Opinion
No. 147, 2000
Submitted: January 9, 2001
Decided: February 28, 2001
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Kent County, Cr. A. Nos. IK99-03-0105 through 0118
Unpublished opinion is below.
Remanded.
ROBERT W. DRAPER, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below-Appellee. No. 147, 2000 Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: January 9, 2001 Decided: February 28, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.
ORDER
This 28th day of February 2001, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on December 19, 1998, a burglar threw a concrete block through a glass door and entered the residence of Lee Slaughter, Jr. while Slaughter was out of the house. The burglar removed one handgun and ten rifles and shotguns from Slaughter's spare bedroom, but the burglar did not disturb anything else in the house.
(2) After an investigation, the police identified Robert Draper as a suspect because one week before the burglary, Draper had accompanied his girlfriend to Slaughter's house to give Slaughter an estimate for painting the spare bedroom.
On February 25, 1999, Draper was brought to the police station in connection with a domestic disturbance. While Draper was in custody, an officer informed him of his Miranda rights and asked to speak with him about the Slaughter burglary.
(3) About thirty minutes after the officer began to question Draper, another officer activated a video camera in the interview room. Questioning continued for approximately fifty minutes after the video camera was activated.
During the course of this interrogation, Draper confessed to the theft of twenty-four guns from Slaughter's home. Draper contends that, at several points during the taped portion of the interrogation, he requested that questioning stop until he could speak with his mother but the officer continued to question him.
(4) At trial, Draper filed a motion to suppress his incriminating statements (a) because the officer continued to question him after he invoked his right to silence and (b) because he was intoxicated during the interrogation and thus did not knowingly waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. The trial court denied Draper's motion, finding that Draper voluntarily waived his rights at the beginning of the interrogation and did not later ask the officer to stop the interrogation. Based primarily on Draper's confession, a jury convicted Draper on eleven counts of theft of a firearm.
384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966) ("If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.").
State v. Draper, Del. Super., Cr. A. Nos. IK99-03-0105 through 0118, Witham, J. (Jan. 5, 2000) (Bench Ruling on Suppression Motion). In ruling on Draper's Motion to Suppress, the trial court found that "[t]he defendant did not assert during the interview of the defendant any of his civic Miranda rights, although he had the opportunity to do so." The trial court observed that "the defendant did request to speak with his mother at several points in the examination," but concluded that Draper did not make "any conscious effort to close the interview by the defendant to remain silent." Based on the videotape and the officer's testimony, the trial court did not find "any difficulty on the part of the defendant to understand the questions being propounded to him."
(5) On appeal, Draper argues that he invoked his right to silence under Miranda during the course of the interrogation. Under Miranda, a suspect in custody may invoke the right to silence and may decline to answer police questions. The police must then stop the interrogation until the suspect indicates a desire to resume the interrogation.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
See id.
(6) In the present case, the parties agree that Draper was in police custody and that the officer informed Draper of his rights under Miranda. If Draper stated that he did not wish to speak further until he spoke with his mother, the officer was obligated to cease the interview immediately. If the officer continued to question Draper after he invoked his right to silence, the officer violated Draper's rights under Miranda, and Draper's subsequent statements must be suppressed as the product of illegal questioning.
The officer testified that Draper asked the officer to call Draper's mother at the beginning of the interview (before the video camera was activated), but that Draper nevertheless agreed to speak with the officer about the Slaughter burglary.
See id. ("[A]ny statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise."); Rickards v. State, Del. Supr., 77 A.2d 199, 205 (1950) ("The most effective way to protect the guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure and compulsory self-incrimination is to exclude from evidence any matter obtained by a violation of them."); see also Dorsey v. State, Del. Supr., 761 A.2d 807, 814 (2000) (discussing Rickards).
(7) Under this analysis, the central factual question is whether Draper invoked his right to silence at some point during his interrogation-either before or after the police activated the video camera. Although the trial court concluded that Draper did not assert his rights under Miranda at any time, the factual basis for this ruling is unclear from the record. To clarify the record, we remand this case to the Superior Court to address Draper's contention that he invoked his right to silence during the interrogation. The report should present a more complete factual account of Draper's interrogation including, if available, a transcript of the videotape, and a reasoned analysis supporting the court's conclusions.
(8) In particular, the trial court's analysis on remand should first address its interpretation of the statements that, according to Draper, constitute an assertion of his right to silence during questioning. If the trial court finds that Draper did invoke his right to silence during the interrogation, the court should then determine whether the State presented Draper's subsequent, illegally obtained statements to the jury.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order, with jurisdiction retained under Rule 19(c) and for return from remand within 60 days of the date of this order.