Opinion
4-3-1958
William A. DRENNAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STAR PAVING COMPANY et al., Defendant and Appellant. * Civ. 5642.
Obegi & High, Van Nuys, for appellant. S. B. Gill, Bakersfield, for respondent.
William A. DRENNAN, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
STAR PAVING COMPANY et al., Defendant and Appellant. *
Obegi & High, Van Nuys, for appellant.
S. B. Gill, Bakersfield, for respondent.
MUSSELL, Justice.
This is an action for damages alleged to have been caused by the refusal of defendant corporation to perform the asphaltic paving work according to its bid submitted to plaintiff as general contractor. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant, Star Paving Company, a corporation, for the sum of $3,817 and costs. The defendant corporation appeals from the judgment, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the judgment and that the judgment is against the law.
On July 28, 1955, plaintiff William A. Drennan was a licensed general contractor engaged in bidding for a public works construction job known as the 'Monte Vista School Job' in the Lancaster school district. The bids of the general contractors for the complete construction job were required by the board of trustees of the school district to be submitted before 8:00 p. m. on July 28, 1955, in the office of the district superintendent of the district. In the afternoon of that day plaintiff's secretary and clerk, Lorraine Johnson, was receiving all subcontractors' bids for the various portions of the school job, recording them in writing on mimeographed forms, and transmitting them to plaintiff, who then posted each sub-bid to his master cost sheet which contained the names and amounts of the bids of all subcontractors bidding on the school job. During the day Mrs. Johnson received approximately seventy-five sub-bids by telephone and recorded them in the manner stated and according to the custom of the business.
Late in the afternoon, between 4:00 and 7:00 o'clock, a telephone conversation was had between Mrs. Johnson and Kenneth R. Hoon, an estimator of bids for the defendant Star Paving Company. Hoon stated his name and 'phone number and stated that he was bidding the paving work on the Monte Vista school, according to the plans and specifications, for $7,131.60, and that he was a representative of the Star Paving Company. Mrs. Johnson asked him to repeat the amount, which he did. Plaintiff listened to this conversation on an extension 'phone and, after receiving the record of it from Mrs. Johnson, he posted the bid to his master cost sheet. Since the bid of the Star Paving Company was the lowest bid received for the asphaltic paving portion of the job, he used it in making his final bid as general contractor and relied on the amount of the bid submitted by Hoon. Plaintiff's bid for the school job was accepted on the night of July 28, 1955. The general contract was awarded to him and thereafter he completed the job.
On the morning of July 29, 1955, plaintiff, while en route to Los Angeles stopped at the office of the defendant company to talk to its representatives and the first person with whom he talked was Mr. Oppenheimer, a construction engineer employed by the defendant company. Plaintiff testified in this connection: 'I introduced myself and he immediately told me they had made a mistake in their bid to me the night before, they couldn't do it for the price they had bid, and I told him I would expect him to carry through with their original bid because I had used it in compiling my bid and the job was being awarded them. And I would have to go and do the job according to my bid and I would expect them to do the same.'
The defendant corporation refused to perform the asphaltic paving work for and sum less than $15,000. Plaintiff then employed the L and H Paving Company to perform said work and was required to pay them the sum of $10,948.60 therefor.
The trial court found, inter alia, that the Star Paving Company, through its agent K. R. Hoon, made a definite and specific offer or bid to perform the asphaltic paving portion of the Monte Vista job according to the official plans and specifications therefor for the sum of $7,131.60; that in reliance upon defendant corporation's bid, plaintiff computed his final figures for said school job and submitted his bid in writing on the evening of July 28, 1955, specifically naming the defendant corporation as the subcontractor selected by him to perform said asphaltic paving work. These findings are supported by substantial evidence and cannot be here disturbed.
Appellant contends that there never was a firm bid given to plaintiff and that the factual situation raises the same problem the court faced in Leo F. Piazza Paving Co. v. Bebek & Brkich, 141 Cal.App.2d 226, 296 P.2d 368, namely, did a contract exist? However, in that case the trial court found that no contract existed and there was substantial evidence that the subcontractor stated that he could not give the general contractor an exact quotation or bid; that he told the general contractor that he would give him some kind of an idea to use as a bid on the job and that he did not intend to make a firm bid. In the instant case the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the defendant made a definite and specific bid. The representatives of defendant corporation knew that plaintiff as general contractor was going to bid on the school job on the evening of July 28, 1955, and that plaintiff would rely on the bid of defendant corporation in submitting his final bid to the school authorities.
In Wade v. Markwell & Co., 118 Cal.App.2d 410, 420, 258 P.2d 497, 502, 37 A.L.R.2d 1363, the court said, quoting from Carpy v. Dowdell, 115 Cal. 677, 687, 47 P. 695: "* * * he who, by his language or conduct, leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. Such change of position is sternly forbidden." And in Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal.App.2d 711, 725, 197 P.2d 807, 816, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is defined as "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." This doctrine is applicable under the facts and circumstances shown by the record herein.
Judgment affirmed.
BARNARD, P. J., and GRIFFIN, J., concur. --------------- * Opinion vacated 333 P.2d 757.