Duval v. R. R

19 Citing cases

  1. Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co.

    327 N.C. 491 (N.C. 1990)   Cited 80 times
    Holding that evidence of groundwater flow from one suspected spill site toward plaintiffs' wells was sufficient to create issue of fact regarding causation, but testimony that groundwater in a lower aquifer could possibly flow in the other direction was not sufficient to support a finding that a different suspected spill site also contributed to contamination

    Several older cases have addressed the issue of whether an action was barred by a statute of limitations for a continuing trespass involving the diversion of water onto the land of another. See Duval v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 161 N.C. 448, 77 S.E. 311 (1913); Roberts v. Baldwin, 151 N.C. 407, 66 S.E. 346 (1909); and Spilman v. Navigation Co., 74 N.C. 675 (1876). In Spilman, for example, defendant had built a canal which deteriorated to the point that water from the canal oozed through the canal banks and over plaintiffs' land.

  2. Barcliff v. R. R

    96 S.E. 644 (N.C. 1918)   Cited 11 times

    This would not do, as it would be manifestly unjust, and contrary to all principles by which we judge the conduct of men. He cannot accept the benefit of his selection and at the same time repudiate the consequences. This Court held in Barcliff v. R. R., 168 N.C. 268, that permanent damages were recoverable, which was approved later in Barcliff v. R. R., 175 N.C. 114, citing Revisal, sec. 394 (2); Ridley v. R. R., 118 N.C. 996; Stack v. R. R., 139 N.C. 366; Beasley v. R. R., 147 N.C. 362; Porter v. R. R., 148 N.C. 563; Duvall v. R. R., 161 N.C. 448; Perry v. R. R., 171 N.C. 38. The jury, in this case, have found as a fact that the ditch or drain has not been changed in any respect that would cause additional damage.

  3. Long v. City of Charlotte

    306 N.C. 187 (N.C. 1982)   Cited 114 times
    Holding that “in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, municipal corporations are immune from punitive damages”

    ually included, and for the impairment of value done to the remainder, and that in ascertaining the amount it is proper, among other things, to consider the inconvenience and annoyances likely to arise in the orderly exercise of the easement which interfere with the use and proper enjoyment of the property by the owner and which sensibly impair its value, and in this may be included the injury and annoyance from the jarring, noise, smoke, cinders, etc., from the operating of trains and also damage from fires to the extent that it exists from close proximity of the property and not attributable to defendant's negligence. (Citations omitted.) And it may be well to note that these damages are allowed and estimated, as stated, on the theory that the right is to be exercised in an orderly and proper manner; for notwithstanding the acquirement of such an easement, if an owner is subsequently injured in his proprietary rights by the negligence on the part of the company, a case presented in Duval v. R. R., 161 N.C. 448, and to some extent involved in Thomason v. R. R., supra, or if, in the enjoyment of the right, a nuisance is clearly and unnecessarily created, a case presented in R. R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, an action lies, and because it does, compensation for injuries attributable to negligence, etc., are not as a rule included. 167 N.C. 464, 467-68, 83 S.E. 809, 811 (1914).

  4. Tate v. Power Co.

    53 S.E.2d 88 (N.C. 1949)   Cited 1 times

    There is neither allegation nor proof of an entry upon the lands of the plaintiffs for the purpose of appropriating them to a public use; nor of ponding water thereon. Duval v. R.R., 161 N.C. 448, 77 S.E. 311. The headwaters of the defendant's reservoir do not reach within three miles of the plaintiffs' farms. The complaint sets out a consequential injury or secondary result, and not a direct trespass or a taking as that term is used in the cases, though so designated once or twice in the pleading.

  5. Gibbs v. Mills

    151 S.E. 864 (N.C. 1930)   Cited 6 times

    There was therefore no error in the instruction that the plaintiff could recover for any damage done her property, in the manner alleged, within three years prior to the time she became a party to the action. Roberts v. Baldwin, 151 N.C. 407; Duval v. R. R., 161 N.C. 448; Langley v. Hosiery Mills, 194 N.C. 644. We find

  6. Dayton v. Asheville

    185 N.C. 12 (N.C. 1923)   Cited 38 times
    Holding that the statute of limitations for eminent domain actions applied to an action to recover damages for smoke, ashes, and odors from a city incinerator next to the plaintiff's land

    It is true his Honor limited the jury in its award of damages to such as had been sustained in the three years next immediately preceding the commencement of the action, together with such further damages as were likely to occur in the future; and this upon the theory of a renewing, intermittent, and recurring trespass. Duval v. R. R., 161 N.C. 448; Roberts v. Baldwin, 155 N.C. 279. But this, we think, was a misconception of the real basis of plaintiffs' cause of action.

  7. Price v. R. R

    102 S.E. 308 (N.C. 1920)   Cited 2 times

    The plaintiff offered evidence tending to show that the drainage was sufficient before the railroad was constructed, but on account of the ditches being filled up, and there being no culvert, the water could not get through, and consequently injured the plaintiff's land and crops by backing up on it. This evidence, if believed, makes out a cause of action, and entitles the plaintiff to recover damages for three years preceding the commencement of the action. Duvall v. R. R., 161 N.C. 448; Roberts v. Baldwin, 155 N.C. 276; Davenport v. R. R., 148 N.C. 287. The defendant excepted to the following charge: "If you find from the evidence, by its greater weight, that the railroad company failed and refused to keep its railroad ditch, or ditches, along its right of way open and free of obstruction, and failed to keep the same clean in such a manner as to allow the water to flow along the same, and by reason of said negligence the flow of water was impeded, and the flow was turned upon the plaintiffs' land, and stood thereon, and sobbed and soured the same, and destroyed the plaintiffs' growing crops, and find that this endangered and probably caused the plaintiffs' injury and damage, then you would answer the second issue `Yes.'"

  8. Spencer v. Wills

    102 S.E. 275 (N.C. 1920)   Cited 7 times
    In Spencer v. Wills, 179 N.C. 275, 102 S.E. 275, it is written, at bottom of page 177: "In various decisions appertaining to the subject, we have held that parties to proceedings of this character and in reference to their lands situate within the district are estopped from questioning by independent suit the judgment establishing the district or the validity and amount of the assessments made in the cause or the matter of burdens and benefits affecting the property.

    Ordinarily such damages are supposed to have been allowed for in the original dedication, but the position does not prevail as a protection against negligence in doing the work. Harper v. Lenoir, 152 N.C. 723, citing Meares v. Wilmington, 31 N.C. 73, and other cases, and so, in land condemned for railroad purposes, the damages naturally incident to the construction of the road, carried out according to the survey and plans, etc., are covered by the original award, but for injuries caused by negligence in construction or maintenance of such places recovery may be had. Duval v. R. R., 161 N.C. 448, and cases cited. We were referred by counsel to McGillis v. Willis, 39 Ill. App. 311, as a decision against plaintiff's right to recover in this instance, but, in our opinion, that case is not an authority for his position.

  9. Barclift v. R. R

    95 S.E. 39 (N.C. 1918)   Cited 6 times

    These positions were all recognized and applied in Barclift v. R. R., 168 N.C. 268, a suit between these same parties concerning another piece of land in the same locality and involving the same diversion of water and the trespass incident to this alleged wrong. That well-considered case is in full accord with our decisions on this subject, and we regard it as decisive of all questions presented on the present appeal. Perry v. R. R., 171 N.C. 38; Duvall v. R. R., 161 N.C. 448; Porter v. R. R., 148 N.C. 563; Beasley v. R. R., 147 N.C. 362; Stack v. R. R., 139 N.C. 366; Ridley v. R. R., 118 N.C. 996. We find no error in the record, and the judgment for plaintiff is affirmed.

  10. Lumber Co. v. Drainage Commissioners

    94 S.E. 457 (N.C. 1917)   Cited 5 times
    In Lumber Co. v. Drainage Comrs., 174 N.C. 647, it was held that the assessment of damages to be paid to the owner of land, taken under the power of Eminent Domain, is conclusive upon such owner, although in proper instances the owner may recover by independent action substantial damages sustained by the negligent exercise of the power.

    It may be, and the authorities seem to hold, that for appreciable damages caused by such negligence, and which the owner could not avoid by reasonable effort on his own part, a recovery might be had, the damages being awarded in the first instance on the theory that the work will be carefully done and in accordance with the plans and specifications. Duvall v. R. R., 161 N.C. 448; Wood v. Land Co., 165 N.C. 367; Quantz v. Concord, 150 N.C. 539; Meares v. Wilmington, 31 N.C. 73. But there are no facts presented which would uphold any such position.