Opinion
NNHCV195046645S
11-15-2019
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
SHEILA ANN OZALIS Judge.
The defendant, Yale New Haven Hospital, has moved to dismiss the plaintiff Bettina Drew’s complaint on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over it because the plaintiff failed to append to her complaint a signed, written opinion of a similar health care provider as required by General Statutes Section 52-190(a).
"It is important to note that § 52-190a applies only to claims of medical malpractice, not ordinary negligence ... Accordingly, not every claim against a medical institution necessarily is subject to the good faith opinion certification requirement." (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women’s Center, 314 Conn. 709, 723 n.4, 104 A.3d 671 (2014).
The Appellate Court has created a test to determine if a specific claim sounds in medical malpractice or ordinary negligence. In Trimel v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation Center, 61 Conn.App. 353, 764 A.2d 203, appeal dismissed, 258 Conn. 711, 784 A.2d 889 (2001), the Appellate Court held that "[t]he classification of a negligence claim as either medical malpractice or ordinary negligence requires a court to review closely the circumstances under which the alleged negligence occurred. [P]rofessional negligence or malpractice ... [is] defined as the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss, or damage to the recipient of those services ... From those definitions, we conclude that the relevant considerations in determining whether a claim sounds in medical malpractice are whether (1) the defendants are sued in their capacities as medical professionals, (2) the alleged negligence is of a specialized medical nature that arises out of the medical professional-patient relationship, and (3) the alleged negligence is substantially related to medical diagnosis or treatment and involved the exercise of medical judgment." (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 357-58.
Upon review of the self-represented plaintiff’s complaint, it is clear that it mainly alleges that the defendant failed to inform the plaintiff of her rights while committed. Actions against health care providers sounding in ordinary negligence, rather than medical malpractice, do not require good faith certificates because in straight negligence actions, there are no uniquely medical issues requiring expert testimony to establish the standard of care.
As the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint sound in ordinary negligence, not medical malpractice, § 52-190a does not apply, and an opinion letter is not required. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to attach to her complaint a signed, written opinion letter of a similar health care provider pursuant to General Statutes Section 52-190(a) is denied.