Opinion
Case No. 1:99-CV-893
May 12, 2000
ORDER
In accordance with the opinion entered this date, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's motion to dismiss (Docket #10) is GRANTED as to Count I. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JUDGMENT is entered in favor of the Defendant as to Count I and the Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff's state law claims in Counts II, III, IV and V are DISMISSED without prejudice.
Date: May 12, 2000
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Court heard oral argument on March 24, 2000. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants the motion.
I
The Plaintiff is employed by Overnight Transportation ("Overnight") in Walker, Michigan. The Defendant is General Teamsters Local 406 ("Local 406"), chartered by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America ("International Brotherhood"). In June 1995, Local 406 was certified by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the approximately 32 employees in the bargaining unit in the Walker facility. Overnight actively campaigned against the union's effort to organize and has been the subject of several unfair labor practice charges. The relationship has been fraught with tension and acrimony. The NLRB issued complaints in six separate actions alleging that Overnight discharged, reprimanded and disciplined its employees for supporting the Defendant. The Defendant is alleged to have "threatened, harassed and misled" Overnight's customers. No collective bargaining agreement has been reached.
Frank Micele Aff. ¶ 7.
In 1999, employees of Overnight filed at least three decertification petitions with the NLRB seeking to have the Defendant decertified as the exclusive bargaining representative.
The NLRB dismissed the petitions.
The Plaintiff contends that he has been physically harassed and threatened by the Defendant's agents, including several incidents while driving an Overnight truck. He also asserts that his mailbox has been smashed and trash has been thrown on his lawn. In June 1999, the Plaintiff wrote a letter to the Defendant, asking that the property damage and threats against him be investigated. He also inquired as to the status of the negotiations and asked why bargaining had not taken place locally. He expressed concern about the potential for a national strike called without local involvement and asked the Defendant to respond. In a July 1999 letter, the Plaintiff stated that he had not heard from the Defendant as to the investigation into the threats against him.
The Plaintiff expressed concern that the Defendant had not provided any information about "what is going on in the negotiations or what, if anything, you have done for employees here." He also asked for information regarding the Defendant's campaign to convince Overnight customers to stop doing business with Overnight, how much the campaign would cost and what was hoped to be gained from it.
On October 25, 1999, the Defendant commenced a strike at the Walker facility. Overnight filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Defendant alleging that it was threatening and intimidating employees. On November 1, 1999, the Plaintiff filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Defendant alleging harassment and intimidation. That charge is currently under investigation.
In November 1999, the Plaintiff commenced this action alleging that the Defendant breached its duty of fair representation in violation of section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (Count I) and state law claims of assault (Count II); battery (Count III); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV); and invasion of privacy/intrusion upon seclusion and solitude (Count V). The Plaintiff requests as relief, inter alia, that the Court decertify the Defendant as the exclusive bargaining representative.
II
The Complaint alleges that the Defendant breached its duty of fair representation by failing to "meet and bargain on behalf of the Grand Rapids employees in any material way"; refusing to adequately represent Plaintiff in the collective bargaining process; improperly delegating its bargaining responsibility to the International Brotherhood; "intentionally concealed the facts surrounding negotiations with Overnight"; and committing tortious acts against the Plaintiff.
Amended Compl. ¶ 15.
Amended Compl. ¶ 35.
Amended Compl. ¶ 17.
Amended Compl. ¶ 37.
The Defendant first moves to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1). Specifically, the Defendant contends that although Count I is cast as a duty of fair representation claim, the allegations are that the Defendant bargained in bad faith, conduct that constitutes an unfair labor practice under Section 8 of the NLRA and is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.
The Plaintiff responds that it is a question of fact as to whether the Defendant has fulfilled its duty of fair representation to him by failing to bargain. Additionally, he argues that the Court should consider his claim because he has no right of recourse through the NLRB as evidenced by the NLRB's decision not to consider the decertification petitions and that charge is severely limited in scope, substance and remedial capabilities. The NLRA preempts state and federal court jurisdiction to remedy conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited by the Act.
Pl's Resp. in Opp'n to Def's Mtn to Dismiss at 7. The relevant portion of the Plaintiff's oral argument provides as follows:
[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Now in this case we're focusing on the relationship between Dean Dykstra and the Teamsters Local in our fair representation claim. And what we're asking for in our fair representation claim is for a jury to decide as a matter of a fact, has the Teamsters Local fulfilled its requirement for fair representation to Dean Dykstra by doing nothing for five years? It hasn't done a thing. By its own admission, it has done no bargaining either on the national issues or on the local issues. They've done nothing. Is that consistent with their duty of fair representation? Trans. of Oral Arg. at 22.
Pl's Resp. in Opp'n to Def's Mtn to Dismiss at 11.
Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 276 (1971); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
Section 8 of the NLRA provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a union or an employer to refuse to bargain. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (d). Thus, claims under section 8 are within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Serrano v. Jones Laughlin Steel Co., 790 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1986).
The semantic label of "fair representation" dressing the Plaintiff's claims cannot disguise that the crux of the complaint is that the Defendant is refusing to bargain. "Pre-emption . . . is designed to shield the system from conflicting regulation of conduct. It is the conduct being regulated, not the formal description of governing legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern." Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 486. See also Sheridan v. Int'l Broth. of Elec. Workers, 945 F. Supp. 12, 17 (D.Mass. 1996) (because the union's alleged activity involved collective bargaining, the court's jurisdiction is preempted by the NLRA). As such, the NLRB has jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claims.
Assuming arguendo that the Court has jurisdiction, dismissal is still appropriate under the circumstances because: (1) the factual allegations fail to constitute a duty of fair representation claim pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) and (2) the Plaintiff has presented the same allegations to the NLRB.
A 12(b)(6) motion questions the sufficiency of the pleadings. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). Such motions will be granted "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Lewis v. ACB Business Services, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir. 1998). The complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and its well-pleaded facts accepted as true. Id. Where matters outside the pleadings are considered, the motion is construed as one for summary judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56. A union breaches its duty of fair representation only if its actions are either "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." This rule applies to all union activity and a union's actions are "arbitrary" only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, its behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational. Air Line Pilots Assn. Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). "O'Neill mandates that a deferential standard of review be utilized in evaluating a union's actions."Nida v. Plant Protection Ass'n Nat'l, 7 F.3d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 1993). They may be challenged only if "wholly irrational." Id. In carrying out its duty of fair representation, an unwise or even an unconsidered decision by the union is not necessarily an irrational decision. Id. "Although O'Neill dealt with a union's alleged breach in the context of contract-negotiation only, the Sixth Circuit has concluded that its standards apply to both the contract-negotiation and grievance claims." Walk v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 958 F.2d 1323, 1326 (6th Cir. 1992).
Both parties have attached documents to their pleadings.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the allegations do not rise to the "arbitrary, irrational or bad faith" standard necessary to state a fair representation claim.
The Defendant's alleged delegation of its bargaining authority to the International Brotherhood is expressly contemplated by the Constitution of the International Brotherhood. In addition, the Defendant has offered evidence indicating that Overnight sought coordinated bargaining. The Plaintiff offers no authority that allegations of refusal to bargain and harassment have been recognized as stating a fair representation claim. Even assuming that the allegations constituted a duty of fair representation claim, dismissal is still appropriate because it is undisputed that the Plaintiff has already engaged the NLRB in the review of the same allegations as he presents here. The policy behind NLRB preemption — the avoidance of conflicting regulation of conduct by entrusting the development of a national, common labor law to a centralized, expert agency, see Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 286-88 — would not be furthered by this Court also considering Plaintiff's claim. The Court can divine no basis to expend additional judicial resources on issues that are presently before the appropriate administrative agency.
Frank Micele Aff. ¶ 14.
Frank Micele Aff. ¶ 11, Ex. 5.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Count I, the basis of federal jurisdiction, and declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's state law claims. Those claims are dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Crooked Lake Development, Inc. v. Emmet County, 763 F. Supp. 1398, 1404 (W.D.Mich. 1991).
The Defendant summarily requests costs, expenses and attorney fees, which the Court denies.
An order and judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Date: May 12, 2000