Opinion
2:20-cv-02750-TMC-MGB
08-10-2021
Robert S. Drayton; Plaintiff, v. Henry McMaster; Bryan Stirling; Terri Wallace; and Wanda Serman, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Robert S. Drayton (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. Under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the Complaint be summarily dismissed, in part.
BACKGROUND
The instant action is primarily based on Kirkland Correctional Institution's (“Kirkland”) response to the coronavirus (“COVID-19”) from approximately April to June 2020, and the ways in which the facility's policies affected the inmate population-both generally and specifically. The Complaint states that on or around April 21, 2020, Kirkland implemented a “total institutional lockdown” to combat the spread of COVID-19. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7-8.) As part of the lockdown, inmates no longer had access to sick calls or non-emergency medical care. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2-4.) Moreover, the lockdown created “crowded and unsanitary living quarters, ” as Kirkland continued to house multiple inmates per cell despite the need for social distancing. (Id. at 2-3.) The Complaint further alleges that inmates were not provided proper cleaning supplies or hand sanitizer, which made it “impossible to maintain vigilant hygiene.” (Id. at 3.) As the warden, Defendant Wallace was apparently aware of these unsafe conditions, but refused to implement any meaningful protocols to protect the inmates against the spread of the virus during the lockdown. (Id. at 20-21.)
With respect to Plaintiff's personal experience during the lockdown, the Complaint alleges that he was repeatedly denied adequate medical treatment for his various chronic conditions. For example, while Plaintiff's acute hypertension had required routine medical treatment, the Kirkland medical team stopped monitoring his blood pressure once the lockdown went into effect. (Id. at 34.) Consequently, Plaintiff s blood pressure rose to levels that caused constant dizziness and migraines and resulted in Plaintiff passing out on a number of occasions. (See id. at 3-15.) Although Plaintiff received some medical care in response to these episodes, the medical staff often sent him back to his cell before his blood pressure had stabilized and failed to monitor Plaintiff's status in the days that followed. (See id. at 6-10, 14.) Of particular relevance here, the Complaint seems to suggest that the facility's healthcare administrator, Defendant Serman, most frequently treated Plaintiff and was largely responsible for his allegedly inadequate medical care- as evidenced by his continuously high blood pressure and fainting episodes. (See id. at 6-15, 2224.) Plaintiff claims that while he discussed these ongoing issues with Defendant Wallace, the warden did nothing to resolve the inadequate medical treatment. (Id. at 4, 11, 20-21.)
In addition to Plaintiff's hypertension, the Complaint also notes that Plaintiff suffered from chronic enlarged tonsils, which blocked his airways and caused him to choke in the night. (Id. at 15-16; Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) Both Defendants Serman and Wallace were apparently informed of Plaintiff's worsening condition but refused to provide further medical treatment during the lockdown. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 15-16, 21-24.) The Complaint asserts that this inadequate medical care, coupled with the poor living conditions at Kirkland, not only exacerbated Plaintiff's health conditions, but also placed him-a particularly vulnerable inmate-at serious risk of contracting COVID-19. (Id. at 22-24.) Accordingly, Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking injunctive relief in the form of more effective protocols in compliance with the guidelines promulgated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), as well as monetary damages in an amount exceeding $75,000. (Id. at 25.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff initially filed this action on behalf of himself and numerous other inmates subject to the lockdown at Kirkland. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2.) He also filed a motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. No. 3) and for class certification (Dkt. No. 4), both of which were denied. (See Dkt. No. 11.) Specifically, the undersigned issued an order explaining that the Court could not certify a class where a pro se litigant like Plaintiff was acting as the representative of the class, and that the Court would consider only Plaintiff's personal claims in conducting the initial review. (See id. at 2.) The undersigned further noted that portions of Plaintiff's pleading were subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim, and provided him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies by filing an amended complaint within twenty-one days. (See id. at 3-4.) The order warned Plaintiff that failure to file an amended complaint or cure the pleading deficiencies within the prescribed time period could result in summary dismissal of certain claims. (Id. at 4.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed any amended pleading or factual allegations, and the time to comply with the undersigned's order has passed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, ” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
As suggested above, Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants in both their individual and official capacities, alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide adequate medical treatment and reasonable conditions of confinement in response to COVID-19. While Plaintiff's allegations can be liberally construed as raising plausible claims against Defendants Wallace and Serman in their individual capacities, the undersigned finds that the remaining allegations are subject to summary dismissal for the reasons discussed below.
I. Injunctive Relief
At the outset, the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual “Cases” or “Controversies.” See U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Friedman's, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997)). In other words, “a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Brown & Pipkins, LLC v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 846 F.3d 716, 728 (4th Cir. 2017). Thus, as the undersigned warned Plaintiff in the proper form order, the transfer of an inmate to a new facility typically renders moot a previous claim for injunctive and declaratory relief. (Dkt. No. 11 at 3.) See, e.g., Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991); Taylor v. Rogers, 781 F.2d 1047, 1048 n.1 (4th Cir. 1986).
Although Plaintiff filed his Complaint while he was incarcerated at Kirkland, he was subsequently transferred to Broad River Correctional Institution (“Broad River”). (Dkt. No. 15.) Consequently, Plaintiff's claims regarding the living conditions at Kirkland and the facility's inadequate medical care no longer reflect an active controversy. See, e.g., Bolick v. Thompson, No. 5:20-cv-03119-RBH, 2021 WL 1220826, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 1, 2021) (finding that prisoner's transfer to a different facility rendered moot claims in which he sought injunctive relief from alleged conditions of confinement at prior facility); Ajaj v. Smith, 108 Fed.Appx. 743, 744 (4th Cir. 2004) (same); see also Wallace v. Solomon, 740 Fed.Appx. 283, 284 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “the newly situated inmate has no further need for such declaratory or injunctive relief, for he is free of the policy or practice that provoked his lawsuit in the first place”) (internal citations omitted). The undersigned therefore recommends that Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief be dismissed as moot.
II. Monetary Damages
In addition to injunctive relief, Plaintiff's Complaint also asserts a claim for monetary damages (Dkt. No. 1 at 25), which survives his transfer to Broad River. See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991) (explaining that a prisoner's transfer moots a request for declaratory and injunctive relief, but not a request for money damages). Nevertheless, Plaintiff's damages claims are still subject to partial dismissal for several reasons.
First, the Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against the State, as well as its agencies, divisions, departments, officials, and other “arms of the State.” See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (explaining that “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself”). Defendants are clearly considered arms of the State for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Fordham v. Bachman, No. 2:16-cv-249-RMG-MGB, 2016 WL 11409542, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 5, 2016) (explaining that prison officials, in their official capacities, are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment as arms of the State), adopted by 2016 WL 1688743 (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 2016); Russell v. Stirling, No. 2:19-cv-01965-CMC-MGB, 2020 WL 6732739, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2020) (finding that Bryan Stirling, as Director of SCDC, is a state official and therefore protected against claims for monetary damages under the Eleventh Amendment), adopted by 2020 WL 6710849 (D.S.C. Nov. 16, 2020); Smith v. McMaster, No. 8:17-cv-2549-JMC-TER, 2017 WL 9286981, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 4, 2017) (finding Henry McMaster, as Governor of South Carolina, immune from § 1983 damages claim under the Eleventh Amendment). The undersigned therefore recommends that Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages be dismissed against Defendants in their official capacities.
Second, it is well-established that a person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017). Thus, the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior generally are not applicable in § 1983 actions. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Indeed, to allege a plausible Eighth Amendment claim, the plaintiff must show: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his or her subordinates engaged in conduct posing a pervasive or unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was “so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) an affirmative causal link between the inaction by the supervisor and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Green v. Beck, 539 Fed.Appx. 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013).
In the instant case, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient factual allegations to establish personal involvement by Defendants Wallace and Serman in the purported deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights. With respect to Defendants McMaster and Stirling, however, the Complaint simply states that they are “legally responsible for the overall operations of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and its 21 institutions, ” and that “[b]oth of these defendants have failed to adequately protect all incarcerated listed plaintiffs from the spread of COVID-19.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 20.) The undersigned explicitly warned Plaintiff that such general allegations are insufficient to demonstrate the level of personal involvement as required under § 1983. (Dkt. No. 11 at 4.) See, e.g., Walker v. Dudek, No. 3:19-cv-02558-JMC-JDA, 2019 WL 7195632, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2019) (finding “general, vague allegations” regarding McMaster's and Stirling's “obligations over SCDC and the Government of South Carolina” insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim), adopted by 2019 WL 5092124 (D.S.C. Oct. 11, 2019); Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012) (dismissing claims against the Governor of South Carolina and Director of SCDC because complaint did not allege that those defendants were aware of, or deliberately indifferent to, any constitutional risk of injury to the plaintiff), adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012). Because Plaintiff did not amend his Complaint and cure these pleading deficiencies, the undersigned recommends that the damages claims against Defendants McMaster and Stirling in their individual capacities be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief in their entirety; Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages against Defendants McMaster and Stirling in their entirety; and Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages against Defendants Wallace and Serman in their official capacities, without prejudice. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 Fed.Appx. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (explaining that, where the district court has already afforded a plaintiff with the opportunity to amend, the district court, in its discretion, can either afford plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint).
The undersigned recommends dismissal without prejudice “because the dismissal is primarily based on Eleventh Amendment immunity (regarding Plaintiff's claim for damages against Defendants in their official capacities) and mootness (regarding Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief), both of which deprive this Court of jurisdiction.” See Smyth v. Stirling, No. 0:18-cv-01218-RBH, 2018 WL 6444374, at *2 n.5 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2018); see also Porter v. Clarke, 852 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2017) (mootness); Hong Tang v. Univ. of Baltimore, 782 Fed.Appx. 254, 255 (4th Cir. 2019) (Eleventh Amendment immunity).
The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the Court dismiss those other inmates listed by Plaintiff as parties to this action (see Dkt. No. 1 at 1-3), as Plaintiff cannot represent other pro se litigants in federal court. See Cobb v. McMaster, No. 1:20-cv-3024-JMC-SVH, 2020 WL 5203495, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 1, 2020) (holding that pro se prisoner's § 1983 claim regarding correctional institution's response to COVID-19 could not encompass other inmates as parties to the action).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).