Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2920 (RWR).
April 25, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff has filed a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) to vacate a summary judgment entered against her in this case almost two years ago. Plaintiff characterizes her motion as
an independent equity action under rule 60(b) . . . [to] set aside the judgment for "fraud on the court[,]" and . . . a claim under Rule 60(b)(4) which permits relief on the grounds that "the judgment is void" and is contrary to due process.
(Pltf.'s Mot. at 1.) Because plaintiff's motion is untimely and fails to demonstrate either that the judgment is void or that a fraud on the court was committed, plaintiff's motion will be denied.
Plaintiff relies on Rule 60(b), which states in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment . . . for the following reasons: . . . (3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; [or] (4) the judgment is void[.]
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3), (4). Plaintiff argues that her adversary committed a fraud on the court which, in turn, renders the judgment void. The sole basis for plaintiff's conclusion that the judgment is void is her view that it was based on fraud by the adverse party. (Pltf.'s Mot. at 2-3.) "A judgment is . . . void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process." 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller Mary Kay Kane, 11 Fed. Prac. Proc. § 2862, at 326-28 (2d ed. 1995) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has made no such showing here, and her assertion that the judgment is void is unavailing. Plaintiff's characterizations notwithstanding, her motion is governed entirely by Rule 60(b)(3).
Any Rule 60(b)(3) motion based on fraud must be made within one year following the date the judgment was entered. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) ("The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) [fraud or misrepresentation] not more than one year after the judgment . . . was entered[.]"). There is "no elasticity in Rule 60(b)'s one-year time limit on the motions to which it applies; it is not judicially extendable, nor does an appeal from the judgment have the effect of tolling or enlarging it." Carr v. District of Columbia, 543 F.2d 917, 925-26 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Here, plaintiff filed her motion on March 8, 2005, some 21 months after the judgment was entered on May 30, 2003, and well beyond the rule's one-year limit.
Plaintiff's motion fails on its merits as well. She moves for relief under Rule 60(b)(3), but also invokes the language of Rule 60(b) that states that it "does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment . . . or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Plaintiff has not availed herself of this exception, however, as she has filed a motion, not an independent action. If the evidence she has presented, though, were what she would present in an independent action, the evidence of fraud she offers falls far short of that required to warrant vacating a judgment.
In recognition of the fact that "there is always in litigation a margin of error," it is "well-settled that a litigant seeking relief from a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) based on allegations of fraud upon the court must prove the fraud by clear and convincing evidence." Shepherd v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 62 F.3d 1469, 1475, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quotations and citations omitted). In addition, as plaintiff acknowledges (see Pltf.'s Mot. at 7), "an independent action should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998). This is because only "sufficiently gross" injustices "demand a departure from rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata."Id. at 46.
Plaintiff's submission establishes neither fraud by defendant's counsel nor that the disposition in this case constitutes a grave miscarriage of justice. Instead, plaintiff offers a list of statements by defendant's counsel regarding discrete, and largely peripheral, facts that plaintiff contends worked a "fraud on the court." As an example of how defendant's counsel "misled" the court, plaintiff notes that defendant's counsel stated in one place in a memorandum filed with the court that "Plaintiff never made the request for transfer as one for an accommodation" and, in another place in the same memorandum, stated by contrast that two people had "testified that Plaintiff expressed to them the desire to be reassigned to Indianapolis as an accommodation for her eye condition." (Pltf.'s Mot. at 12, emphasis and alterations supplied by plaintiff omitted.) In another example of "fraud," plaintiff asserts that defendant's counsel "distorted" the facts by clever placement of a footnote, leaving the erroneous impression that plaintiff was represented by counsel prior to March 23, 1999, while plaintiff was under investigation by the Inspector General. (Id. at 10.) Whether or not an erroneous inference was drawn, it was not material and had no bearing whatsoever on the ultimate disposition of this case. Although plaintiff offers several examples of what appear to be inconsistent or erroneous statements presented out of context, they do not, either singly or taken as a whole, even begin to suggest that the conclusion reached in adopting the thorough and well-documented Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge was erroneous, let alone a grave miscarriage of justice.
"Defendant served Plaintiff with a notice of proposed removal, . . . on March 16, 1999, containing the various allegations of ethical [mis]conduct documented in the IG investigation. Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, replied to the proposal on May 5, 1999. The proposal was subsequently withdrawn, and a second proposal was issued. . . . Plaintiff, through counsel, responded to the second proposal in September, 1999." Report Recommendation, Mar. 31, 2003, at 4-5 (Robinson, M.J.) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff's motion [Dkt. # 66] to set aside the judgment be, and hereby is, DENIED.