Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JV07-214, JV07-215
DAVIS , Acting P.J.
D.W. (petitioner), the mother of M.G. and D.G. (the minors), seeks an extraordinary writ to vacate orders of the juvenile court entered at the 12-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Petitioner contends she was not provided reasonable reunification services and that the juvenile court erred by not ordering additional services. Disagreeing with these contentions, we shall deny the petition.
Hereafter, undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Facts and Procedural History
On June 7, 2006, petitions were filed in Placer County regarding 16-year-old D.G. and 10-year-old M.G. based on petitioner’s substance abuse and untreated mental illness, which rendered her periodically unable to provide adequate care for the minors. This included a lack of consistent medical care for M.G., who had shunted hydrocephalus and complex partial seizures. It was further alleged that petitioner had left M.G. in the care of a registered sex offender who sexually molested her. Petitioner had a psychiatric history that included bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, panic attacks and depression. The family had a lengthy history of referrals for neglect issues, although no prior petitions had been filed.
The minors’ father was deceased.
The allegations in the petitions were sustained, and in September 2006 the juvenile court adopted the social worker’s recommended case plan, requiring petitioner to participate in two assessments and to follow the treatment recommendations of these assessments, in addition to submitting to testing three times per week.
According to the six-month review report, petitioner had completed the required assessments but had not participated in treatment or testing. She continued to insist there was no basis for removal of the minors and disagreed with the assessment recommendation for residential treatment. She told the social worker that she would continue to fight the court case and the requirement that she participate in recommended services. Meanwhile, the minors had been placed with their paternal aunt in San Mateo.
In March 2007, on the date of the six-month review hearing, petitioner filed a change of address reflecting that she was living in Yolo County. The Placer County juvenile court found that the social services agency had complied with the case plan and that petitioner’s compliance with the plan had been poor. The court ordered the reunification plan to remain in effect, adding requirements for residential treatment and weekly therapy, and ordered the matters transferred to Yolo County.
The transfer was accepted by Yolo County in early May 2007, after which the social worker met with petitioner and explained to her what she needed to do to comply with the case plan. She gave petitioner referrals to substance abuse programs (including a referral to John H. Jones, a dual diagnosis program) and to Yolo County Mental Health, as well as housing and other referrals. Petitioner expressed the same attitude toward treatment that she had in Placer County, but said she was considering different programs and would enter a program “after a certain event.” Petitioner did not indicate when this event would occur. The social worker told petitioner to inform her of the program she chose to assure it would satisfy the case plan.
According to the 12-month review report, petitioner was unemployed, had failed to contact the social worker, aside from one visit, had failed to return her telephone calls, had not confirmed she was participating in services and had failed to drug test. Visits were supervised by the minors’ aunt and occurred every week in San Mateo or Sacramento. Petitioner was often late or cancelled visits, and would spend much of the time during visits talking with her fiancé. She also complained to the minors about her life and threatened not to come “if she [got] hassled.” The social worker recommended termination of reunification services.
At a court hearing in November 2007, the juvenile court ordered petitioner to drug test immediately after court. Petitioner complied, testing positive for marijuana and an opiate.
The 12-month review hearing occurred on November 30, 2007. Petitioner’s fiancé testified that petitioner had attempted to contact the social worker “several times,” and that, to his knowledge, the social worker returned her calls once. According to the fiancé, petitioner entered a rehabilitation program in August 2007, but after approximately six weeks in the program, she was asked to leave because they were unable to handle her mental health problems. The fiancé testified that petitioner’s mental health problems had made it difficult for her to access services, but that she currently was attending group therapy at the John H. Jones program and was seeing a psychiatrist for her bipolar disorder.
The social worker testified that the lead counselor at petitioner’s rehabilitation program had communicated to her that petitioner “walked out” of the program after less than three weeks. According to the social worker, petitioner had left only one message for her, which the social worker returned. The social worker also had asked petitioner’s attorney to have petitioner call her.
The juvenile court found that reasonable services had been offered to petitioner and terminated services. The court noted that the social worker had referred petitioner to mental health services, and the fact that petitioner finally was in an appropriate program was “too little, too late.”
Discussion
I
Petitioner contends the juvenile court erred in finding she was offered reasonable reunification services, contending the social services agency “made absolutely no attempt to assist” her. We disagree.
At a 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court must determine whether the parent has been offered reasonable services designed to aid in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and continued custody of the child. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) “The court may not order that a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 be held unless there is clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(C), 3d par.).)
The purpose of reunification services is to correct the conditions that led to removal so that the dependent child can be returned home. (In re Joanna Y. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 433, 438.) The social worker must make a good faith effort to provide reasonable services responding to the unique needs of each family “in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of success.” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 254.) “[T]he record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult[.]” (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414, italics omitted.) In evaluating reunification services, “[t]he standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
On the other hand, “[r]eunification is not without its limits or conditions.” (In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 679.) “Reunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent.” (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.) They are subject to time constraints (§ 361.5, subd. (a)) and require the cooperation of the parent. (In re Mario C. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 599, 604.)
A juvenile court’s finding regarding reasonable services is subject to review for substantial evidence. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010.) In making a substantial evidence determination, we resolve all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party and leave the resolution of issues of fact and credibility to the trier of fact. (In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) “In the presence of substantial evidence, appellate justices are without the power to reweigh conflicting evidence and alter a dependency court determination.” (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705.)
Petitioner complains that the social worker’s efforts to assist her in completing her case plan were limited to arranging visits and providing her with a list of referrals, and that there was no evidence the list of referrals was tailored to her needs. To the contrary, the social worker provided petitioner referrals to a dual diagnosis program and to Yolo County Mental Health to address petitioner’s substance abuse and mental health issues. In other words, the referrals were tailored to petitioner’s needs. In response to the social worker’s efforts to provide appropriate referrals, petitioner informed her that she was considering various programs and would choose one on her own timetable. Thus, we find petitioner’s complaints about the social worker’s referrals disingenuous.
Nor does the evidence support petitioner’s claim that the social worker did not help her “understand which services should be accessed right away[] and which should have less priority.” In fact, the social worker met with petitioner and explained to her what she needed to do to comply with the case plan. Moreover, the record suggests that it was petitioner’s procrastination and her resistance to social services’ intervention, not her failure to prioritize services, which caused reunification to be unsuccessful.
Petitioner complains about the lack of contact from the Yolo County social worker after their meeting in May 2007, claiming that her mental health problems required “some hands[-]on assistance from the social worker.” However, when the social worker met with petitioner following the transfer of the matters to Yolo County, she instructed petitioner to inform her when she had chosen a program. Thereafter, the social worker made telephone calls to petitioner and attempted to contact her through her attorney, but petitioner did not return her calls and otherwise failed to contact her. Such efforts to contact petitioner were reasonable.
Petitioner claims the social worker could have contacted her at visits with the minors, but petitioner reportedly was often late for visits or cancelled them. Furthermore, visits had been reduced to twice a month and were supervised by the minors’ aunt, presumably in San Mateo where the aunt lived. Reasonable contact did not require the social worker to travel this distance on the hope that petitioner would be present and would be willing to meet with her before or after the visit.
Petitioner also faults the social worker for not contacting her fiancé regarding “the situation at the home and what [petitioner’s] needs might be.” However, there is no evidence that petitioner had authorized the social worker to discuss her circumstances with her fiancé, nor is there reason to believe the social worker would have been any more successful in contacting petitioner’s fiancé than she had been in contacting petitioner herself.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services had been offered or provided to petitioner.
II
Petitioner also claims the juvenile court abused its discretion by not continuing services. She premises this argument, in part, on her contention that she was not provided reasonable services, an argument that we have rejected.
Petitioner cites authority both for continuing services to the 18-month limit and for continuing services beyond the 18-month limit. However, as petitioner offers no factual analysis as to why she should have received services beyond the 18-month limit and does not request this remedy, we do not address this issue.
The other basis for petitioner’s claim is that the juvenile court failed to make a finding that there was not a substantial probability the minors could be returned if services were extended to the 18-month limit.
It is true that, at the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court “shall continue the case [to the 18-month limit for services] only if it finds that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent . . . and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time.” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) In such case, “the hearing shall occur within 18 months of the date the child was originally taken from the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) However, to continue services on this basis, the court must find that the parent has made significant progress in resolving the problems leading to removal and has demonstrated the capacity to complete the objectives of her case plan and to provide for the child’s needs, in addition to finding that the parent has maintained regular contact with the child. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)-(C).)
Although the juvenile court is required to make this finding if it orders a continuation of services beyond the 12-month review, petitioner cites no authority requiring that the court make a contrary finding when the evidence to support continued services is lacking. And even assuming the juvenile court was required to make such a finding, an implied finding would suffice. (See In re Andrea G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 547, 554.) Based on petitioner’s attitude and progress in the present matter and the fact that only seven days remained before the 18-month limit was reached, the finding properly can be implied here.
Disposition
The writ petition is denied.
We concur: NICHOLSON , J., HULL , J.