's prior opinions, the Court held:
[W]e conclude that, where the plan, as submitted, addresses all of the ordinance's prerequisites for the special exception sought, and reasonably shows that the property owner is able to fulfill them in accordance with the procedures set forth by the zoning code (as reasonably interpreted by the board), a reviewing court should not reverse the grant of such an exception on the sole basis that some of the items described in the plan may be completed at a later date. Here, as noted, the [board] interpreted the relevant provisions of the ordinance to permit granting a special exception where [the applicant's] submissions contained adequate assurances that the off-site parking needs associated with the proposed use would be met in accordance with the requirements of the ordinance, even though no legally-binding contract existed at the time of the hearings. ... [W]e see no basis in the Zoning Code or in any other legal doctrine to conclude that the [board] was required to insist upon the presence of an actual, recordable contract at the plan-submission stage, particularly as substantial proof that [the applicant] could provide the requisite number of off-site parking spaces was reflected in the [applicant's submissions] ....Broussard, 907 A.2d at 502 (citation omitted).
However, Broussard is distinguishable from this case because, unlike the applicant in that case, Landowner's special exception application here does not address all of the Zoning Ordinance's prerequisites for a special exception approval. As noted above, Section 8.222.e. of the Zoning Ordinance states, as one of the objective requirements for the grant of a special exception, "[t]hat adequate off-street parking is provided and ingress and egress is so designed as to cause minimum interference with traffic on abutting streets." (R.R. at 944a). In addition, Section 8.223.a. states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he proposed development shall not be located on a site where primary access to the site is from a minor street designed primarily to provide vehicular access to abutting properties." (Id.).
Shumacher's testimony, which was relied upon by the Board to grant the application, clearly demonstrates that the application as submitted did not meet the objective requirements of Section 8.222.e. and Section 8.223.a. of the Zoning Ordinance. Schumacher specifically conceded that ingress and egress to the airport and parking have not been actually designed or established, but that his review of the map indicated enough open space to accommodate the parking requirements. (R.R. at 317a-318a). Likewise, Mariscano acknowledged that while the property would have its own on- and off-ramp to I-81, there is currently no access to the property except for a haul road that goes over I-81; that the plan that was submitted merely depicted the runway layout and did not indicate any access points; and that he was unaware if any plan was submitted which indicated the access points and that Kohler was the expert and testified regarding that issue. (Id. at 210a, 401a-403a).
As a result, this case is more akin to the line of cases distinguished by the Supreme Court in Broussard and relied upon the trial court in this case. See Edgmont Township v. Springton Lake Montessori School, Inc., 622 A.2d 418 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993); Lafayette College v. Zoning Hearing Board of City of Easton, 588 A.2d 1323 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991); Appeal of Baird, 537 A.2d 976 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), appeal denied, 557 A.2d 344 (Pa. 1989). In Broussard, the Supreme Court explained:
Although this Court has never addressed the specific issue discussed in the Edgmont/Lafayette College/Baird line of cases, we do find those decisions instructive in that their distinctive feature is that the property owner had failed to include in its submissions before the zoning board any indication of an intention to fulfill the conditions associated with the special exception at issue. It was on this basis that the Commonwealth Court deemed the property owner's submissions insufficient, and not upon the lack of literal completion of all conditions reflected in the plan itself. The Edgmont court, for example, did not suggest that the proposed land and building alterations had to be performed before a special exception could issue; rather, so long as the plan included these provisions in a satisfactory manner, approval could be given conditioned upon full compliance with the plan at a later date. Because, however, the zoning board had approved the special exception solely upon the landowner's promise to revise the plan to come into compliance with the zoning code, the court reversed. See id. at 420. Likewise, the applicant in Baird simply expressed his general purpose to comply with applicable regulations, but there was nothing in the proposal as submitted to the board that reflected any intent to do so; and in Lafayette College, the school's plan simply did not satisfy the zoning code's parking requirements.Broussard, 907 A.2d at 501-02.
See also Ryan, Pennsylvania Zoning Law and Practice, §5.2.1 (2004) ("It is common enough to amend the proposal at the hearing to bring it into compliance with the zoning ordinance and there is nothing in the Edgmont Township decision that questions that practice. However, it is one thing to say that a plan that is 'short' five parking spaces can be approved if the owner agrees to add five more conforming spaces at a specific location and another to say that it is sufficient for the owner to testify that, in one fashion or another, he will bring his plans into compliance before the use begins.").
Here, as in the Edgmont, Lafayette College and Baird, Landowner did not include in its special exception application any indication of its intent to fulfill the foregoing Zoning Ordinance requirements. In light of the concessions by Landowner's witnesses that the application as submitted does not meet the objective requirements of the Zoning Ordinance, the trial court did not err in granting the Township's and Service Electric's appeal; reversing the Board's decision; and denying Landowner's special exception application on this basis.
Landowner also claims that the trial court erred in reversing the Board's grant of its special exception application because it did not satisfy Section 8.222.f. of the Zoning Ordinance because 67 Pa. Code §471.3 requires prior PennDOT approval for the cargo airport use. In support, Landowner cites the 2007, 2009 and 2010 letters from the FAA issuing a Conditional No Objection determination on the feasibility study that the proposed cargo airport use will not adversely affect the safe and efficient use of navigable airspace subject to a number of conditions and extending that determination.
However, as noted above, the FAA's 2007 letter specifically stated that "[t]his determination does not constitute FAA approval or disapproval of the physical development involved in the proposal;" "[t]his determination does not preempt or waive any ordinance, law, or regulation of any other governmental body or agency;" and "[a] general ordinance of the State of Pennsylvania provides that certain airport construction or alteration require written permits prior to construction [which] may be obtained from [PennDOT]." (R.R. at 29a, 31a).
As a result and contrary to the Board's determinations, the FAA letters do not bring the instant application within the exclusion of 67 Pa. Code §471.3(a) that prior PennDOT approval is not required for "an airport approved or maintained by the government of the United States..." or that FAA regulation and approval was already obtained. (See Board 8/3/12 Decision at 6). Rather, the FAA's 2007 letter specifically recognizes and acknowledges the requirements of 67 Pa. Code §471.3(a) that "[n]o person may establish ... an airport ... unless authorized to do so by the Bureau...;" 67 Pa. Code §471.3(h) that "[i]ssuance of an airport license does not preempt requirements of local zoning authorities;" and Section 8.222.f. of the Township's Zoning Ordinance "[t]hat the use conforms with all applicable regulations governing the district where located." (R.R. at 944a).
In Maher v. East Norriton Township Zoning Hearing Board, 764 A.2d 98 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000), the applicant sought a special exception to construct a personal use heliport and a variance from the set-back requirements of the township's zoning ordinance. The township's zoning hearing board granted the special exception conditioned upon future compliance with PennDOT's licensing requirements for the heliport use. On appeal, the trial court affirmed; however, on further appeal, this Court reversed, explaining:
We are persuaded, therefore, that the language of Section 471.3(a) and (h) lends itself to no other interpretation but that licensure precede the establishment, maintenance or operation of a heliport.... The Regulations ... make no exceptions. Their language, in our view, is unequivocal that application for licensure must be made and a license must be obtained before the Board can act on a request for a special exception to construct and operate a heliport.... In addition, we cannot ignore the mandate of Section 471.3 of the PennDot Regulations which clearly states that a heliport may not be established without authorization. The grant of a special exception is the first step in the establishment of a heliport and would violate the applicable PennDot Regulations which require licensing as a condition precedent. Thus, the language of Section 471.3(a) and (h) of the PennDot Regulations and [the township's zoning ordinance] unequivocally and unambiguously require that licensure be a condition precedent to any action by the Board on an application for a special exception to construct and operate a heliport.Maher, 764 A.2d at 100 (emphasis in original).
Likewise, it is uncontradicted in this case that Landowner did not seek or obtain PennDOT licensure for the cargo airport use prior to applying for a special exception. As a result, the application as submitted does not meet the objective requirements of Section 8.222.f. of the Zoning Ordinance; the trial court did not err in granting the Township's and Service Electric's appeal; reversing the Board's decision; and denying Landowner's special exception application on this basis. See Maher, 764 A.2d at 100 ("Because we deem the application for and the obtaining of a license to construct and operate the proposed heliport to be a condition precedent to any application or action by the Board, we reverse.").
Landowner also claims that the trial court exceeded its scope of review by weighing evidence and making credibility determinations. However, because the Board's grant of the application was properly reversed based on Landowner's failure to meet the foregoing objective requirements of the Zoning Ordinance, we need not reach the merits of this claim and may affirm the trial court's order on either of the foregoing bases alone. See, e.g., Maple Street A.M.E. Zion Church v. City of Williamsport, 7 A.3d 319, 323 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) ("[T]his Court may affirm a trial court's order for any reason raised below, regardless of the reason the trial court relied on in its decision....") (citation omitted). See also Maher, 764 A.2d at 100 n.1 ("In light of our disposition, we need not address any of the other issues presented by Appellant regarding future compliance with licensing, fencing and parking requirements and failure to demonstrate how the parking area will be reconfigured."). --------
Accordingly, the trial court's order is affirmed.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge Judge McGinley did not participate in the decision in this case. ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of October, 2014, the order of the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas dated January 30, 2014, at No. S-1947-2012 is affirmed.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge
(Id. at 944a).