Opinion
Case No. 1:99-CV-465.
Date: March 31, 2000.
ORDER
In accordance with the opinion entered this date, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket #28) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JUDGMENT is entered in favor of the DEFENDANTS and the Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.
OPINION
The Plaintiffs, Duane Ritter, a union member, and his spouse, Shelly Ritter, bring this action alleging that the Defendants, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAMAW) and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers/local Lodge 475/AFL-CIO/District #97 (hereinafter "the Union"), breached the duty of fair representation by not recommending that his grievance be submitted to arbitration. The complaint further alleges loss of consortium on behalf of Shelly Ritter. Before this Court is the Union's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons contained herein, the Court grants the motion.
I
Duane Ritter worked as an assembler in Belding, Michigan for Viatec, Inc. from 1990 until he was discharged on December 23, 1998 for dishonesty regarding an investigation of destruction of company property.
In November 1998, Ritter participated in member voting and discussions on renegotiation of the IAMAW contract with Viatec. In December 1998, he was elected as the Chief Steward for the IAMAW for the membership in the plant and was to take office in January 1999. Ritter was a vocal opponent in some of the decisions and agreements that IAMAW made with Viatec during contract negotiations.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 11.
Ritter alleges that his continued employment at Viatec was used as a "bargaining chip" by Viatec. In exchange for granting certain concessions to the union, Viatec allegedly sought from union officials a list of certain employees, including the Plaintiff, who could be terminated without union opposition during its union negotiations. Ritter complained that District Business Representative Paul Shemanski had not done a good job in negotiating the contract.
On December 17, 1998, a Viatec employee, Carl Demoray kicked and broke a toilet. Another employee, Dave Peterman, was in the stall next to Demoray at the time the toilet was broken. According to Peterman, at the time Demoray broke the toilet, Ben Alcala, Jr. and Carl Demoray were in the restroom.
Defs' Exh A2.
In his complaint, Ritter alleges that he first "became aware of the incident when he saw company officials bringing the cracked toilet out of the men's room, and taking pictures, and hearing about it from a fellow worker, Jim Thacker." There were rumors that Demoray was responsible but that Ritter "did not see the actual kicking or breaking itself, and was not present to see Demoray kick the toilet." Demoray approached the Plaintiff, "presumably because he was the Union Steward-Elect, and told him that he had not broken the toilet on purpose, but had simply lost his temper and kicked the toilet, breaking it." Ritter "may have been in the bathroom the day of the toilet breaking," but did not see or hear it occur, and he told Demoray this.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 17.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 19.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 19.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 20.
Viatec commenced an investigation. Viatec employees Chris Shepard, Human Resources Director, Les Raymond and Dave Kensington interviewed Ritter about his knowledge of the incident. In the initial interview, Ritter stated that he had not heard nor seen the incident personally and furthermore did not know if he had been in the room when the incident occurred. Viatec also interviewed Ben Alcala, Jr., Dave Peterman, and Carl Demoray. Alcala stated that Ritter may have been in the bathroom at the time but he wasn't sure. Demoray admitted to breaking the toilet and told Viatec officials that he "thought Duane Ritter was present when he kicked the toilet, and that Plaintiff had approached him specifically to tell him he wouldn't tell anyone what he saw." Peterman's written statement stated that Alcala, Demoray and Ritter where present when Demoray broke the toilet. The company then re-interviewed Ritter and told him that other employees had put him on the scene at the time of the incident. Ritter, however, gave the same answers as he had in the first interview. He was then told that he would be placed on suspension pending further investigation. On December 23, 1998, Ritter was asked to come in to work and was given a document entitled Separation Notice that stated that he was being fired for dishonesty.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 22. The Plaintiffs are advised that they are not before a jury and inflammatory rhetoric such as characterizing the interview by company officials as "Nazi gestapo like" is not of assistance to the Court.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 23.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 25.
The Separation Notice stated that Ritter:
violated #14 of the Work Rules and Regulations for Viatec, Inc. which is just cause for discharge:
#14 Falsification of or supplying false information for records or reports, including but not limited to employment application and other personnel records, time cards, absence, sickness or other records, or dishonesty of any kind.
Duane was dishonest in his statement to Company management during an investigation of an incident which occurred on December 17, 1998 which involved the destruction of company property by another employee.
The Work Rules and Regulations for Viatec, Inc. are given to each employee.
After the termination, Ritter told union officials Monte Newland and Paul Shemanski that he wished to challenge the termination. Ritter contends that Shemanski gave him a grievance form, and said that Viatec "had" him and that a grievance was unlikely to be successful. Ritter completed the grievance form.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 29.
He contends that union officials did not return his calls. In a January 25, 1999 memo, Viatec denied the first step grievance.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 31.
After the company denied the grievance, Shemanski contacted Viatec's attorney, Robert Chovanec and advised him that if Ritter "came clean" on being in the bathroom at the time of the incident and Viatec did not reinstate him, he would recommend the case for arbitration. Chovanec stated that the company would reconsider the discharge if Ritter admitted that he had been in the bathroom at the time of the incident. A meeting was scheduled for February 15, 1999.
Shemanski Aff. ¶ 7.
On February 11, 1999, Ritter alleges that he saw Demoray who told him that he was still employed at Viatec and that he had been pressured during the investigation by Viatec to adopt a "made up written on a statement laid before him on a table" that Ritter and Acala had seen the incident and had told him that they would deny witnessing it to "cover it up" for him. When Demoray resisted signing the statement he was told that the police would be called and he would lose his job if he did not sign. Ritter sought to have union officials obtain a written statement from Demoray.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 35.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 36.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 38.
Ritter alleges that "little" was done in preparation of the February 15, 1999 meeting. At the meeting were Viatec officials Dave Kensington, Chris Shepard, then Defendant Local Union Chief Steward Craig Pearce and Chovanec. Ritter admitted lying about not being in the bathroom and stated that he was present when Demoray was there but later stated that he first became aware that there was a broken toilet when another employee, Jim Thacker, told him and he then "stuck his head" into the bathroom and saw the "flood." He specifically stated that this was the first he knew of this incident. Chovanec informed him that Viatec would not reconsider the discharge.
First Amended Compl. ¶ 41.
On March 11, 1999, Demoray provided a written statement in which he stated that he felt "intimidated" during the investigation. He stated that Ritter "was in the bathroom when I entered, but I do not know if he was present when the toilet was broken." Demoray further states that "[t]he only conversation he had with Ritter was when Demoray approached him and asked him if he saw what happened in [the] bathroom. Ritter replied that "He did not see anything."
The Plaintiff requested a meeting to vote on sending his grievance to arbitration. During the April 21, 1999 meeting, Ritter gave a statement to the union members and told them about the "list" and his belief that he and Alcala had been "set up" to be fired by Viatec and that Shemanski had not given him any support in contesting the discharge.
Ritter's claim for unemployment benefits was denied. The denial was upheld on appeal. He also filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board, which was dismissed.
On June 23, 1999, Ritter filed this action in which he alleges that through "deliberate intentional acts, the Defendants failed to fairly represent his interest, the grievance was denied arbitration, and he has been unable to find comparable employment." On February 15, 2000, the Union filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On March 15, 2000, the Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to which the Union replied on March 30, 2000.
II
The purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriately granted if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court must view the record and any inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). Entry of summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Id. at 321. Only then does the burden shift to the non-movant to come forward with evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. However, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
III
Ritter asserts that the Union's refusal to submit his grievance to arbitration was bad faith. Specifically, he asserts that Shemanski "did everything he could to stymie the Plaintiff's effort to get his job back. He didn't just abandon him, he undermined him." The Union, in opposition, argues that the Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that indicate its conduct was in bad faith.
Pls' Br. in Opp'n at 5; First Amended Compl. ¶ 51.
Pls' Br. in Opp'n at 24.
A union's duty of fair representation includes "a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct."Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). The duty extends to all of the union's represented employees in all contexts of union activity, including contract negotiation and grievance processing. "[A] union breaches its duty of fair representation if its actions are either `arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.'" Id. at 190. "A union must . . . undertake reasonable investigation to defend a member from employer discipline. . . . A union does not, however, have to exhaust every possible remedy requested by a member facing disciplinary action." Black v. Ryder, 15 F.3d 573, 585 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). "[T]o establish a breach of fair representation, the plaintiff must meet the onerous burden of proving that the grievance process was seriously flawed by the union's breach of its duty to represent employees honestly and in good faith and without invidious discrimination or arbitrary conduct. . . . Thus, if a union fails to present favorable evidence during the grievance process, this failure may constitute a breach of its duty only if that evidence probably would have brought about a different result." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Plaintiffs contend that Viatec wanted to terminate certain individuals, including Ritter, that the Union was aware of this and that "the union, through Shemanski, did everything it could to stay out of Viatec's way in its quest to get rid of" him. Ritter relies on testimony from Shop Steward Monte Newland that during contract negotiations with Viatec, and its CEO Ken Kensington, the union team sought to remove Don Meade as team leader because of perceived ineffectiveness. According to Newland:
Pls' Br. in Opp'n at 16.
We asked Ken Kensington if he could do something, you know, help us on it and get [Meade] out of the group leader position and replace him with somebody else in that position and put him back on the floor, and Ken opened up a notebook that he had and said, you want Donny, and he slid it across the table to me and he said, I want these guys.
Q. And who are on this list that he slid across the table?
A. Benny Acala, Duane Ritter, and Randy Thompson.
Q. Okay. And you were present when this occurred?
A. Yes.
* * *
Q. Okay. Was there any further discussion at that time about the names, the guys on the list?
Newland Dep. at 20.
In Black v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 15 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 1994), a case upon which the Plaintiffs rely, a truck driver was suspended and later discharged for having returned a truck to a depot without reporting that the truck had been damaged. In his grievance proceeding, Black argued that the truck was undamaged when he left it at the terminal and that any damage must have occurred after that time. Black was represented by a union rival with whom he had a long, well established "acrimonious history."Id. at 577. The union representative refused to travel to Birmingham to interview the mechanic who had repaired the truck and had signed the damage report, the crucial piece of evidence on which the employer rested its case against Black. Had the representative interviewed the mechanic, he would have learned that the mechanic had no knowledge of the condition of the truck when Black left it at the terminal.
Unlike in Black, Ritter cannot identify specific evidence that the Union should have pursued but refused to. Indeed, because the issue was the Plaintiff's credibility, it is difficult to imagine what evidence "would have brought about a different decision" in the grievance proceeding. See Black, 15 F.3d at 585.
Ritter testified that the union should have interviewed Carl and his work partner to ascertain whether Ritter had been at his work station or not. Ritter Dep. at 70. It is unclear how additional interviews would have shed light on the Plaintiff's inconsistent answers to Viatec's direct question of whether he had been present at the time of the damage.
In addition, in Black, the Court of Appeals articulated as the basis for its decision the substantial evidence of animus between the union representative and Black. Such evidence is lacking here. Although there was evidence that Viatec's reaction to the incident was related to Kensington's desire to terminate Ritter, there is no evidence that the union's representation of the Plaintiff was comprised. The union did not agree to forgo contesting disciplinary action against certain individuals. The Plaintiffs have failed to adduce evidence that either the Union or Shemanski undermined his efforts or worked at cross purposes. Indeed, the union filed a grievance on behalf of the Plaintiff. Shemanski actively negotiated on Ritter's behalf with Chovanec and arranged a meeting whereby the company would reconsider its decision if Ritter would "come clean." Union officials arranged a vote as to whether the grievance should be set to arbitration. Ritter was provided ample opportunity to present his case. Porter indicated that Dave Peterman was likely to make a credible witness against the Plaintiff. Shemanski, who had witnessed Ritter's inconsistencies, opined that success was unlikely in the case.
The relevant testimony is as follows:
Q. [D]id you connect the list and the statement by Mr. Kensington, we want these guys, with the fact that these guys were involved in an investigation that could lead to termination?
A. Yes.
Q. And why did you connect that in your mind?
A. Just because of the way it was handled.
Q. By?
A. By the company.
Shemanski Dep. at 53.
It is well-settled that no individual employee has an absolute right to have his or her grievance arbitrated. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979); Vaca v. Sipes, supra, 386 U.S. at 191; Poole v. Budd Co., 706 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1983). This is because union officials have a wide range of reasonableness in dealing with discretionary decisions under the grievance process. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). Unions are given considerable discretion in sifting out grievances and although what constitutes arbitrary treatment depends upon the facts of each particular case, it suffices if a union decides in good faith on the basis of objective, rational criteria that the grievance lacks sufficient merit to justify the expense of arbitration. Poole, 706 F.2d at 133; Sargent v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 713 F. Supp. 999, 1010 (E.D.Mich. 1989)
In this case, the evidence establishes that the Union's decision not to send the Plaintiff's grievance to arbitration was based upon rational and objective grounds. Ritter had not only misled company officials in the investigation after the incident by stating that he was not in the bathroom at the time when witnesses had stated that he was, but had contradicted himself in the February 15, 1999 meeting with company officials, after assuring them that he was being truthful. The union reasonably could have concluded that the grievance was not likely to be successful.
Drawing all inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs, the facts before the Court fail to establish that the Union's decision not to arbitrate was in bad faith. Because no genuine issues of material fact exist for trial, summary judgment is granted in favor of the Union.
An order and judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.