Drumm v. Sizeler Realty Co., Inc.

5 Citing cases

  1. Eichman v. Fotomat Corp.

    871 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1989)   Cited 88 times
    Holding that a plaintiff's prior state court action alleging state antitrust claims did not toll the statute of limitations on his federal antitrust claim filed in a subsequent federal action, because "[i]f the filing of a state antitrust claim could equitably toll the federal antitrust statute of limitations, this would result in a judicially mandated tacking of state limitations periods onto the federal limits"

    Eichman also claims that the pendency of the state court action in Eichman II equitably tolled the statute of limitations with respect to the federal antitrust claims in the matter before this court. We rejected a similar argument in Pace Industries, Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 240-41 (9th Cir. 1987); see also, Mir. v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); accord, Drumm v. Sizeler Realty Co. Inc., 817 F.2d 1195, 1197 (5th Cir. 1987). When a plaintiff has both state and federal law antitrust claims, he has the discretion to pursue a remedy in state or federal court. If the plaintiff chooses to pursue a state remedy first, the plaintiff may not invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling. If the filing of a state antitrust claim could equitably toll the federal antitrust statute of limitations, this would result in a judicially mandated tacking of state limitations periods onto the federal limits.

  2. Monrouzeau v. Asociación Del Hosp. Del Maestro, Inc.

    153 F. App'x 7 (1st Cir. 2005)   Cited 10 times
    Concluding that equitable tolling did not apply to Monrouzeau's alleged EMTALA violation even though Monrouzeau "timely pleaded her federal claim in the Commonwealth court action ... where she was allowed to have it adjudicated ... does not entitle her to replead it beyond the statutory window in this parallel federal lawsuit"

    1999) — does not entitle her to replead it beyond the statutory window in this parallel federal lawsuit. See Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315, 319 (1st Cir. 1978) ("[P]rior judicial actions generally do not toll the statute of limitations, no matter how close their relationship to the case at bar."); accord Drumm v. Sizeler Realty Corp., 817 F.2d 1195, 1196 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1987); Pace Indus., Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 240 (9th Cir. 1987). So far as we can tell, there are no additional equities on Monrouzeau's side favoring tolling.

  3. Arivella v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.

    623 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D. Mass. 2009)   Cited 23 times
    Finding that American Pipe tolls ERISA's statute of repose, section 413, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1113, in spite ofLampf because "American Pipe tolling is a species of legal tolling, in that it is derived from a statutory source, in this case Rule 23"

    Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363. The Court recognizes that many Circuit court decisions have referred to American Pipe tolling as equitable tolling. Bridges v. Department of Md. State Police, 441 F.3d 197, 211 (4th Cir. 2006) ("The American Pipe/Crown, Cork Seal equitable tolling rule is a limited exception to the universal rule that statutes of limitations are impervious to equitable exceptions."); Veltri v. Building Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 322-23 (2d Cir. 2004); Raie v. Cheminova, Inc., 336 F.3d 1278, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003); Sawtell v. E.U. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 248, 252 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[Plaintiff] next argues the running of the statute of limitations should have been tolled under the `equitable tolling' doctrine of American Pipe. . . .");Youngblood v. Dalzell, 925 F.2d 954, 959 n. 3 (6th Cir. 1991);Drumm v. Sizeler Realty Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 1195, 1196 (5th Cir. 1987); Donaghue v. Orange County, 848 F.2d 926, 930 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1987); Washington v. Walker, 734 F.2d 1237, 1240 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1984). The distinction between legal and equitable tolling, however, is only thrown into relief in limited circumstances, namely, when a court must decide whether to toll a statute of repose.

  4. Rodriguez v. Banco Cent.

    727 F. Supp. 759 (D.P.R. 1989)   Cited 14 times
    Dismissing claims under ILSFDA as time-barred

    We disagree, noting that the filing of the state law action in no way prevented plaintiffs from filing a timely federal action and thus does not toll the limitation period for the federal claims. Drumm v. Sizeler Realty Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1987). See also Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1978) (so long as actions are not barred by the pendency of prior actions, prior judicial actions do not toll the statute of limitations, no matter how close their relationship to the one at bar).

  5. Brown v. Dow Chemical Co.

    777 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Miss. 1989)   Cited 3 times

    Further, plaintiffs' participation in these earlier lawsuits negates any suspension of the limitation period applicable under state law. See Drumm v. Sizeler Realty Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 1195, 1196-97 (5th Cir. 1987) (where filing of state claim lay wholly within discretion of plaintiff, it does not toll limitations on federal cause of action for similar claim). Finally, on account of all the expired time, it is clear that plaintiffs neither can avail themselves of the protection afforded by Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-69 (1972).