Opinion
C. A. 1:21-1095-BHH-SVH
03-16-2022
Zion Rashaun Dukes, Plaintiff, v. Terrance Smalls, Willis Beatty, and James Al Cannon, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
In this case, a pretrial detainee complains he was not provided with the appropriate religious diet. Zion Rashaun Dukes (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint for alleged violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three employees of the Charleston County Sheriff's Office (“CCSO”): current employee and chaplain Terrance Smalls (“Smalls”), former employee Willis Beatty (“Beatty”), and Charleston County Sheriff, James Al Cannon (“Cannon”) (collectively “Defendants”).
The case is before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 31]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendants' motion. [ECF No. 32]. Having been fully briefed [ECF Nos. 37, 38], the motion is ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the case has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. Having carefully considered the record, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
At all relevant times, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at Al Cannon Detention Center and in the custody of the CCSO. Defendants have provided general background information that inmates at this facility may request a kosher meal. [See ECF No. 31-2 ¶ 3, ECF No. 31-4¶ 3]. A kosher meal request may be denied based on non-kosher canteen purchases. Id. All canteen items are marked as kosher or non-kosher, with the addition of a small red “k” next to all kosher canteen items. Id.
Plaintiff has submitted evidence that he may have purchased nonkosher items at the canteen on July 15, 2019, but not thereafter. [ECF No. 37-1 at 1-2]. Plaintiff has also submitted numerous grievances concerning this issue.
Plaintiff submitted these grievances in conjunction with a document titled “motion of discovery,” but represented that “[t]he following papers [are] for this case, to give background to my claims.” [ECF No. 25].
On November 8, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a grievance stating, “I would like to be put on a kosher diet,” and was instructed by Officer Frazier (“Frazier”) to “contact Captain Grant.” [ECF No. 25-1 at 9]. On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a grievance stating, “I would like to change my diet to kosher,” but this grievance was not answered, nor is there a name indicating it was reviewed. Id. at 8.
On December 9, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a grievance stating as follows:
I was wondering if you could write Captain Grant an email and see about getting me put on kosher trays. I put it in and see the chaplain. It's been a month and nothing has been done and my religion does not permit me to eat any food that is not prayed over and the processed food we eat is not holy so if you could help me out as quickly as you can, thank you.Id. at 7 (spelling and punctuation altered). Frazier responded “[t]hank you for your grievance!” Id.
The record indicates that Plaintiff's references to the chaplain are referring to Smalls.
On December 31, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a grievance stating in part “I want to be put on kosher trays[.] I have talked to a chaplain[,] but no one read[s] my request and it's been 2 months.” Id. at 6. This grievance was not answered, nor is there a name indicating it was reviewed. Id. On April 4, 2020, it appears Plaintiff may have submitted four grievances, stating “I am of the Islamic faith and would like to be placed on kosher trays,” to which Frazier stated, “inform the unit officer about this request” and Smalls stated, “I have pass[ed] your request to the captain.” Id. at 1-4.
On July 6, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a grievance stating, “I have not received my kosher diet tray yet,” but it appears this grievance was not answered, nor is there a name indicating it was reviewed. Id. at 10. Plaintiff has also submitted evidence that on August 2, 2021, Smalls sent Plaintiff a letter stating as follows: “I am writing to inform you that your request for kosher diet has been denied by the administration due to your recent purchase of non-kosher items on the canteen.” [ECF No. 37-1 at 3].
Smalls and Andrew Grant (“Grant”), also an employee of CCSO, represent to the court as follow:
That, upon information and belief, in the past Plaintiff's requests for kosher meals have not been granted due to non-kosher canteen purchases. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff has had a past kosher meal request granted, and Plaintiff is currently receiving kosher meals.[ECF No. 31-2 ¶ 4, ECF No. 31-4 ¶ 4]. Beatty represents he “had no personal involvement in this matter” and “did not interact with the Plaintiff regarding kosher meals and did not speak to any Charleston County detention officer regarding the Plaintiff or his kosher meal requests.” [ECF No. 31-3 ¶ 3].
Plaintiff agrees, without supporting evidence, that at some point after August 2, 2021, his request for kosher trays was granted. [ECF No. 37 at 2].
Plaintiff argues he wrote to Beatty, who responded, but has not submitted any admissible evidence in support of this allegation. [See ECF No. 37 at 1].
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 10, 2021, and alleges Defendants violated his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, specifying that he is bringing claims based on “religious and political freedom, due process.” [ECF No. 12 at 4]. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id. at 6.
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Summary Judgment
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a means to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, but the statute is not, itself, a source of substantive rights. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). “Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who, under the color of state law, deprives another person ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.'” Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish three elements to state a cause of action: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute; (2) by a person; (3) acting under color of state law.” Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Eleventh Amendment provides “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001).
A plaintiff “is not entitled to monetary damages under § 1983 against Defendants in their official capacities.” Moneyhan v. Keller, 563 Fed.Appx. 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars suits against non-consenting state, its agencies, and its officers acting in their official capacities)). However, suits for damages against state officials sued in their individual capacity are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose ‘individual and personal liability' on state officials under § 1983.”) (citation omitted).
To the extent Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities, they are not subject to suit under § 1983, and the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding claims brought against them in their official capacities.
2. First Amendment Claim
“‘The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids the adoptions of laws designed to suppress religious beliefs or practices.'” Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 656 (4th Cir. 2001)). “This encompasses policies that impose a substantial burden on a prisoner's right to practice his religion.” Id. (citing Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 198 & n. 8 (4th Cir. 2006)). “Under . . . the Free Exercise Clause . . ., a prisoner has a ‘clearly established . . . right to a diet consistent with his . . . religious scruples ....” Id. (citing Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 198-99).
As held by the Fourth Circuit, “[t]he Free Exercise Clause requires prison officials to reasonably accommodate an inmate's exercise of sincerely held religious beliefs.” Greenhill v. Clarke, 944 F.3d 243, 253 (4th Cir. 2019). Defendants have not argued that Plaintiff's religious beliefs are not sincerely-held.
However, “prison officials may restrict an inmate's religious practices subject to a ‘reasonableness' test that accords substantial deference to the professional judgment of correctional officers.” Id. at 499. The four-part test to determine the reasonableness a regulation that impinges on an inmates constitutional rights is as follows: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it”; (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates”; (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) whether there's an “absence of ready alternatives” to the regulation, which “is evidence of [its] reasonableness.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987) (citations omitted).
Additionally, under the qualified immunity defense, “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).Qualified immunity ensures that “[officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992). Whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity is a question of law for the court and, when there are no relevant disputed material facts, a court should rule on the qualified immunity issue at the summary judgment stage. Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily, the question of qualified immunity should be decided at the summary judgment stage.”).
Defendants have asserted a qualified immunity defense, which is only applicable to claims asserted against them in their individual capacities. Plaintiff in his original complaint did not indicate whether he was suing Defendants in their official or individual capacities, although he indicated he was suing them in their official capacities in his amended complaint. [ECF Nos. 1, 12]. However, the only stated grounds for recovery are for monetary damages, and Defendants' motion for summary judgment addresses Plaintiff's claims as having been brought against them in both capacities. Given the liberal standards set forth, and in the spirit of allowing a pro se plaintiff to develop meritorious claims, the court will construe the amended complaint as suing Defendants in both their official capacities, as already addressed above, and in their individual capacities. Defendants can be sued in their individual capacities for monetary damages. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
To resolve a qualified immunity defense, the court must (1) determine whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Courts may address the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis in whichever order is appropriate in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand. Id.
Defendants argue the detention center policy that resulted in denying Plaintiff's request for kosher meals meets the four-part Turner test as follows:
Here, the kosher meal policy of the Charleston County detention center is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Kosher meals are more expensive than an ordinary detention center meal, and the detention center has a legitimate interest in keeping costs as low as possible. The Plaintiff is clearly able to exercise his religion through alternative means, such as praying from a Qur'an or obtaining a prayer rug. As the kosher meal is more expensive and requires increased supervision from detention center staff, the accommodation of Plaintiff's asserted constitutional right will inherently impact guards, other inmates, and the allocation of detention center resources. Other inmates might feel the detention center is showing favoritism, prison guards must closely monitor Plaintiff's canteen purchases for non-kosher items, and the detention center's financial resources would be put towards purchasing kosher meals instead of some other venture. Finally, there is no ready alternative to the detention center policy. The detention center must have some guide posts on providing kosher meals to inmates out of cost concerns, and requiring that inmates also keep kosher in their canteen requests does not present a significant burden to the inmates. Thus, the detention center policy is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and is therefore valid.[ECF No. 31-1 at 8-9].
However, Defendants have failed to indicate to the court what the kosher meal policy actually is and, taking evidence in light most favorable to Plaintiff, it appears that the policy at issue is that multiple kosher meal requests over the course of years can be denied due to a one-time trip to the commissary where non-kosher items were purchased, a trip that might have been taken prior to the inmate's religious conversion.
Plaintiff indicates, without supporting evidence, that he converted to Islam at some point in 2019 and thereafter began requesting a change in diet for religious purposes. [See ECF No. 37 at 1].
Defendants have failed to offer argument or evidence as to why Plaintiff's requests for a kosher diet were denied for such an extended period, or why, after such an extended period, his request was finally granted. See, e.g., Cousins v. Rogers, C/A No. 3:18-26-GFVT-HAI, 2019 WL 5106780, at *9 (E.D. Ky. July 15, 2019) (“What the defendants have not provided, however, is evidence of the reason Abrams, Jones, and Lucas deferred or denied Cousins's requests for a kosher meal .... Without evidence on that question, the Court is unable to determine whether the rationale for such action was based on a legitimate penological interest or was based on some arbitrary or impermissible reason”), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 3:18-26-GFVT-HAI, 2019 WL 3854684 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 16, 2019) (denying summary judgment as to the relevant defendants and rejecting application of qualified immunity); see also, e.g., Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 296 (6th Cir. 2010) (“we note that MDOC's policy of removing a prisoner from the kosher-meal program for mere possession of a nonkosher food item may be overly restrictive of inmates' religious rights”).
The timeline at issue separates this case from others where courts have found constitutional prison policies that temporarily denied the provision of kosher diets to those that purchase non-kosher items. For example, in Berryman, the inmate participated in the kosher meal program at the St. Louis Correctional Facility, but was removed from the program following an administrative hearing that determined he had violated “Policy Directive 05.03.150, paragraph WW, which states that ‘[a] prisoner approved to eat from a religious menu shall have that approval rescinded if s/he eats, or has in his/her possession, any food item that violates a tenet of his/her designated religion.'” 343 Fed.Appx. at 3. The court noted the plaintiff was allowed to reapply for the program 60 days after his suspension if the order of removal was his first. Id. The court held the plaintiff's “removal from the Kosher meal program passes muster under the deferential Turner standard,” particularly where the plaintiff “himself conceded that he had ordered and signed for the non-kosher food and that he had held it in his lap.” Id. at 6; see also Tapp v. Proto, 404 Fed.Appx. 563, 565 (3rd Cir. 2010) (holding that a two-week delay in serving Kosher meals after an inmate requested them does not impinge on free exercise rights); Parkell v. Senato, 224 F.Supp.3d 388, 398 (D. Del. 2016), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded on other grounds, C/A No. 171101, 2017 WL 2954599 (3d Cir. July 11, 2017) (rejecting grant of qualified immunity and recognizing short term delays in processing requests for kosher diet were reasonable, but two-year delay at issue in that case violated the First Amendment, particularly where the requests for kosher meals were denied “based on their assessment of the tenets of his belief system”); O'Connor v. Leach, C/A No. 1:18-977, 2020 WL 2187814, at *1 (W.D. Mich. May 6, 2020) (“Plaintiff does not dispute that he purchased eleven non-kosher items after requesting his religious designation be changed. These items, furthermore, were voluntarily purchased at the commissary. This is not a case, then, where prison officers relied on the plaintiff's diet before the plaintiff changed his religious designation ....”) (emphasis added)).
Here, summary judgment is not appropriate where the record, viewed in light most favorable to Plaintiff, indicates the chaplain, Smalls, denied Plaintiff's requests for a kosher diet for years, and the only offered reason for doing so is that Plaintiff, prior to submitting these requests, bought nonkosher items once at the commissary. Grant of qualified immunity is also not appropriate at this juncture for the same reasons. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 19899 (“Under . . . the Free Exercise Clause . . . in its most elemental form, a prisoner has a clearly established . . . right to a diet consistent with his . . . religious scruples” and “[a] prison official violates this clearly established right if he intentionally and without sufficient justification denies an inmate his religiously mandated diet.”); Wall, 741 F.3d at 502 (“Wall's right to participate in Ramadan was clearly established, and when the defendants abridged this right without first satisfying Turner's reasonableness test, they subjected themselves to the potential for liability.”).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment in part, allowing Plaintiff's claim for violation of his First Amendment rights to proceed; however, the undersigned recommends this claim proceed only against Smalls in his individual capacity, as discussed more below.
3. Personal Involvement and Supervisory Liability
The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Fisher v Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court explains that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-74 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization).
Here, although Plaintiff argues otherwise, Beatty has submitted undisputed evidence that he was not personally involved in this matter, did not interact with Plaintiff regarding kosher meals, and did not speak to any detention officer regarding Plaintiff or his kosher meal requests. [ECF No. 31-1 ¶ 3]. Plaintiff has not submitted any admissible evidence that Beatty personally violated his rights or was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm.
Additionally, the record is silent as to Cannon. Here, there is simply no evidence indicating anything about Cannon, such as evidence demonstrating a pattern of widespread abuse necessary to establish supervisory action or inaction giving rise to § 1983 liability. See Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that “[g]enerally, a failure to supervise gives rise to § 1983 liability . . . only in those situations in which there is a history of widespread abuse”); Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373 (“A supervisor's continued inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses, however, provides an independent basis for finding he either was deliberately indifferent or acquiesced in the constitutionally offensive conduct of his subordinates.”); see also, eg., Jones v Al Canon Det Ctr., C/A No. 5:i-04083-TLW, 2014 WL 6666728, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 21, 2014) (“The Slaken exception is not adequately pleaded in this case because . . . there are no allegations of any personal knowledge (or even subjective knowledge) on Sheriff Cannon's part of the problems that Plaintiff alleges he had with the medical department at the detention center. Thus, regardless of how pervasive the alleged problems at the detention center might be, Cannon cannot be found liable for them simply based on his job as the overall ‘supervisor.'”).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Beatty and Cannon.
4. Due Process Claim
Plaintiff has also asserted a procedural due process claim. [See ECF No. 12 at 4]. Although not wholly clear, the court construes this claim as asserting that Defendants', and more specifically Smalls', denial of Plaintiff's grievances about a religious diet violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See Id. (“Each defendant ignored Plaintiff's plea to be on religious trays.”). However, the Due Process Clause is not implicated by Plaintiff's filing a grievance over this issue. See Booker v. SCDC, 855 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir. April 28, 2017) (citing Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 1994)) (“[I]nmates have no constitutional entitlement or due process interest in access to a grievance procedure. An inmate thus cannot bring a § 1983 claim alleging denial of a specific grievance process, for example.”)); Adams, 40 F.3d at 75 (“[T]he Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or access to any such procedure voluntarily established by a state.”). Therefore, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to this claim.
The undersigned declines Plaintiff's invitation to issue sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(h) related to the affidavits submitted by Defendants asserting that Plaintiff received kosher trays previously and ordered nonkosher items. [See ECF No. 37 at 3 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(h) (“If satisfied that an affidavit or declaration under this rule is submitted in bad faith or solely for delay, the court-after notice and a reasonable time to respond- may order the submitting party to pay the other party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, it incurred as a result.”))].
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment, allowing Plaintiff's claim for a First Amendment violation to proceed against Smalls in his individual capacity. [ECF No. 31].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).