Opinion
C. A. 24-1770-TMC-SVH
07-26-2024
Sean Richard Dunagan, Plaintiff, v. Director Patricia Ray; Major Shanae Lumpkin; Sgt. Tamieka Gregg-Wright; Sgt. Glission; Captain Whealler Sweat; Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Sean Richard Dunagan (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, is currently detained at the Barnwell County Detention Center. He filed this complaint alleging a violation of his constitutional rights while previously detained at Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center (“SLRDC”). He sues Director Patricia Ray, Major Shanae Lumpkin, Sgt. Tamieka Gregg-Wright, Sgt. Glission, Captain Whealler Sweat, and SLRDC (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be summarily dismissed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff asserts the same general allegations against each defendant. He alleges his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Defendants based on his detention in solitary confinement and alleges conspiracy regarding his confinement. He further alleges his First Amendment rights have been violated because he has not had access to a law library or legal searches. He also vaguely alleges violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights “by being in alliance with all other Defendants that continionsly abridging Plaintiff's immunities an privileges of solitary confinement.” [ECF No. 1 at 9 (errors in original)].
On May 22, 2024, the undersigned issued orders (1) directing Plaintiff to submit documents necessary to bring this case into proper form and (2) advising Plaintiff of the deficiencies of his complaint and permitting him until June 12, 2024, to file an amended complaint. [ECF Nos. 10, 11]. Plaintiff filed service documents, but did not file an amended complaint.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. SLRDC is Not a Person
To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege that he was injured by “the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1230 (3d ed. 2014). Only “persons” may act under color of state law; therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.”
Plaintiff's complaint is before this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally-guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.
Plaintiff has not stated a valid § 1983 claim against SLRDC, as it does not qualify as a “person.” A sheriff's department, detention center, or task force is a group of officers or buildings that is not considered a legal entity subject to suit. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F.Supp. 1131 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because not “person” under the statute); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F.Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D.Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions). Therefore, Plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal as to SLRDC.
2. Vague Allegations
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting an alleged constitutional violation.
With regard to the alleged solitary confinement, Plaintiff must make more specific allegations to sue an individual defendant for his alleged unconstitutional detention in solitary confinement. Plaintiff generally alleges each defendant is responsible for holding him in solitary confinement without a disciplinary hearing to “set sanctioned time for solitary confinement.” [ECF No. 1 at 6, see also ECF No. 1 at 8, 10, 12]. However, Plaintiff's allegations fail to show how each defendant is responsible for the decision to place Plaintiff in solitary confinement or why. Without more, Plaintiff has failed to show how any specific defendant is responsible for his prolonged detention in solitary confinement.
To the extent Plaintiff claims a lack of access to the courts, he has not shown a specific injury. The Constitution does not guarantee an inmate adequate legal assistance and an adequate law library; rather, it guarantees a right to reasonable access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 838 (1977). To establish a claim of denial of access to the courts, an inmate cannot rely on conclusory allegations, but must instead allege an actual injury or specific harm or prejudice that has resulted from the denial. Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996); Michau v. Charleston Cnty., 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding sua sponte dismissal appropriate where the plaintiff did not explain how he was injured by any limitations on his access to a law library). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has unambiguously held that local jails, designed for temporary detainment, are generally not required to have a law library. See Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987).
3. Supervisory Liability
The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court explains that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-74 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization). To the extent Plaintiff sues any defendant in their supervisory capacities, they are subject to summary dismissal.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this case be dismissed without further leave for amendment.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.