Opinion
22-cv-07218-DMR
07-29-2024
DWIGHT F., Plaintiff, v. MARTIN J. O'MALLEY, Defendant.
ORDER REMANDING MATTER FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
RE: DKT. NOS. 42, 48
Donna M. Ryu Chief Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Dwight F. moves to reverse the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's (the “Commissioner's”) final administrative decision finding Plaintiff was disabled for a period that ended on June 15, 2020. Plaintiff's requested remedy is a remand for award of benefits. [Docket Nos. 42 (Pl.'s Mot.), 51 (Reply).] The Commissioner concedes that the final administrative decision must be reversed, but moves the court to remand for further proceedings, not for an award of benefits. [Docket No. 48 (Def.'s Mot.).] For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's unopposed motion to reverse the final administrative decision is granted. The Commissioner's motion for a remand for further proceedings is granted. Plaintiff's motion for remand for award of benefits is denied.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits on February 12, 2019, and filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits on July 28, 2020, alleging disability beginning July 31, 2016. Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 251, 339. The application was initially denied on May 10, 2019 and again on reconsideration on August 13, 2020. A.R. 246, 256. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a telephonic hearing on June 10, 2021 and issued a partially favorable decision on October 6, 2021. A.R. 3552. The ALJ determined that from July 31, 2016 through June 15, 2020, Plaintiff was under a disability and had the following severe impairments: congestive heart failure; psoriasis; psoriatic arthritis; alcoholic cirrhosis with ascites; and umbilical hernia. A.R. 42, 45-48. The ALJ also concluded that even though Plaintiff had the same severe impairments on June 16, 2020, “medical improvement” occurred on that date. A.R. 48-49. The ALJ concluded that beginning on June 16, 2020, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) “to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)” with certain limitations. A.R. 49. Relying on the opinion of a vocational expert (“V.E.”) who testified that an individual with such an RFC could perform Plaintiff's past relevant work as a project director, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's disability ended on June 16, 2020. A.R. 51.
After the Appeals Council denied review, Plaintiff sought review in this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In his motion, Plaintiff raises several grounds for reversal of the ALJ's decision, including that the ALJ erred in her evaluation of the medical opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Mythri Gollapalle. See Pl.'s Mot. 8-11. Plaintiff asks the court to remand for an immediate award of benefits. Id. at 19. In response, the Commissioner moves for remand, stating that the parties agree that the ALJ erred in her assessment of Dr. Gollapalle's opinions, and therefore remand is warranted, but the parties could not stipulate to the appropriate type of remand. Def.'s Mot. 1-4. Plaintiff maintains that the remand should be for an immediate award of benefits, while the Commissioner argues the remand should be for further proceedings. See generally Reply.
II. ISSUE FOR REVIEW
Whether the ALJ's error in assessing the medical opinions of Dr. Gollapalle warrants remand for an immediate award of benefits or for further proceedings.
III. DISCUSSION
As noted above, the parties agree that the ALJ erred in assessing Dr. Gollapalle's medical opinions and that this error warrants remand. Accordingly, the only issue remaining is the type of remand. Plaintiff argues that a remand for immediate award of benefits is appropriate, while the Commissioner argues that the case should be remanded for further proceedings.
“A district court may ‘revers[e] the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing,' but ‘the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation[.]'” Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc., Sec. Admin.,775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted)). A court may only remand for benefits “where the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In determining whether to remand for benefits, the Ninth Circuit has devised a “three-part credit-as-true standard.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). Each part of the standard must be satisfied in order for a court to remand to an ALJ with instructions to calculate and award benefits:
(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.
A court is required to remand for further development of a disability case when, “even though all conditions of the credit-as-true rule are satisfied, an evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Id. at 1021.
In 2017, the Social Security Administration promulgated revised regulations applicable to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed.Reg. 5844-01, 2017 WL 168819 (Jan. 18, 2017). Under the new regulations, the SSA no longer gives “any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight,” to medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings, including those from treating physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). One court in the Ninth Circuit has noted that “[t]he new regulations appear to prohibit application of the credit-as-true rule as to medical opinions,” Alonzo v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-18-08317-PCT-JZB, 2020 WL 1000024, at *7 (D. Ariz. Mar. 2, 2020), because the SSA has explained that its “intent in these rules is to make it clear that it is never appropriate under our rules to ‘credit-as-true' any medical opinion.” Revisions, 82 Fed.Reg. 5844-01, at *5858. It appears that the Ninth Circuit has yet to provide guidance on this issue, but courts in the Ninth Circuit have concluded that it no longer is appropriate to apply the credit-as-true rule to medical opinions. See Alonzo, 2020 WL 1000024, at *7; Bracamonte v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-20-01373-PHX-MTL, 2021 WL 4145936, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 13, 2021).
Here, Plaintiff appears to admit that the credit-as-true no longer applies and offers no argument in support of the rule. See Reply 4 (“Defendant correctly notes that the 2017 regulations have likely abrogated the credit-as-true rule”). Accordingly, the court assumes without deciding that the credit-as-true rule does not apply in this case. Nonetheless, Plaintiff contends that “there is ample evidence for the Court to remand for payment regardless of the credit-as-true rule,” arguing that “[t]here is no question” that the ALJ committed reversible error with respect to Dr. Gollapalle's opinions and there are no remaining issues to be resolved by further proceedings. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff argues that the court may remand for payment of benefits in “rare circumstances,” citing Dominguez, 808 F.3d at 407, and asserts that such circumstances are present in this case because “the ALJ found Plaintiff disabled one day and then not disabled the next day based on the exact same medical opinion evidence.” Id. at 6 (emphasis removed). But Plaintiff takes the “rare circumstances” language from Dominguez out of context; in that case, the Ninth Circuit noted that a court may reverse a decision by the Commissioner “with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing” but that “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Dominguez, 808 F.3d at 407 (citations omitted). The court then went on to discuss the credit-as-true rule. It did not establish a separate “rare circumstances” test. See id. at 407-08. In this case, the record is fully developed, but further proceedings are appropriate so that a new disability determination may be made with proper consideration of Dr. Gollapalle's medical opinions.
The court also notes that Plaintiff made additional contentions of error in his opening brief, including whether the ALJ erred 1) with respect to other medical opinion evidence; 2) in determining that Plaintiff's mental impairments are non-severe; 3) in rejecting Plaintiff's testimony; and 4) in assessing Plaintiff's post-June 15, 2020 RFC. See Pl.'s Mot. 1. The Commissioner did not respond to these arguments and Plaintiff asks the court to find in his favor on them. See Reply 7-9. The ALJ's treatment of Dr. Gollapalle's medical opinions may have impacted the ALJ's assessment of other medical opinion evidence, Plaintiff's testimony, and the post-June 15, 2020 RFC. Accordingly, the ALJ shall reconsider these issues on remand.
With respect to Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ erred in finding his mental impairments non-severe, the court finds that the Commissioner failed to respond to the argument and thus concedes it. On remand, the ALJ shall consider the effects of Plaintiff's mental impairments in determining Plaintiff's post-June 15, 2020 RFC. See Valentine v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n RFC that fails to take into account a claimant's limitations is defective.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for relief is granted in part and denied in part. The Commissioner's motion to remand this matter for further proceedings is granted. Plaintiff's motion for remand for award of benefits is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.