Opinion
Civil Action 9:21-4058-RMG
02-16-2022
Pamela E. Drake, Plaintiff, v. WalMart, Inc., Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., Wal-Mart Supercenter, and Azana Price, Defendants.
ORDER AND OPINION
Richard M. Gergel United States District Judge
This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff Pamela E. Drake's motion to remand. (Dkt. No. 9). For the reasons set forth below, the court grants Plaintiff's motion to remand. (Dkt. No. 9).
I. Background
On November 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed a civil action against Defendants in the Circuit Court of Jasper County, South Carolina, as Case No. 2021-CP-27-00506. (Dkt. No. 1-1). Defendants were served on or about November 19, 2021. (Id. at 14-24). Defendants timely removed the case to this court on December 16, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1-2). Plaintiff alleged she is a citizen of the State of South Carolina; corporate Defendants are corporations organized under the laws of a state other than the State of South Carolina; and individual Defendant Azana Price is a citizen of the State of South Carolina. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 1-5). At the time of removal, the face of the Complaint did not specify the amount of damages sought, but prayed for an award of actual damages, consequential damages, punitive damages, pre-judgment interest, post-judgment interest, costs, and attorney's fees. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at p. 12).
Defendants' notice of removal alleges that Defendant Azana Price is not a proper defendant in this action because she was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 23).
On January 13, 2022, Defendants filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 6). On January 18, 2022, the court entered an Order regarding Defendants' motion to dismiss that granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint or respond to Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 7). On January 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 8). The amended complaint alleges the amount of damages sought does not exceed $74,999.00. (Dkt. No. 8 at p.12).
On January 27, 2022, Plaintiff timely filed a motion to remand the case to the state court alleging the court lacks diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy has not been met and the parties are not completely diverse. (Dkt. No. 9). On February 10, 2022, Defendants filed a response in opposition to the motion to remand. (Dkt. No. 12). On February 14, 2022, Plaintiff field a reply in support of motion to remand. (Dkt. No. 13). On reply, Plaintiff submitted a unilateral stipulation for damages. (Id.). In the stipulation, Plaintiff states that she “irrevocably stipulate[s] that the amount in controversy in this action does not exceed $75,000.00.” (Id.). The Plaintiff further agrees that she will “never seek to accept, accept, receive, or collect on any judgment rendered in this action in excess of $75,000.00.” (Id.).
II. Legal Standard
As the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction after removing a case from state court to federal court, the defendant has the burden of proving jurisdiction upon a plaintiff's motion to remand. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994)); see Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 73, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996) (stating that the party seeking to remove a case from state court to federal court bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is proper at the time the petition for removal is filed). In deciding a motion to remand, the federal court should construe removal jurisdiction strictly in favor of state court jurisdiction. Id. “If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary.” Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151 (citations omitted), Pohto v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 10-2654, 2011 WL 2670000, at *1 (D.S.C. July 7, 2011) (“Because federal courts are forums of limited jurisdiction, any doubt as to whether a case belongs in federal or state court should be resolved in favor of state court.”).
III. Analysis
The Plaintiff's complaint brought causes of action for civil conspiracy, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and invasion of privacy. (Dkt. No. 1-1). For these claims, the complaint requested actual, consequential, and punitive damages, but does not specify an amount. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at p. 12-13). The amended complaint dropped the civil conspiracy claim and alleges the amount in controversy does not exceed $74,999.00. (Dkt. No. 8 at p. 12). The Plaintiff requests that the court remand the case to the Circuit Court of Jasper County because the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.00 and complete diversity of the parties does not exist because both Plaintiff and Defendant Price are alleged to be citizens of the State of South Carolina. (Dkt. No. 9 at 1).
Defendants argue the amended complaint and motion to remand are vague and ambiguous as to the amount in controversy because Plaintiff does not provide a formal stipulation the amount in controversy will not exceed $75,000.00, but rather simply alleges such. (Dkt. No. 12 at 9). Defendants argue the amended complaint artificially limits the damages in order to return to state court and that the amount in controversy is satisfied at the time of removal. (Dkt. No. 12 at 1). In addition, Defendants argue Defendant Price is not a proper Defendant in this action and was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity of citizenship. (Dkt. No. 12 at 3-8).
On reply in support of her motion to remand, Plaintiff filed a unilateral post-removal stipulation, which stipulates that (1) the total amount in controversy of her claims is no more than $75,000.00, (2) she will not move to amend the Complaint to seek an amount in excess of $75,000.00, and (3) she will not attempt to collect on any excess of $75,000.00 on any judgment rendered in excess of that amount. (Dkt. No. 13). Plaintiff does not address Defendants' argument that Defendant Price was fraudulently joined.
The court will first analyze whether the amount in controversy has been met. Courts generally determine the amount in controversy by examining the complaint at the time of commencement of the state court action and at the time of removal. JTH Tax, Inc. v. Frashier, 624 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 2010); Brown v. VSC Fire & Sec., Inc., 2016 WL 1600126, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2016). “The Fourth Circuit has not adopted a rule regarding the burden of proof on the removing party for establishing the amount in controversy.” Clifton v. Allen, No. 9:17-CV-02920-DCN, 2018 WL 3095026, at *2 (D.S.C. June 22, 2018) (quoting Carter v. Bridgestone Americas, Inc., 2013 WL 3946233, at *1-2 (D.S.C. July 31, 2013)) (citing Rota v. Consolidation Coal Co., 1999 WL 183873, at *1 n. 4 (4th Cir. Apr. 5, 1999)) (expressly declining to adopt any particular standard of proof for determining the amount in controversy). Regardless, “courts within the District of South Carolina have leaned towards requiring defendants in this position to show either to a ‘legal certainty' or at least within a ‘reasonable probability' that the amount in controversy has been satisfied.” Id. (quoting Brooks v. GAF Materials Corp., 532 F.Supp.2d 779, 781-82 (D.S.C. 2008)).
The Fourth Circuit has adopted a general rule regarding the effect of post-removal stipulations on the propriety of removal where the amount in controversy is plainly stated in the complaint. In situations where the amount in controversy is plainly and unambiguously stated in the complaint, “‘[e]vents occurring subsequent' to the filing of the complaint ‘which reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction.'” JTH Tax, Inc., 624 F.3d at 638 (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 292, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938)). In other words, under St. Paul Mercury, a plaintiff may not reduce or change his or her demand for damages by way of stipulation to defeat diversity jurisdiction once an amount has been stated. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248, 255-56 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A] court determines the existence of diversity jurisdiction at the time the action is filed, regardless of later changes in originally crucial facts such as the parties' citizenship or the amount in controversy.” (citation and internal quotations marks omitted)); Griffin v. Holmes, 843 F.Supp. 81, 87 (E.D. N.C. 1993) (“[T]he plaintiff ... may not defeat diversity jurisdiction by filing a post-removal amendment of the complaint which reduces the amount of damages requested by the complaint below the amount in controversy required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).”)
However, the Fourth Circuit has not opined on the effect of a post-removal stipulation, as is the case here, where the initial complaint does not specify an amount. There is guidance on this issue from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and other federal district courts within the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. Various jurisdictions have found that “a post-removal stipulation that damages will not exceed the jurisdictional minimum can be considered as a clarification of an ambiguous complaint, rather than a post-removal amendment of the plaintiff's complaint.” Carter, 2013 WL 3946233, at *1-2; see also Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2000) (asserting that post-removal affidavits and stipulations may be considered in determining the amount in controversy only if the jurisdictional basis was ambiguous at the time of removal); see also Ferguson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1994 WL 653479, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 1994) (remanding case when the plaintiff alleged an unspecified amount of damages and then filed a post-removal stipulation clarifying that the amount of damages sought was below the jurisdictional amount); Gwyn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 955 F.Supp. 44, 46 (M.D. N.C. 1996) (when presented with indeterminate claims, “the court may consider a stipulation filed by the plaintiff that the claim does not exceed” the jurisdictional amount). This use of clarification is permitted, rather than forbidden, under St. Paul Mercury. See Walker v. Poland, 2009 WL 5195762, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2009); Tommie v. Orkin, Inc., 2009 WL 2148101, at *1-2 (D.S.C. July 15, 2009).
In this case, Plaintiff's original complaint did not specify an amount of damages. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at p. 12). Defendants' removal notice asserts that Plaintiff will attempt to seek damages for lost wages and benefits, presumably dating back to December 14, 2020, the date that Plaintiff's employment was allegedly terminated. (Dkt. No. 13 at ¶ 50) (citing Dkt. No. 1-1 at ¶ 22). Defendants assert that this, in conjunction with claims of additional forms of damages, exceeds the amount in controversy requirement. (Dkt. No. 13 at 50). Defendants did not monetize that allegation.
The Court has no way of determining the amount in controversy from the face of the complaint, thus it will consider Plaintiff's amended complaint and stipulation as a clarification that the amount of damages she is seeking does not exceed $75,000. Stanley v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 423 F.Supp.3d 225, 229 (D.S.C. 2019); Ferguson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 94-2696, 1994 WL 653479, at * 2 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 1994); Gwyn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 955 F.Supp. 44, 46 (M.D. N.C. 1996). Plaintiff “irrevocably stipulates” that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.00 and that Plaintiff will not “seek, accept, receive, or collect on any judgment rendered in this matter in excess of $75,000.00.” (Dkt. No. 13). The Court finds that the Plaintiff's stipulation is binding and Plaintiff may not recover an amount that exceeds $75,000.00 in actual and punitive damages, exclusive of costs and interests. Stanley, 423 F.Supp.3d at 231. As the court finds the threshold jurisdictional amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction has not been met, the Court need not rule on whether Defendant Price is a proper defendant in this action or whether she was fraudulently joined to defeat complete diversity of the parties.
The Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over this case and will remand the case to the Circuit Court of Jasper County, South Carolina.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff Pamela E. Drake's motion to remand (Dkt. No. 9) is GRANTED. The Court REMANDS this action to the Circuit Court of Jasper County, South Carolina.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.