Opinion
No. C 02-4024 CRB (PR)
October 1, 2003
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In its order filed October 16, 2002, the court found that when liberally construed, the petition stated colorable claims for relief under § 2254, and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer and petitioner filed a traverse in response.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner was sentenced to 15 years in prison after a jury convicted him of conspiring to manufacture (Cal. Pen. Code, § 182) and manufacturing methamphetamine (Cal. Health Saf. Code, § 11379.6) in a quantity exceeding 25 gallons (CaL Health Saf. Code, § 11379.8, subd. (a)(3)), possessing substances with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine (Cal. Health Saf. Code, § 11383, subd. (c)(1)), possessing laboratory glassware for manufacturing purposes (Cal. Health Saf. Code, § 11104.5), disposing of hazardous waste (Cal. Health Saf. Code, § 11374.5, subd. (a)), and giving false information to a police officer (Cal. Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a)).
In a published opinion, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, but reversed the 10-year drug quantity enhancement imposed against count one — the conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine — on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that petitioner was substantially involved in the direction, supervision, or financing of the conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. See People v. Duran, No. H021 112, 94 Cal.App 4th 923 (CaL Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2001) (Resp't. Ex. B-2). On remand, the trial court imposed one of the enhancements it had previously stayed and again sentenced petitioner to an enhanced term of 15 years in state prison.
Petitioner sought review from the Supreme Court of California, but on March 13, 2002, the state high court denied review of his petition.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 20, 2002.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts of the case adopted by the California Court of Appeal are as follows:
It was undisputed at trial that, on March 3, 1999, a narcotics task force discovered a methamphetamine laboratory in a detached garage on ranch property at 270 Highway 183 in Monterey County between Salinas and Castroville. Evidence of almost every step of methamphetamine manufacture was found on both sides of a partition in the garage: 132 empty bottles of pseudophedrine; blenders and a spice grinder for grinding the pseudophedrine pills into powder; empty cans of denatured alcohol for soaking the powder to separate the pseudophedrine from its binders; metal pots and a propane tank for cooking off the alcohol; large heating flasks and mantles for cooking together the powder with red phosphorous and iodine; coveralls stained with a characteristic red ana orange; hoses and a fan to ventilate the poisonous fumes resulting from the cooking; used and unused latex gloves; a bucket of sodium hydroxide for changing the cooked product from an acid to a base; a can of freon, a solvent to which methamphetamine attaches; and a cylinder of hydrochloride gas for crystallizing the liquid. The result of this entire chemical process is a paste, which is put onto cut bed sheets and run through a mop bucket to squeeze out more liquid. Mop buckets and used and unused sheets were in the garage. Five-gallon plastic buckets contained a number of solutions, some containing ephedrine. Over 25 gallons of solution in different buckets contained methamphetamine. There was no finished methamphetamine.
The task force discovered that hazardous waste byproducts of methamphetamine manufacture had been disposed of in the backyard of the property.
Living in the residence on the property at the time were Marco and Elva Carranza and their infant child. In the Carranzas' bedroom were keys to padlocks for the rear and front of the garage. One hundred thirty-one grams of ephedrine were found in a baggie inside a sock in a shoe box in a spare bedroom of the residence. Also in that bedroom were men's clothing and a mattress on the floor. In a bucket under the kitchen sink was some methamphetamine solution.
Defendant's connection to the methamphetamine laboratory follows. The police surveilled the residence on March 2, 1999, the day before the laboratory was discovered, based on information revealed during an ongoing DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) wiretap of a cellular telephone with a Los Angeles number. When the police began surveillance at 7:00 p.m., a Dodge Ram pickup truck borrowed by codefendant Juan Garcia was parked at the residence along with a Honda car. The Honda car left the premises at 7:05 p.m. and returned around 10:20 p.m. A female took a small child out of the backseat.
A blue Chevy van arrived at 8:30 p.m. Two men inside either loaded or unloaded something from the garage area and left about five minutes later.
Around 9:30 p.m., one of the surveillance officers, Monterey County Sheriff's narcotics investigator Douglas Dahmen, mistakenly drove a camper truck down the driveway of the ranch property before leaving through a field. A wiretapped phone call at 9:28 p.m. asked someone to check out a camper truck parked near the ranch. The person said they would not be at the ranch until 10:00 p.m. Dahmen was warned and moved his truck.
Around 9:30 p.m., two men got into the Dodge pickup and drove off the ranch. The pickup lights only went on when the truck reached the highway. The truck returned around 9:45 p.m. and two men went into the residence.
Dahmen had the blue Chevy van stopped in Salinas by other officers around 10:00 p.m. The van was searched with a drug-sniffing dog. The two male occupants were field-interviewed and released within about 45 minutes. An intercepted telephone call from an occupant of the van warned the occupants of the house to leave immediately.
Around 11:00 p.m. three males left the ranch in the Dodge pickup. At 11:09 p.m. Monterey County Deputy Sheriff Larry Robinson stopped the pickup truck just outside Salinas. Jose Vasquez was driving. Defendant Noe Duran and codefendant Juan Garcia were also in the truck. Defendant identified himself as Felipe Sibrian. Garcia identified himself to the police as Raul Delgadillo.
Monterey County Deputy Sheriff Ruben Garcia told the truck's occupants in Spanish that they were investigating the theft of chemicals. He made up this story because the methamphetamine investigation was continuing.
The occupants of the truck all agreed to accompany Garcia to the sheriff's department. In an interview at the sheriff's department, defendant continued to identify himself as Sibrian. He said he lived in San Jose but could not provide the address. He went to the ranch to drink beer. He had not been there before. No one came or left while he was there. He had met Delgadillo two weeks earlier.
In an interview at the sheriff's department, Garcia continued to identify himself as Delgadillo. He said he lived in Salinas. He was from Mexico. He had borrowed the truck from someone who lived in Watsonville. He visited the ranch around 7:00 p.m. to drink beer and visit his cousin Javier Rodriguez. No one came or left while he was there. First he said he had not been to the ranch before, then he said he had been there a couple of months before. Defendant said he had known Vasquez and Sibrian for about 15 years.
When Garcia left the room after his police interview, Monterey County Deputy Sheriff Terry Kaiser found a wadded-up Big-K receipt on the table. The receipt was for coveralls, pants, sheets, and pillow cases. It was dated March 2, 1999. Hanging on a nook in the ranch garage was a Big-K bag containing new jeans and an unopened package of pillowcases.
Defendant's fingerprints were found on an empty can of denatured alcohol in a bag with other empty cans inside the garage. Defendant's fingerprints were also found on a battery in one of the three flashlights located in the garage.
At 12:09 p.m. on March 3, 1999, "Eddie" called the wiretapped telephone number from jail. He said during the call that he went by the name "Juan Garcia."
Garcia did not testify at trial. Defendant testified as follows. He knew Garcia from Mexico, but they got better acquainted in California when defendant moved to Los Angeles before moving to San Jose. Defendant was in Salinas on March 2, 1999, at Garcia's invitation. They went to a rodeo to ride horses. A horseman invited them to the ranch, where they drank beer and had a barbecue. Defendant barbecued the meat in front of the house. He used a can of denatured alcohol provided by Carranza to start the coals. The fire flared up and almost burned defendant. Because it was dark, he asked Carranza for a flashlight. Carranza gave him a flashlight and batteries. Defendant left the alcohol can and the flashlight outside the garage. Defendant never went inside the house, instead urinating in the field.
When the police stopped them that night, defendant gave the name of Felipe Sibrian because he knew there was a Los Angeles warrant out for him for drunk driving. Defendant called Garcia Delgadillo because Garcia said there was also a warrant out for him.
Duran, 94 Cal.App.4th at 928-30 (footnote omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claims: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
"Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 363, 412-13 (2000). "Under the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Id. at 413.
"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411. Rather, that application must be "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409.
The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 317 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled in part on other grounds, Lockver v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1172(2003). "While circuit law may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, only the Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be reasonably applied." Id. at 1044 (citations and internal quotations omitted). II. Claims
Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief by raising three claims: (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was guilty of the crimes charged; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence co-defendant Garcia's statements in violation of petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation; and (3) petitioner's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the admission of co-defendant Garcia's statements on the ground the admission violated petitioner's right to confrontation.
A. Insufficient Evidence
The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction was insufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a constitutional claim which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas relief. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321, 324(1979).
A federal court collaterally reviewing a state court conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). Instead, the federal court "determines only whether, `after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319) (italics in original). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may the writ be granted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338.
"The reviewing court must respect the province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming that the jury resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict."Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). The "prosecution need not affirmatively `rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt,'" and a reviewing federal court `"faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.'" Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-97 (1992) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). The existence of some small doubt based on an unsupported yet unrebutted hypothesis of innocence is not sufficient to invalidate an otherwise legitimate conviction. See Taylor v. Stainer, 31 F.3d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1994) (three hypotheses regarding petitioner's fingerprints which government failed to rebut unsupported by evidence and therefore insufficient to invalidate conviction). The government is only required to rule out any hypotheses of innocence that are sufficient to create reasonable doubt. See id
According to petitioner, the evidence used to convict him consisted of: (1) observations by the sheriff's deputies who conducted surveillance of the property on March 2d 1999, and alleged to have observed various vehicles arrive and depart from the property; (2) the presence of the methamphetamine laboratory on the premises; (3) petitioner's fingerprints on a can of alcohol and a flashlight battery found at the premises; (4) petitioner's false statement to the police regarding his identity; and (5) the "so-called conflicting statements" of co-defendant Garcia and petitioner.
Petitioner contends that this evidence was insufficient to establish that he conspired with anyone to manufacture methamphetamine or that he manufactured the drug. He asserts that there was no evidence connecting him to the lab or to any agreement to engage in criminal activity and that none of his actions was criminal. Petitioner testified that he was merely present at the residence for a brief social visit on March 2, 1999, and that his fingerprints were left on the can of alcohol and the flashlight batteries when he used the items while barbecuing. He gave the police a false name to avoid being arrested on a warrant from Los Angeles.
Even if petitioner's version of the facts is plausible, he has not demonstrated that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317-320.
The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner's claim on the ground that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crimes charged. The court explained that the evidence connecting petitioner to a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and related crimes included the following:
Defendant spent much of an evening on the premises where the manufacture of methamphetamine was in process. His fingerprints were found on the battery in a flashlight inside the detached garage which served as a methamphetamine laboratory. His fingerprints were also found on an empty can of denatured alcohol. Denatured alcohol is one of the substances used to transform pseudophedrine into methamphetamine. Defendant and two other men left the premises shortly after a call warning the occupants to get out. When defendant was apprehended by the police upon leaving the premises, he gave a false identity. Defendant lied to the police about whether anyone came to or left from the ranch while he was there. Defendant was apprehended with Juan Garcia. Defendant and Garcia admitted being acquainted, but they were inconsistent about how long they had known each other. Defendant and Garcia gave the same false identity for Garcia. Garcia possessed a receipt for, items commonly employed in making methamphetamine, including protective clothing, sheets, and pillowcases. At trial, defendant testified about a barbecue that was not seen by any of the surveilling officers.Duran, 94 Cal.App.4th at 931.
Although the evidence used to convict petitioner was largely circumstantial and could result in more than one interpretation, petitioner must demonstrate more than that his account is merely plausible. See Taylor, 31 F.3d at 910. "Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction," Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358, and based upon the above evidence in this case, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
The California Court of Appeal's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to support petitioner's convictions was a reasonable application of the Jackson standard. The record demonstrates that the state court's decision was not "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," or was based on an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus based on this claim.
B. Violation of Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that in criminal cases the accused has the right to "be confronted with witnesses against him." U.S. Const, amend. VI; see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). The Confrontation Clause serves several purposes: `"(1) ensuring that witnesses will testify under oath; (2) forcing witnesses to undergo cross-examination; and (3) permitting the jury to observe the demeanor of witnesses.'" United States v. Medjuck, 156 F.3d 916, 919 n.l (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted): see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (a primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of cross-examination).
Petitioner claims that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the trial court allowed into evidence the statements made by his co-defendant Garcia to the police. Petitioner argues that without Garcia's statements, there would have been little evidence connecting him to the methamphetamine laboratory and that as such, the admission of Garcia's statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The record shows that the trial court held a hearing to determine the admissibility of statements made by petitioner and co-defendant Garcia to the police. Deputy Ruben Garcia testified at the hearing as to the following statements made by co-defendant Garcia and petitioner.
Co-defendant Garcia, who identified himself as Mr. Delgadillo, stated that: (1) he went to 270 Highway 183 to drink beer; (2) the vehicle belonged to a cousin who lived in Watsonville; (3) Mr. Vasquez and Mr. Sibrian [a.k.a., petitioner] had never previously been to 270 Highway 183; (4) he only went to that residence and did not go to any other building; (5) no one else came or left the property while he was visiting there; (6) Mr. Vasquez was going to spend the evening with him and petitioner was going back to San Jose; and (7) he had known Mr. Vasquez and petitioner for a long time, somewhere in the area of fifteen years. See RT 536-39.
Petitioner, who identified himself as Mr. Sibrian, stated that: (1) he lived in San Jose but could not provide an address; (2) he went to 270 Highway 183 to drink with his friends but he had never previously been there; (3) he did not know the residence of the property; (4) no one left the property while he was there; (5) he was going to spend the evening at Mr. Delgadillo's [a.k.a., Garcia's] residence; and (6) he knew Mr. Delgadillo Garcial back in Mexico when they were children and had become better acquainted with him in the last two years. See RT 541-42.
The prosecutor argued that the codefendants gave "conflicting stories" in furtherance of the conspiracy in order to avoid detection of the conspiracy by law inforcement. See Duran, 94 Cal.App.4th at 934. According to the prosecutor, the statements were made to try to minimize their involvement, "to avoid discovery of the lab which they had just left, to conceal the truth of the lab, to conceal their involvement of the lab and the existence of the lab itself." Id.
Petitioner countered that there was no showing of a conspiracy, that he had just made a social visit to the ranch, and gave a false identity only to avoid an arrest warrant from Los Angeles.
The trial court ruled the statements were admissible because they were made at a time when the conspiracy was ongoing and, they were made in furtherance of the conspiracy in an attempt to minimize their involvement or suggest to the police officer that hey were simply at that address for a social visit. See id The trial court found it significant `that both Mr. Garcia and Mr. Duran said that no one had come on to the property or left while they had been there and the evidence that we've heard thus far in the trial is contrary to hat, was in fact traffic on or off the property during that time period." Id
The California Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the statements.Id. at 936. The court noted that because the prosecution offered the statements not for their truth, but for their falsity, the statements were not hearsay and were admissible without qualifying as a hearsay exception. Id. at 935. The court rejected petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim based on United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400 (1986) (admission of an available co-conspirator's statements does not violate the Confrontation Clause) and, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (hearsay exception for co-conspirator statements is firmly rooted and therefore, does not require independent indicia of reliability of co-conspirator's out-of-court statements), and stated that "so long as co-defendant Garcia's statements qualify as being made in the course and furtherance of a conspiracy, a Confrontation Clause objection would have been unavailing." Id. at 936.
In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980), the Supreme Court established a general framework for determining whether out-of-court statements meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. The Court attempted to harmonize the competing interests of protecting the accused's right to confront witnesses against him and society's interest in accurate factfinding by requiring the prosecution to demonstrate both the unavailability of the declarant and the `Indicia of reliability" surrounding the out-of-court statement. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182.
However, the Supreme Court has relaxed the requirements of the two-pronged Roberts framework for cases, such as this matter, where the out-of-court statement at issue is made by a co-conspirator. First, when the declarant is a co-conspirator, the government is not required to demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable. See Inadi 475 U.S. at 395-96. Second, the reliability requirement can be inferred, without more, in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 815 (1990). The Court determined that the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule was "firmly enough rooted in [its] jurisprudence that . . . a court need not independently inquire into the reliability of such statements." Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183.
Here, the issue of whether Garcia's statements were properly admitted turns on whether Garcia and the petitioner were co-conspirators and whether Garcia's statements were made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Bouriaily, 483 U.S. at 175 (before admitting co-conspirator's statements as an exception to the hearsay rule, there must be evidence that there was a conspiracy and that the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy). A co-conspirator's statements can, by themselves, be probative of the existence of a conspiracy and the participation of both 3etitioner and the declarant in the conspiracy.See id. at 180.
As previously noted, the California Court of Appeal properly concluded that petitioner's connection to a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine was sufficiently established by the evidence. See Duran, 94 Cal.App.4th at 931. This evidence is also sufficient to demonstrate that petitioner and Garcia were involved in a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and that Garcia's statements were an attempt to conceal the activities at the ranch and to distance himself from them. Accordingly, it reasonably can be said that Garcia's statements were made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy and were properly admitted under Inadi and Bourjaily.
In any event, petitioner has not shown that admission of Garcia's statements had an actual and prejudicial effect upon the jury. See Hernandez v. Small 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (habeas relief is proper only if the state courts' error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."(quotingBrecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). The record shows that the jury heard other evidence that likely would have been sufficient to convict petitioner. Petitioner was admittedly at the location where methamphetamine was being manufactured. His fingerprints were found on items inside the garage that was used as a methamphetamine lab and, notably, on a substance used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The officers who conducted surveillance on the ranch testified that petitioner and two other men left the premises shortly after a call warned the occupants to get out. Petitioner attempted to account for his fingerprints at the scene by testifying that he used the denatured alcohol, batteries, and flashlight to barbecue meat in front of the house and that the barbecue "fire flared up" and nearly burned him. Petitioner's account was uncorroborated by any evidence and conflicted with the testimony of the surveilling officers who did not observe any barbecue in front of the house. Additionally, petitioner lied to the police about whether anyone came to or left from the ranch while he was there, and he admitted that he lied to police about his identity.
The California Court of Appeal's denial of petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim was a reasonable application of Inadi andBourjaily. The record shows that the state court's decision was not "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," or was based on an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus based on this claim.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id.
In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner must establish two elements. First, he must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under "prevailing professional norms." Id. at 687-88. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a court "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.
Under Strickland, to demonstrate prejudice from counsel's failure to object to the admission of Garcia's statements based on the Confrontation Clause, petitioner must show that (1) had his counsel made the objection, it is reasonable that the objection would have been successful; and (2) had the objection been sustained, it is reasonable that there would have been an outcome more favorable to him. Cf. Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating same with respect to failure to file a motion to exclude evidence) [citing] Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1986)).
Here, petitioner failed to meet his burden. He has not demonstrated that trial counsel's performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Had his trial counsel objected to the admission of Garcia's statements based on the Confrontation Clause, the objection likely would have failed because the state courts reasonably determined that Garcia's statements to the police concealing his involvement and the existence of the lab were made in furtherance of the conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. "[S]o long as codefendant Garcia's statements qualify as being made in the course and furtherance of a conspiracy, a Confrontation Clause objection would have been unavailing." Duran, 94 Cal.App.4th at 936.
Even assuming that counsel's performance was deficient, petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable probability the jury verdict would have been different if his co-defendant's statements had been suppressed. As stated in the previous section, evidence at trial included: petitioner's admission that he was at the scene where methamphetamine was being manufactured; petitioner's fingerprints were found on a flashlight battery inside the garage used as a methamphetamine laboratory and on a substance used in the manufacture of methamphetamine; testimony by the surveillance officers that petitioner and two other men left the premises shortly after a caller warned the occupants to get out and that they did not observe any barbecue in front of the house; petitioner's false statement to the police about whether anyone came to or left from the ranch while he was there; and petitioner's admission that he lied to police about his identity. Even without his co-defendant's statements, there is no reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been different.
The California Court of Appeal's denial of petitioner's ineffectiveness of counsel claim was a reasonable application of the Strickland standard. The record shows that the state court's decision was not "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," or was based on an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus based on this claim.
CONCLUSION
After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the court is satisfied that the petition for writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED.
The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.