Messrs. Gregory Gregory, of Lancaster, for Appellant, cite: As to the Trial Judge's erring in finding that the Appellantas a matter of fact was guilty of adultery within themeaning of our divorce law: 192 S.E.2d 329; 237 S.C. 532, 118 S.E.2d 171; 252 S.C. 146, 165 S.E.2d 633; 248 S.C. 144, 149 S.E.2d 353; 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330, 15 A.L.R.2d 163; 248 S.C. 144, 149 S.E.2d 353; 252 S.C. 146, 165 S.E.2d 633; 192 S.E.2d 329. As to the Trial Judge's erring in statingin his Order and Decree of Final Divorce certain findingsthat Appellant was guilty of adultery which findingsare against the clear preponderance of the evidence andwithout evidentiary support: 248 S.C. 144, 149 S.E.2d 353; 192 S.E.2d 329. As to the Trial Judge'serring in granting Respondent a divorce on adultery basedsolely on the testimony of interested persons in the outcomeof the alimony question, thus rendering such testimonyuncorroborated: 254 S.C. 78, 173 S.E.2d 372; 244 S.C. 265, 136 S.E.2d 537; 246 S.C. 299, 143 S.E.2d 580; 250 S.C. 114, 156 S.E.2d 641; 27 A C.J.S., Divorce, Section 136 (b), p. 459; Annotation 15 A.L.R.2d 170; 244 S.C. 265, 136 S.E.2d 537. As to the Trial Judge's erring in failing toaward Appellant alimony and
Messrs. Arrowsmith Jackson, of Florence, for Petitioner-Appellant, cite: Section 20-1011, S.C. Code of Laws (1962); 243 S.C. 383, 134 S.E.2d 222; 244 S.C. 143, 135 S.E.2d 760; 242 S.C. 292, 130 S.E.2d 903; 243 S.C. 20, 132 S.E.2d 11. As toerror in not granting the Petitioner-Appellant a divorcefrom the Respondent-Appellant on the ground of Adultery: 259 S.C. 418, 192 S.E.2d 329; 248 S.C. 144, 149 S.E.2d 353; 237 S.C. 532, 118 S.E.2d 171; 259 S.C. 418, 192 S.E.2d 329. As to error in not grantingany support or alimony: 225 S.C. 274, 82 S.E.2d 119; 194 S.E.2d 238; 254 S.C. 372, 155 S.E.2d 628. As to error in awarding Mrs. Reaves attorney fees in theamount of three hundred and fifty ($350.00) Dollars: 256 S.C. 243, 182 S.E.2d 75; 252 S.C. 363, 166 S.E.2d 302.
When reviewing decisions of the family court, we are cognizant of the fact the family court had the opportunity to see the witnesses, hear "the testimony delivered from the stand, and had the benefit of that personal observance of and contact with the parties which is of peculiar value in arriving at a correct result in a case of this character." DuBose v. DuBose, 259 S.C. 418, 423, 192 S.E.2d 329, 331 (1972) (internal citation and quotations omitted). LAW/ANALYSIS
When reviewing decisions of the family court, we are cognizant of the fact the family court had the opportunity to see the witnesses, hear "the testimony delivered from the stand, and had the benefit of that personal observance of and contact with the parties which is of peculiar value in arriving at a correct result in a case of this character." DuBose v. DuBose, 259 S.C. 418, 423, 192 S.E.2d 329, 331 (1972). When the evidence is conflicting and susceptible of different inferences, the family court has the duty of determining not only the law of the case, but the facts as well, because it had the benefit of observing the witnesses and determining how much credence to give each witness's testimony.
This does not require us to disregard the findings below nor ignore the better vantage point the trial judge occupies in determining witness credibility. The burden is upon the appellant to convince this Court that the trial judge erred in his findings of fact. DuBose v. DuBose, 259 S.C. 418, 192 S.E.2d 329 (1972); Lee v. Lee, 237 S.C. 532, 118 S.E.2d 171 (1961). In 1970, Cherry and Thomasson were engaged in various construction projects in York County when they agreed to apply as a partnership for a Federal Housing Authority guarantee of a loan for construction of a large apartment complex.
ark Johnson, Florence, for Appellant, cite: As to the Court's below improperly excludingcertain evidence and improperly admitting certainevidence to the prejudice of Appellant: 31A Corpus JurisSecundum, Evidence Section 384; 215 S.C. 175, 54 S.E.2d 769; 241 S.C. 412, 218 S.E.2d 692; 101 S.C. 280, 85 S.E. 636; Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Section 1414; 181 S.E.2d 750, 11 N.C. App. 567; 241 P.2d 651, 109 Cal.App.2d 777; 87 P.2d 818, 149 Kan. 295; 40 N.E.2d 988, 112 Ind. App. 116; 205 S.C. 333, 32 S.E.2d 5; 114 S.C. 517, 104 S.E. 186; 137 S.C. 227, 135 S.E. 306; 121 S.C. 143, 113 S.E. 579; 110 S.C. 357, 96 S.E. 526; 162 S.C. 281, 160 S.E. 843; 248 S.C. 447, 151 S.E.2d 92; 141 S.C. 265, 139 S.E. 625; 29 A.L.R. Third, page 8 and 29 A.L.R. Third, 174; 260 S.C. 245, 195 S.E.2d 615. As to the Court's belowcommitting error in granting to the Respondent a divorceon the ground of adultery and in failing to grant to the Appellanta divorce on that same ground: 237 S.C. 532, 118 S.E.2d 171; 259 S.C. 418, 192 S.E.2d 329; 224 S.C. 265, 135 S.E.2d 537; 246 S.C. 355, 143 S.E.2d 719; 242 S.C. 292, 130 S.E.2d 903; 250 S.C. 363, 157 S.E.2d 858; 244 S.C. 265, 136 S.E.2d 537; 27A Corpus Juris Secundum, Divorce, § 60. As to theCourt's below erring in requiring the payment of alimonyin a lump sum of Seventy-Five Thousand and No/100($75,000.00) Dollars: Section 20-3-120 Code of Laws of South Carolina 1976; Section 20-3-130 Code of Laws of South Carolina 1976; Page v. Page, 260 S.C. 298, 195 S.E.2d 613; 260 S.C. 86, 194 S.E.2d 238; 225 S.C. 254, 82 S.E.2d 119; 27 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife, Section 408; 17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation, Section 615; Annotations 6 A.L.R., Page 22, and 10 A.L.R. 2d, page 489; 243 S.C. 218, 133 S.E.2d 323; 260 S.C. 526, 197 S.E.2d 683; 186 S.C. 93, 195 S.E. 122; 242 S.C. 9, 129 S.E.2d 736; 243 S.C. 218, 133 S.E.2d 323. As to the Court's below erring in requiring theAppellant to pay to the attorneys for the Respondent a fee inthe amount of Twenty-Five Thousand and No/100 ($25,00
31 C.J.S., p. 289; Section 2, Estoppel, 31 C.J.S., p. 291; Footnote 26, Section 63, Estoppel, 31 C.J.S., p. 399; Section 59(c), Estoppel, 31 C.J.S., p. 375; Section 107, Estoppel, 31 C.J.S., p. 547-548; Section 108, Estoppel, 31 C.J. S., p. 551; Section 110(7), Estoppel, 31 C.J.S., p. 577; Footnote 6.55 to Section 115, Estoppel, 31 C.J.S., p. 602; Section 148, Estoppel, 31 C.J.S., p. 734; 125 S.C. 105, 118 S.E. 178; 132 S.C. 288, 128 S.E. 705; 132 S.C. 288, 128 S.E. 705; 172 S.C. 362, 174 S.E. 33; 212 S.C. 311, 47 S.E.2d 716; 125 S.C. 89, 118 S.E. 178; 132 S.C. 288, 128 S.E. 705; 172 S.C. 362, 174 S.E. 33; 226 S.C. 257, 84 S.E.2d 857; 234 S.C. 352, 108 S.E.2d 572; 27A C.J.S., Divorce, Section 202, p. 869; 194 S.C. 115, 8 S.E.2d 351. Morris D. Rosen, of Charleston, for Respondent, cites: As to the Court's properly having held that Appellant's actof adultery and refusal to answer questions barred her fromrecovering alimony: 169 N.W.2d 850; 357 F. Supp. 1028; 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330; 259 S.C. 418, 192 S.E.2d 329; 212 S.C. 311, 47 S.E.2d 716; 234 S.C. 352, 108 S.E.2d 716; 234 S.C. 352, 108 S.E.2d 572; 290 F. Supp. 141; 18 N.Y.2d 635, 272 N.Y.2d 780, 219 N.E.2d 294; 229 S.E.2d 725; 189 So.2d 832; 248 S.C. 144, 149 S.E.2d 353; 226 S.C. 257, 84 S.E.2d 857; Opinions, Supreme Court of South Carolina, for week ending January 8, 1977; 125 S.C. 105, 118 S.E. 178; 160 So.2d 320, 4 A.L.R. 3rd, 539; 172 S.C. 362, 174 S.E. 33; 132 S.C. 288, 128 S.E. 705; Chapter 20, Title 20, Sections 20-101, through 20-121, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, as amended; Volume 27-A, C.J.S., Divorce; 4 A.L.R. 3rd. August 31, 1977.
Divorce, Sec. 293; 239 S.C. 339, 123 S.E.2d 297; 115 Colo. 505, 176 P.2d 363; 165 N.C. 397, 81 S.E. 627; 90 S.C. 522, 73 S.E. 1029; 237 S.C. 424, 117 S.E.2d 583; Annotation 1 A.L.R. 3d 118. As to the Court'shaving erred in awarding custody of the minor child of theparties to his paternal grandmother when she was not aparty to the action and neither requested nor accepted custody: Section 31-51 Code of Laws of South Carolina; 232 S.C. 12, 100 S.E.2d 231. Hemphill P. Pride, II, and Jesse Clark, of Jenkins, Perryand Pride, and Walter W. Brooks, of Columbia, for Respondent, cite: As to the Lower Court's not having committederror by granting the Respondent husband a divorceon ground of the Appellant wife's adultery, inasmuch as theevidence was patently clear and irrefragable that she committedadultery with numerous men: 244 S.C. 520, 80 S.E.2d 123; 228 S.C. 149, 89 S.E.2d 225; 220 S.C. 90, 66 S.E.2d 629; 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330; 248 S.C. 144, 149 S.E. 353; 252 S.C. 160, 165 S.E.2d 632; 259 S.C. 418, 192 S.E.2d 329; 228 S.C. 149, 89 S.E.2d 225; 246 S.C. 355; 251 S.C. 117, 160 S.E.2d 558; 216 S.C. 451; 3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 325, Condonation, Proof 1; 244 S.C. 265, 136 S.E.2d 537; 246 S.C. 355, 143 S.E.2d 719; 255 S.C. 25, 176 S.E.2d 561; 170 S.E.2d 650; 245 S.C. 370, 140 S.E.2d 593; 239 S.C. 44, 123 S.E.2d 772; 230 S.C. 299, 95 S.E.2d 493; 237 S.C. 532, 534, 118 S.E.2d 171; 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330; 228 S.C. 149, 89 S.E.2d 225; 194 S.E.2d 392; 219 S.E.2d 358; 263 S.C. 279, 210 S.E.2d 230; 189 S.E.2d 294. As to the evidence clearly supporting thelower Court's findings that the Appellant "condoned" an actof previous cruelty committed by the Respondent, but thatthe Respondent did not "condone" his wife's adulteries: 136 S.E.2d 541. As to the lower Court's not having erredin divesting the Appellant of all interest in her husband'sseparate property: 203 Va. 677, 127 S.E.2d 104; 115 Colo. 505, 176 P.2d 363; 165 N.C. 397, 81 S.E. 627; 90 S.C. 522, 73 S.E. 1029; 237 S.C. 424, 117 S.E.2d 583; 239 S
Messrs. West, Bendorf, Cooper and Bowen, of Camden, for Respondent-Appellant, cite: As to the Plaintiff's beingentitled to a divorce from the Defendant on the ground ofphysical cruelty: 244 S.C. 265, 136 S.E.2d 537; 254 S.C. 78, 173 S.E.2d 372; 246 S.C. 299, 143 S.E.2d 380; 258 S.C. 135, 187 S.E.2d 528; 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330; 27A C.J.S., Divorce, § 136(b), page 459; 100 So.2d 35; 277 S.W.2d 327; 231 So.2d 915. As to the Defendant's not being entitled toa divorce from the Plaintiff on the ground of adultery: 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330; 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 139(a); 248 S.C. 160, 165 S.E.2d 633; 262 S.C. 291, 204 S.E.2d 53; 237 S.C. 532, 118 S.E.2d 171; 259 S.C. 418, 192 S.E.2d 329. As to it's beingin the best interest of Robbie Mays to be placed in thecustody of the Plaintiff, Shirley Mays: 238 S.C. 521, 121 S.E.2d 4; 242 S.C. 258, 130 S.E.2d 758; 242 S.C. 263, 130 S.E.2d 552; 220 S.E.2d 228; 250 S.C. 363, 157 S.E.2d 858. As to the Defendant's beingrequired to pay for the Plaintiff's attorney: 263 S.C. 291, 204 S.E.2d 53; 38 Neb. L. Rev. 761; 1 Rich. Eq. 282; S.C. Code Ann. § 20-112 (1962); 285 S.W.2d 176; 258 S.C. 554, 189 S.E.2d 820; 9 S.C.L.R., Volume 27, Number 2; 242 S.C. 263, 130 S.E.2d 552; 262 S.C. 291, 204 S.E.2d 53. As to the award of supportand alimony as set forth in the decree of divorce being inadequate: 256 S.C. 243, 182 S.E.2d 75; 250 S.C. 264, 157 S.E.2d 249; 246 S.C. 332, 143 S.E.2d 619. Messrs. Blease, Griffith and Stone, of Newberry, and Savage, Royall, Kinard and Sheheen, of Camden, for Appellant-Respondent, cite: As to the Plaintiff's not being entitledto a divorce from the Defendant on the ground ofphysical cruelty: 244 S.C. 265, 136 S.E
SeeBrown v. Brown , 379 S.C. 271, 277, 665 S.E.2d 174, 178 (Ct. App. 2008) ("When reviewing decisions of the family court, we are cognizant of the fact the family court had the opportunity to see the witnesses, hear ‘the testimony delivered from the stand, and had the benefit of that personal observance of and contact with the parties ....’ " (quoting DuBose v. DuBose , 259 S.C. 418, 423, 192 S.E.2d 329, 331 (1972) )).