Opinion
C. A. 22-4442-JFA-PJG
01-25-2023
Marcus T. Drayton, Petitioner, v. Director, Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Marcus T. Drayton, a self-represented state prisoner, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.). Having reviewed the Petition in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner is currently detained in the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center on state charges in Richland County. Petitioner contends that his continued detention without a trial violates the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause. Petitioner indicates that his charges stem from an incident that occurred in 2009, but he was arrested in October 2021. Petitioner also indicates that his court-appointed attorney made a motion for a speedy trial in May 2022 that was granted by the state circuit court, and a trial was set for August 2022. However, Petitioner indicates that the trial date was pushed back to September and then again to October, but a trial was never held. Petitioner indicates that his counsel then filed a motion for a bond that was heard by the state circuit court on November 30, 2022 but denied. Petitioner asks this court to either order that he be tried or dismiss his indictments.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se petition filed in this case pursuant to the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se petitions, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
A federal court may only entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254 by a person claiming he is in state custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41(1984). Generally, § 2254 cannot be used to prevent a state criminal prosecution, especially where the detainee can raise his claims in the court where his charges are pending. See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973). In limited circumstances, federal courts have entertained habeas corpus actions where the petitioner seeks to enforce his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 489-90 (finding that pretrial detainees may seek federal habeas relief to assert their right for a speedy trial in limited circumstances); see also Atkins v. People of State of Mich., 644 F.2d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding the speedy trial exception recognized in Braden does not apply where the detainee complains only about the prejudice from the delay rather than seeks enforcement of the state's duty to provide a prompt trial).
However, a prerequisite to filing any habeas corpus action pursuant to § 2254 is that the petitioner must first exhaust his available remedies in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). “To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner must present his claims to the state's highest court.” Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Barnette, 644 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2011). To exhaust his available state court remedies, a petitioner must “fairly present[] to the state court both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles associated with each claim.” Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where a federal habeas petitioner seeks to enforce his right to a speedy trial, he must first seek to enforce the right in state court and, failing that, seek dismissal of his charges in the state court based on the unconstitutional delay. Kane v. State of Va., 419 F.2d 1369, 1373 (4th Cir. 1970).
Here, Petitioner indicates he filed a motion for a speedy trial that was granted, but the trial has not yet happened despite being scheduled three times. Petitioner also indicates that he recently sought to be released on bond while his charges are pending but that motion was denied. But Petitioner fails to assert that he moved to dismiss the charges based on the purportedly unconstitutional delay. See, e.g., State v. Langford, 735 S.E.2d 471, 482 (S.C. 2012) (“If a court concludes that this right [to a speedy trial] has been violated, dismissal of the charges is the ‘only possible remedy.' ”) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972)). Consequently, Petitioner fails to allege that he exhausted his state administrative remedies.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the Respondent to file a return.
The Petitioner is directed to the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).