Several aspects of the Bongard application do not expressly disclose elements of the Mavrovic process. Stamicarbon has thus relied on the law of inherent disclosure. This patent law doctrine holds that for process A to be held to duplicate process B, it is not necessary for process A to expressly disclose all the limitations of process B; rather, it is sufficient if the "necessary and only reasonable interpretation" of process A is that it duplicates process B. Dyer v. Field, 386 F.2d 466, 471, 55 CCPA 771 (1967). In a recent similar case where one party had copied counts from his opponent and relied on the doctrine of inherent disclosure, the court stated that the former had a "twofold burden":

Therefore, whether the Rohm and Haas Netherlands application is § 102(b) prior art with respect to the Mobil claims turns on whether their subject matter was disclosed in the 1971 application "in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms" as required by § 112. See Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int'l, Inc., 835 F.2d 1419, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1735, 100 L.Ed.2d 198 (1988); In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 261 (C.C.P.A. 1976); Martin v. Johnson, 454 F.2d 746, 750, 59 CCPA 769 (1972); In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967, 968, 58 CCPA 1233 (1971); In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1406, 56 CCPA 1424 (1969); Dyer v. Field, 386 F.2d 466, 468 n. 3, 55 CCPA 771 (1967); Swain v. Crittendon, 332 F.2d 820, 823-24, 51 CCPA 1459 (1964). Prior to amendment in 1984, 35 U.S.C. § 120 provided that:

However, by its terms, section 120 applies only if the earlier-filed application, in this case the grandparent, complies with the requirements of section 112. See Dyer v. Field, 386 F.2d 466, 468 n. 3, 156 USPQ 85, 86 n. 3, 55 C.C.P.A. 771 (1967). Thus, Bayer may defeat the 102(d) bar on this basis only if the '560 application fulfills the disclosure requirements of section 112.

See Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571-72, 41 USPQ2d 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1997). It is insufficient as written description, for purposes of establishing priority of invention, to provide a specification that does not unambiguously describe all limitations of the count. See, e.g., Wagoner v. Barger, 463 F.2d 1377, 1380, 175 USPQ2d 85, 86-87 (CCPA 1972); Dyer v. Field, 386 F.2d 466, 156 USPQ 85 (CCPA 1967); Bocciarelli v. Huffman, 232 F.2d 647, 109 USPQ 385 (CCPA 1956). Hyatt and Boone presented conflicting views of the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention at the time the '881 patent application was filed, and disputed whether such a person would have understood the text of Hyatt's original claim 40 as describing all of the limitations of the count.

We see no reason why the co-spinning process of Sze would not result in as much random disposition of the filaments as the process of Bloch. If Bloch's process results in random distribution, and it is out of the Bloch patent that claims arose having such a limitation, we think Sze's co-spinning process must also necessarily result in such random disposition. Appellee also relies on Dyer v. Field, 386 F.2d 466, 55 CCPA 771 (1967), where this court found counts directed to a bulky yarn having interwoven filaments were not supported by the Field disclosure. While that case involved the same art area and generally similar issues, both the count limitations in issue and the disclosed process which allegedly supported those limitations are different from those involved herein. We fail to see how Dyer v. Field is controlling in this case; however, to the extent that it is relevant we have considered it, and the other cases cited by the parties, in reaching our decision.

He nevertheless contends that the application should be interpreted as supporting the limitations in question. As pointed out by Noyce, the present case generally parallels the case of Dyer v. Field, 386 F.2d 466, 55 CCPA 771 (1967). There, the junior party Field was involved in interference on a continuation-in-part application which was expanded substantially over the parent application relied on for priority with respect to the very feature of the invention in issue that was in controversy.

Compare the wording of 35 U.S.C. § 119. See Dyer v. Field, 386 F.2d 466, 55 CCPA 771 (1967), footnote 3; In re Risse, 378 F.2d 948, 54 CCPA 1495 (1967); In re Hitchings, 342 F.2d 80, 52 CCPA 1141 (1965); Swain v. Crittendon, 332 F.2d 820, 51 CCPA 1459 (1964). Finally, appellant argues that the instant application is entitled to the filing date of the German applications even though we find it is not entitled to the date of the parent U.S. application.

It is sufficient if the disclosure in the application is so worded that the "necessary and only reasonable" construction to be given the application by one skilled in the art is one which will lend clear support to each limitation in the count. Krohm v. Oishei, 373 F.2d 992, 996, 54 C.C.P.A. 1260 (1967); Dyer v. Field, 386 F.2d 466, 471, 55 C.C.P.A. 771 (1967); Binstead v. Littmann, 242 F.2d 766, 770, 44 C.C.P.A. 839 (1957). However, to inherently disclose the invention, it is not sufficient that a person following the disclosure in the application might obtain the results set forth in the count because it must inevitably happen.