All three of the matters of which the husband complains are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its judgment regarding such matters will not be reversed, absent a showing that it has abused that discretion. Lucero v. Lucero, 485 So.2d 347 (Ala.Civ.App. 1986). See (regarding alimony) Dyar v. Dyar, 484 So.2d 1116 (Ala.Civ.App. 1986); Brannon v. Brannon, 477 So.2d 445 (Ala.Civ.App. 1985); Golson v. Golson, 471 So.2d 426 (Ala.Civ.App. 1985). See (regarding the division of property) Dyar, 484 So.2d 1116; Brannon, 477 So.2d 445; Golson, 471 So.2d 426.

" Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324 (3) (50 Am. D. 329). To the same effect see Scott v. McKee, 105 Ga. 256 (2) ( 31 S.E. 183); Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615 (2), 619 ( 131 S.E. 535); Morgan v. Bell, supra; Redfearn, Wills and Administration of Estates, 65, § 48. But it is contended by counsel for the plaintiff in error that the testimony of the caveator made a conflict on the question of the testamentary capacity of his wife, and that such issue should have been referred to the jury.

Dibble v. Currier, 142 Ga. 855, 857 ( 83 S.E. 949) (1914). Accord, e.g., English v. Shivers, 219 Ga. 515 ( 133 S.E.2d 867) (1965); Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615, 628 ( 131 S.E. 535) (1925). In this case, as in Dibble v. Currier, supra, the question of whether the beliefs harbored by the testatrix were insane delusions springing from a disordered intellect, or merely illogical deductions from actual facts, was a question for the jury.

The witness gave sufficient facts upon which to base his opinion as to the mental condition, and it was for the jury to decide if his opinion was well founded. Code § 38-1708; Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324 ( 50 AD 329); Gray v. Obear, 59 Ga. 675; Scott v. McKee, 105 Ga. 256 ( 31 S.E. 183); Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615 ( 131 S.E. 535); McWilliam v. Pattillo, 173 Ga. 771 ( 161 S.E. 597). The injection of the word "monomania" in no degree rendered his testimony inadmissible. Furthermore, counsel for the propounder elicited the testimony from a hostile witness which was apparently a direct and pertinent response to the questions propounded, and he will not be heard to object.

" It is insisted that this charge was erroneous and unsound as an abstract principle of law, in that in effect it instructed the jury that, in considering the question of undue influence, they had a right to consider the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the will, movant contending that the court should have qualified the charge in this respect by instructing the jury that only in case of doubt as to the existence of undue influence could they consider the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the disposition of the estate. Each of the cases cited by counsel for the plaintiff in error in support of this ground of the motion ( Whitfield v. Pitts, 205 Ga. 259, 53 S.E.2d 549; Griffin v. Barrett, 183 Ga. 152, 187 S.E. 828; Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615, 131 S.E. 535; and Thompson v. Ammons, 160 Ga. 886, 129 S.E. 539) deals with this question as applied to mental capacity, and the ground of the motion itself discloses that as to that phase of the case the trial court correctly instructed the jury in accordance with the contentions of the plaintiff in error. As to the issue of undue influence, this court, in Galloway v. Hogg, 167 Ga. 502, 526 ( 146 S.E. 156), said: "It is undoubtedly true that where a will is attacked upon the grounds of the mental incapacity of the testatrix, and of undue influence in the procurement of it, it is always proper to inquire whether the provisions of the will are just and reasonable, and in accord with the state of the testatrix's `family relations or the contrary.

" Slaughter v. Heath, supra. "It is well settled that a non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity of another person, based upon his acquaintance with him and the manner, appearance, and conduct of such person during the time that the witness has known him." Glover v. State, 129 Ga. 717 (5) ( 59 S.E. 816); Harris v. State, 155 Ga. 405 (4) ( 117 S.E. 460); Compton v. Porterfield, 155 Ga. 480 ( 117 S.E. 464); Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615 ( 131 S.E. 535). "Undue influence which operates to invalidate a will is such influence as amounts either to deception or to force and coercion, destroying free agency." Bohler v. Hicks, 120 Ga. 800 (5) ( 48 S.E. 306); Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324 (50 Am. D. 329); Thompson v. Davitte, 59 Ga. 472 (3). Not all persuasion or influence is "undue.

ll, 189 Ga. 432 ( 5 S.E.2d 897). Where a jury can form a correct conclusion from the facts appearing in a case, the opinion of a witness as to such matter is inadmissible. Shaw v. Jones, Newton Co., 133 Ga. 446 (2) ( 66 S.E. 240). Where the jury are as competent as a witness to draw conclusions from facts testified, the opinion of a witness is inadmissible. Robinson v. State, 128 Ga. 254 (4) ( 57 S.E. 315). "Although the opinion of a witness as to a fact is admissible where it is impossible to detail the circumstances which lead him to a particular conclusion, or it is impossible to give the jury sufficient data for them to make a conclusion, and it is permissible for a witness, after the facts and circumstances upon which his conclusion is drawn are stated, to give an opinion, a witness can not state an opinion or conclusion where the data or facts are such that the jury can make its own calculations or conclusions." Harris v. State, 188 Ga. 745, 747 ( 4 S.E.2d 651). It was held in Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615 (8) ( 131 S.E. 535), that whether or not the will sought to be probated represented the vagaries of a drunkard, instead of the natural desire of one disposing of his property, is a question for the jury. The fact that the will is ungrammatical or inaccurate does not of itself establish mental incapacity to execute a will.

Ordinarily, an unnatural or unreasonable disposition of his property by a testator will not, in and of itself, be sufficient to set aside a will. Compare Code § 113-205; Penn v. Thurman, 144 Ga. 67 (3) ( 86 S.E. 233); Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615 (9) ( 131 S.E. 535). Finally, it is insisted by counsel for the caveator that the will was executed under a mistake of fact, and is for that reason void.

This statement was followed with the further statement that the jury should decide that question in estimating the weight to which the opinion is entitled. This same principle has been held and applied in numerous cases, among which are Herndon v. State, 111 Ga. 178 ( 36 S.E. 634; Proctor v. Pointer, 127 Ga. 134 ( 56 S.E. 111); Glover v. State, 129 Ga. 717 ( 59 S.E. 816); Mosley v. Fears, 135 Ga. 71 ( 68 S.E. 804); Harris v. State, 155 Ga. 405 ( 117 S.E. 460); Pennington v. Perry, 156 Ga. 103 ( 118 S.E. 710); Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615 ( 131 S.E. 535); Espy v. Preston, 199 Ga. 609 ( 34 S.E.2d 705). The law as thus stated is sound provided it is held strictly to what it says. It means and says that, when facts sufficient to authorize the introduction of opinion evidence of a nonexpert witness as to the mental condition are shown, such opinion evidence may be introduced. It is then the province of the jury to determine whether or not the facts upon which the opinion is based are sufficient to authorize the opinion; hence what weight the jury will give to such opinion evidence.

" It is urged that this portion of the charge was error, since (1) the issue of general testamentary capacity had been withdrawn from the jury's consideration and they were not authorized to consider whether the will was reasonable or unreasonable; (2) a charge that the jury should give much weight to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the will, even if a charge on that principle of law were applicable, placed too much weight and importance on that principle, and precluded the jury from giving it the consideration which they thought it was entitled to; and (3) the fact that the charge was actually given caused the jury to believe that the court thought they should give "great emphasis, weight, and importance" to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the disposition of testator's estate. In Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 623 ( 131 S.E. 535), this court approved a charge in the following language: "I charge you that in case of doubt as to the extent of the alleged monomania or partial insanity if it existed, and as to its effect in bringing about the disposition of the testator's property, shown by the will, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the disposition of his estate should be considered by you in the decision of such question." In the Dyar case, the court also charged that the reasonable or unreasonable disposition of the testator's estate should have much weight with the jury in its decision on the question.