Opinion
No. 74-089
Decided January 14, 1975. Rehearing denied January 28, 1975. Certiorari denied March 31, 1975.
In eminent domain proceeding, condemning authority appealed the award entered, contending that certain business relocation expenses should be deducted from the award.
Affirmed
1. EMINENT DOMAIN — Statute — Condemnee — Entitled — Market Value — Land, Building and Improvements. Where a statute gives a new power and at the same time provides the means of executing it, those who claim the power can execute it in no other way; thus, under statutory condemnation proceedings, condemnee was entitled to the market value of the property taken, and this includes the land, the building, and the improvements.
2. Improvements in Building — Condemnee — Entitled — Value — Evidence Supports Award. In eminent domain proceedings, condemnee was entitled to be compensated for improvements in his building when the condemnor took possession; thus, the commission correctly admitted the testimony of witnesses as to the value of these improvements, and the evidence of value that was admitted supports the amount of the award and will not be disturbed on review.
3. Relocation Expenses — Statutes — Separate — Do Not Create — Additional Compensable Elements. Statutes providing for an award for relocation expenses are separate from the general eminent domain statutes, and they provide, in part, for reimbursement to displaced businesses of moving expenses and replacement expenses in federally assisted projects; however, they do not create additional elements compensable under eminent domain laws but rather provide supplemental assistance for particular losses incurred by reason of dislocation.
4. Relocation Expenses — Properly Separated — Issues — Property Taken — — Hearing — Properly Limited. In light of the separate statutory treatment accorded relocation expenses in eminent domain proceedings, the trial court was correct in separating the issues as to the award for the property taken from the issues as to the award for relocation expenses, and the hearing by the commissioners was thus properly limited to the issue of the value of the property condemned and did not go to the issue of relocation expenses.
Appeal from the District Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable Henry E. Santo, Judge.
Clark, Martin Pringle, C. Willing Browne, for petitioner-appellant.
Wayne B. Schroeder, for respondent-appellee Marshall Manufacturing Company.
Petitioner, Denver Urban Renewal Authority (DURA), is given authority to condemn property by the Urban Renewal Law, § 31-25-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973. In 1970, DURA filed a petition in condemnation under the general eminent domain statutes , § 38-1-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973 to acquire property of respondent, Marshall Manufacturing Company (Marshall), which consisted of land, building, and special improvements located in the building. The commission appointed by the court to determine the amount of compensation to be awarded to defendant heard evidence from the parties as to the value of the property being condemned. The district court directed the commission that Marshall was entitled to the full market value of the property including all improvements in place when DURA took possession, and that relocation expenses were a separate issue and not to be considered by the commission. The commission, after a final hearing, awarded $80,400 to Marshall for the value of the building and improvements and rule and order was entered thereon by the trial court. DURA appeals contending that certain relocation expenses should be deducted from the commission award. We disagree and affirm.
[1] The rule in eminent domain proceedings is stated in Ossman v. Mountain States Telephone Telegraph Co., 184 Colo. 360, 520 P.2d 738:
"Eminent domain proceedings are special statutory proceedings and are to be conducted strictly according to the procedures set out in the eminent domain statute . . . . "
. . . .
"Where a statute gives a new power, and at the same time provides the means of executing it, those who claim the power can execute it in no other way."
Section 38-1-114, C.R.S. 1973 directs that "the full and actual value of all property actually taken" at the time of possession or trial, whichever is earlier, shall be used to compute compensation. Marshall was entitled to the market value of the property taken; this includes the land, the building, and the improvements. Piz v. Housing Authority, 132 Colo. 457, 289 P.2d 905; Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Steiner American Corp., 31 Colo. App. 125, 500 P.2d 983.
[2] Marshall was entitled to be compensated for improvements in the building when DURA took possession; thus, the commission correctly admitted the testimony of witnesses as to the value of these improvements. This evidence of value supports the amount of the award and will not be disturbed on review. Kistler v. Northern Colorado Conservancy District, 126 Colo. 11, 246 P.2d 616.
However, DURA used relocation money, under § 24-56-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973 to install in Marshall's new building improvements similar to those in Marshall's old building and contends that thus Marshall had already been compensated for the special improvements in place when DURA took possession of Marshall's old building and that therefore the expended relocation money should be subtracted from the condemnation award. We disagree.
[3] The relocation statutes are separate from the eminent domain statutes. They provide, in part, for reimbursement to displaced business of moving expenses and replacement expenses in federally assisted projects. They do not create additional elements compensable under eminent domain laws, but do provide supplemental assistance for particular losses incurred by reason of dislocation. See Auraria Businessmen against Confiscation, Inc. v. Denver Renewal Authority, 183 Colo. 441, 517 P.2d 845.
[4] In light of the separate statutory treatment accorded relocation expenses, the trial court was correct in separating the two issues. The hearing in this case was thus properly limited to the issue of the value of the property condemned and did not go to the issue of relocation expenses. The proper method of determining relocation expenses would be by the administrative procedures set forth in § 24-56-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973. See Auraria Businessmen against Confiscation, Inc., supra.
Since the relocation expenses are not at issue in this proceeding, we will not consider Marshall's claim that DURA waived argument on relocation expenses.
Judgment affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE SILVERSTEIN and JUDGE KELLY concur.