We note at the outset that the Seventh Circuit has expressly limited the application of Henry quasi-judicial immunity to the enforcement of valid court orders. See Zoretic v. Darge, 832 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2016), reh'g denied (Sept. 2, 2016) ("where officers are not acting pursuant to an enforceable order, they cannot receive quasi-judicial immunity.") citing Dunn v. City of Elgin, 347 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2003). This does not require officers to undertake a legal analysis of a court's order prior to enforcing it, but it does required that, at a minimum, they "look for some indicia of authority...before enforcing an order."
A municipality can be liable under Section 1983 when the municipality itself causes the constitutional injury. Dunn v. City of Elgin, Ill., 347 F.3d 641, 645–46 (7th Cir.2003). “One example of this is where the municipality fails to provide adequate police training.”
Deliberate indifference in a failure to train context can be shown one of two ways: failing to train employees on how to "handle a recurring situation that presents an obvious potential for a constitutional violation" or failing to provide further training "after learning of a pattern of constitutional violations by the police." Dunn v. City of Elgin, 347 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). A. On the Illinois Lockup Standards
First, "a municipality shows deliberate indifference when it fails to train its employees to handle a recurring situation that presents an obvious potential for a constitutional violation and this failure to train results in a constitutional violation." Dunn v. City of Elgin, Illinois, 347 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2003); accord Jenkins, 487 F.3d at 492. It must be true that "'a reasonable policymaker [would] conclude that the plainly obvious consequences' of the [municipality's] actions would result in the deprivation of a federally protected right."
Second, a municipality shows deliberate indifference if it fails to provide further training after learning of a pattern of constitutional violations by the police.Dunn v. City of Elgin, Ill. , 347 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). In other words, " ‘[i]t may happen that...the need for enhanced training is so obvious, and the inadequacy of training is so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that a jury could reasonably attribute to the policymakers a deliberate indifference to those training needs.
In particular reference to Plaintiff's claims, municipalities can be liable for failure to train its police officers. Dunn v. City of Elgin, Illinois, 347 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2003). "However, `inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to a deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.'"
v. City of Elgin, Ill., 347 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
Dunn v. City of Elgin, Illinois, 347 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
In the failure to train context, deliberate indifference can be established by showing that the municipality either "fails to train its employees to handle a recurring situation that presents an obvious potential for a constitutional violation and this failure to train results in a constitutional violation" or "fails to provide further training after learning of a pattern of constitutional violations by the police." Dunn v. City of Elgin, Illinois, 347 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). In their motion for summary judgment, the Defendants first argue that the Plaintiff's Monell claim against the City of Indianapolis and IMPD Chief Taylor should be dismissed because he cannot establish that a policy, practice, or custom caused a violation of his constitutional rights.
This is especially problematic considering, even with a temporary interference in custody, that "once physical custody is erroneously transferred, it may never be regained." Dunn v. City of Elgin, Ill, 347 F.3d 641, 650 (7th Cir. 2003). A jury, therefore, could find that a policy that does not require service of the PFA before enforcing child custody orders, was the moving force behind plaintiff's constitutional injury.