The landlord is correct that the 1980 Act in effect creates, for all residential rental property in the District of Columbia, tenancies for a term of years, or periodic tenancies, terminable only on the occurrence of an event specified by statute (it does not, of course, create a life estate). See Dunnington v. Thos. E. Jarrell Co., 96 A.2d 274, 275 (D.C. 1953) (District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act (of 1941), codified, as amended, at D.C. Code § 45-1605 (1951), converts "monthly tenanc[ies]" into "indeterminate tenancies"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1.7 comment e (1977) (tenancy subject to a condition subsequent). Accordingly, although the District of Columbia Code retains provisions, enacted years earlier, recognizing periodic tenancies, see, e.g., D.C. Code §§ 45-221, -1402 (1981) (month-to-month, quarter-to-quarter), as well as tenancies at will, D.C. Code §§ 45-222, -1403 (1981), or by sufferance, D.C. Code §§ 45-220, -1404 (1981), the 1980 Act in a number of ways supersedes them.
Indeed, such a right in the landlord may well exist in certain circumstances even in the absence of a lease provision. See Dunnington v. Thomas E. Jarrell Co., 96 A.2d 274 (D.C. 1953) (landlord had implied right to reenter premises to make necessary repairs in a rent-controlled building). As with other contracts, a residential lease must be interpreted to carry out the reasonable expectations of the parties.
These cases did not refer to the timing of such a notice, but because a statutory predecessor of § 45-1402 was on the books at the time of each decision, presumably the caselaw was referencing these statutory requirements (reflecting the common law), including the timing provisions. See Dunnington v. Thomas E. Jarrell Co., 96 A.2d 274, 275 (D.C. 1953) (because tenant had not used apartment in unlawful manner, court held tenant had not waived notice to quit "and consequently the tenant was entitled to a thirty days' notice"); Hall v. Henry J. Robb, Inc., 32 A.2d 707, 708 (D.C. 1943) (where tenant violated lease provision prohibiting subletting, court noted tenant's written waiver of notice to quit). But see Banks v. Torre, 56 A.2d 52 (D.C. 1947) (in suit for possession, where tenant operated shoe shine parlor on premises limited by lease to use as private dwelling, court sustained directed verdict for landlord with no mention of notice to quit).