Opinion
No. 2010 CA 1823.
March 30, 2011.
APPEALED FROM THE 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE STATE OF LOUISIANA CASE NO. C560894 THE HONORABLE TODD W. HERNANDEZ, JUDGE PRESIDING. D. Brian Cohn, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees, Vincent Drago, et al.
Paulette Porter LaBostrie, Geismar, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, Full Gospel United Pentecostal.
BEFORE: CARTER, C.J., GAIDRY AND WELCH, JJ.
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
The purchaser of a tract of immovable property appeals a judgment in favor of the sellers, reforming the act of sale to correct the property description and further declaring the sellers to be the owners and possessors of a lot found to be excluded from the property sold. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment in part and affirm it in all other respects. We also deny the sellers' answer to the appeal.
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
On March 29, 2000, Vincent Drago, his wife, and 21 other relatives (referred to collectively as "the Drago family") sold to Full Gospel United Pentecostal Church (Full Gospel), a nonprofit corporation, certain immovable property located near the intersection of Mickens Road and Silverleaf Avenue in East Baton Rouge Parish. The property was described in the act of sale as constituting the remainder of a tract originally containing approximately 35.5 acres, with a net area amounting to approximately 17.85 acres, and excluding eight described portions previously sold or transferred.
Prior to the sale, the Drago family had listed the property located at the southwest corner of the intersection (the Southwest Corner Lot) with a realtor. The Drago family also owned a lot on the southeast corner, Lot 22, which was also part of the original 35.5-acre tract, but that property was not listed for sale. Full Gospel contacted the realtor about the purchase of the Southwest Corner Lot. The Drago family and Full Gospel eventually entered into a purchase agreement on March 30, 1999, in which the property to be purchased was described as "Southwest corner of Mickens Road and Silverleaf Avenue, approximately 19.6 acres." Full Gospel had the property surveyed, providing a site plan depicting the property to be purchased to the surveyor, Bruce Dyson. The completed survey included the Southwest Corner Lot, encompassing a stated area of 17.85 acres, but not Lot 22.
Hibernia National Bank financed the purchase of the property by Full Gospel and retained an attorney, Walter O'Roark, to conduct a title examination and to prepare the sale and mortgage documents. The legal description of the property in the act of sale did not specifically exclude Lot 22 from the property description, although it specifically referenced the survey and the 17.85-acre area of the Southwest Corner Lot.
In late November 2003, William Drago, a member of the Drago family who had been closely involved in the sale negotiations, contacted Mr. O'Roark concerning the fact that they were not being billed for property taxes on Lot 22. Mr. O'Roark confirmed that Lot 22 was not included in Mr. Dyson's survey and was not supposed to have been included in the act of sale he prepared. He suggested that an act of correction be prepared for the signature of Full Gospel's corporate representative. After the act of correction was prepared by Mr. O'Roark, he contacted Raymond Allmon, Full Gospel's business administrator, regarding the situation. Mr. O'Roark also spoke with Full Gospel's attorney, who reviewed the act of correction. A few days after their initial conversation, Full Gospel's attorney advised Mr. O'Roark that he had spoken with both the realtor's listing agent, Chris Shaheen, and the bank's loan officer, Lillian Grossley, and that although they confirmed that Lot 22 was not considered to be part of the property sold, Full Gospel's board had taken the position that it owned Lot 22 and decided not to authorize the signing of the act of correction.
On January 23, 2004, Mr. O'Roark prepared and executed an affidavit of correction pursuant to La.R.S. 35:2.1, attesting that the property description was incomplete and correcting it to specifically exclude Lot 22 from the description of the property sold, which, as corrected, consisted of only the Southwest Corner Lot, with the stated area of 17.85 acres unchanged.
The Drago family subsequently allowed the same realtor employed for the prior sale to promote Lot 22 for sale, although a formal listing agreement was not executed. On or about September 1, 2007, a representative of Full Gospel removed a "for sale" sign placed on Lot 22 by the sellers.
On November 7, 2007, the surviving sellers of the property and descendants of the deceased sellers (the plaintiffs) instituted the present action, naming Full Gospel as defendant. In their petition, styled as a "Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, and Reformation of Cash Sale Deed," the plaintiffs alleged that the property sold to Full Gospel was the Southwest Corner Lot, and that Lot 22 was not located at the southwest corner of the intersection of Mickens Road and Silverleaf Avenue, and that the act of sale contained a clerical error in the legal description of the property sold. They also alleged that the act of correction accurately reflected the true intent of the parties as to the property sold. They prayed for declaratory judgment declaring that Lot 22 was not included in the purchase agreement's property description and for reformation of the act of sale. The plaintiffs further alleged that Full Gospel's removal of the "for sale" sign was a disturbance of their possession of Lot 22, and they sought declaratory judgment declaring them to be the possessors of Lot 22 and a permanent injunction enjoining Full Gospel from further activity on Lot 22.
Full Gospel answered the petition, denying the plaintiffs' possession of Lot 22, admitting that it took the "for sale" sign off "its" property, and alleging that it had possession of Lot 22 since the time of "the transfer of said property" by the act of sale. It further affirmatively alleged that Lot 22 "was conveyed to Full Gospel . . . by [a]ct of [s]ale and remains in its possession."
Trial on the merits was held on November 9 and 10, 2009. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement and ordered that post-trial memoranda be submitted by the parties concurrently in lieu of closing argument, with no traversal or reply memoranda permitted.
On March 3, 2010, the trial court issued its ruling and written reasons for judgment, rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and its judgment was signed on April 9, 2010. The trial court's judgment declared Lot 22 not to have been part of the property sold to Full Gospel, reformed the legal description of the property sold to exclude Lot 22, and further declared the plaintiffs to be the lawful owners and possessors of Lot 22. Finally, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs the sum of $12,000.00 for attorney fees.
On April 9, 2010, Full Gospel filed a motion for new trial, but its motion was summarily denied without a hearing on May 6, 2010. On May 12, 2010, Full Gospel filed a motion seeking a suspensive appeal, but the order was not in proper form, so a second motion for a suspensive appeal was filed on May 24, 2010. The order granting the suspensive appeal was signed June 21, 2010. On August 10, 2010, Full Gospel filed a motion to convert its suspensive appeal to a devolutive appeal, and the order granting that motion was signed on August 12, 2010.
On October 7, 2010, the plaintiffs filed an answer to the appeal, seeking an increase in the amount of the attorney fees awarded by the trial court, the issuance of a permanent injunction enjoining Full Gospel from further activity on Lot 22, and damages for frivolous appeal.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Full Gospel contends that the trial court erred in the following respects:
1) The trial court erred in finding that Lot 22 was not part of the [c]ash [s]ale transaction between the [p]laintiffs, Vincent Drago, et al. [,] and the defendant, Full Gospel;
2) The trial court erred in finding that the [a]ffidavit of [c]orrection dated January 23, 2004[,] by Walter O'Roark [should] be allowed to reform and correct the [c]ash [s]ale transaction between the [p]laintiffs, Vincent Drago, et al.[,] and the defendant, Full Gospel[;]
3) The trial court erred in not finding that [defendant] Full Gospel [was] the lawful and legitimate [buyer] of [Lot 22];
4) The trial court erred by decreeing the plaintiffs to be lawful owners in a possessory action[;]
5) The trial court erred in failing to [o]rder the defendant, Full Gospel[,] to assert [its] adverse claim of ownership of [Lot 22] in a petitory action . . . pursuant to La. [C.C.]P. [a]rt. 3662(2)[;]
6) The trial [court] erred in granting the plaintiff[s] attorney fees [p]ursuant to La. [C.C.]P. [a]rt. 3662(3)[;]
7) The trial court erred in allowing post[-]trial briefs that could not be traversed by either party.
In addition to the foregoing, Full Gospel identifies one of the issues presented for our review as "[w]hether the trial court erred in granting the reformation of the contract (ownership) and also possession of the property in the same proceeding."
DISCUSSION Reformation of the Act of Sale
A contract is formed by the consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance. La.C.C. art. 1927. Consent may be vitiated by error. La.C.C. art. 1948. Error vitiates consent only when it concerns a cause without which the obligation would not have been incurred and that cause was known or should have been known to the other party. La.C.C. art. 1949. Error may concern a cause when it bears on the thing that is the contractual object or a substantial quality of that thing. La.C.C. art. 1950.
The granting of relief for error presents no problem when both parties are in error, that is, when the error is bilateral or mutual. When that is the case, the contract may either be rescinded or, as an alternative, reformed in order to reflect the true intent of the parties. La.C.C. art. 1949, Revision Comments — 1984, (d). Either party to a contract is permitted to correct any mutual error in an instrument purporting to evidence the contract, so as to make it express truly and correctly the intention of the parties, provided that the rights of third parties have not intervened. Wilson v. Levy, 234 La. 719, 721-22, 101 So.2d 214, 215 (La. 1958); Succession of Jones v. Jones, 486 So.2d 1124, 1127 (La. App. 2nd Cir.), writ denied, 489 So.2d 249 (La. 1986). This includes the right to correct inaccurate legal descriptions contained in real estate contracts. See Freeman v. Williams, 450 So.2d 1030, 1031-32 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ not considered, 456 So.2d 162 (La. 1984).
The most common ground for an action seeking reformation of a contract is mutual error or mistake of the parties. M.R. Bldg. Corp. v. Bayou Utilities, Inc., 25, 759, p. 2 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 5/4/94), 637 So.2d 614, 616. A determination of mutual error is mainly a question of fact. Succession of Jones, 486 So.2d at 1127. The burden of proof is on the party seeking reformation to establish the mutual error by clear and convincing proof, with parol evidence being admissible for this purpose. M.R. Bldg. Corp., 25, 759 at p. 2, 637 So.2d at 616.
Without reciting the circumstances of their testimony in detail, it is sufficient for us to state that the testimony of William Drago, Mr. Shaheen, Mr. O'Roark, Mr. Dyson, and Ms. Grossley supported the plaintiffs' contention that Lot 22 was never considered by any of those witnesses to have been part of the property sold by the plaintiffs to Full Gospel. Additionally, the testimony of Linda Stroud, another of the sellers and the Drago family member who maintained the records of the property, corroborated the testimony of the other witnesses and verified the plaintiffs' acts of possession and payment of property taxes for Lot 22.
The only witness called to testify regarding Full Gospel's understanding of the property it purchased was Raymond Allmon, Full Gospel's business administrator. Mr. Allmon testified to various acts of maintenance performed and expenses incurred by Full Gospel in connection with Lot 22 following the act of sale. However, as emphasized by the plaintiffs, Mr. Allmon was not hired by Full Gospel until June 2000, after the act of sale was executed in March. He did not participate in any negotiations or discussions relating to the purchase agreement or the act of sale. Both the purchase agreement and the act of sale were signed by Mr. Allmon's father, Reverend Richard V. Allmon, Full Gospel's pastor, but Reverend Allmon was not called to testify at trial. In weighing Mr. Allmon's testimony, the trial court no doubt took into account Mr. Roark's description of Mr. Allmon's apparent surprise upon being contacted regarding the original proposed act of correction and its purpose.
In order to reverse a factual determination by the trier of fact, the appellate court must apply a two-part test: (1) the appellate court must find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist in the record for the finding; and (2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous). Stobart v. State through Dep't of Transp. Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993). Further, when factual findings are based upon determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989).
Full Gospel contends that the plaintiffs failed to establish their right to reformation of the act of sale by clear and convincing evidence. Its primary argument in that regard centers upon the supposed lack of credibility of Mr. Shaheen, the realtor's listing agent, and Mr. Roark, the attorney who handled the closing of the sale. Full Gospel urges that Mr. Shaheen's testimony was unreliable in light of the discrepancy in the area or acreage of the property between the purchase agreement and the act of sale, and that it was also motivated by his self-interest in earning a commission from any separate sale of Lot 22. As to Mr. O'Roark, Full Gospel contends that his testimony was colored by his potential professional liability to the plaintiffs due to his admitted error in the property description in the act of sale.
The trial court resolved the contradictory testimony and evidence in favor of the plaintiffs, obviously finding their witnesses' testimony and supporting documentary evidence to be more credible than those of Full Gospel. The trial court's credibility determination is entitled to great deference from this court and is fully supported by a clear and convincing weight of the evidence in the record. Full Gospel's first three assignments of error, relating to the action for reformation of the act of sale, have no merit.
The Possessory Action
The possessory action is one brought by the possessor of immovable property or of a real right therein to be maintained in his possession of the property or enjoyment of the right when he has been disturbed, or to be restored to the possession or enjoyment thereof when he has been evicted. La.C.C.P. art. 3655. It must be brought within a year of the disturbance in the plaintiff's possession. La.C.C.P. art. 3658.
A disturbance in fact includes "any . . . physical act which prevents the possessor of immovable property . . . from enjoying his possession quietly, or which throws any obstacle in the way of that enjoyment." La.C.C.P. art. 3659. A disturbance in law includes "the execution, recordation, registry, or continuing existence of record of any instrument which asserts or implies a right of ownership . . . of immovable property" or "any claim or pretension of ownership . . ., adversely to the possessor of such property." Id. The plaintiffs instituted this action within a year of Full Gospel's removal of the "for sale" sign, but over seven and a half years after the execution and recordation of the act of sale. However, if the latter event constituted a legal disturbance, it was a continuing disturbance, regarded as occurring not only on the date of recordation of the act of sale, but also on each day thereafter as long as it existed. See Blanchard v. Naquin, 476 So.2d 520, 523-24 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
When a defendant in a possessory action asserts ownership of the property, the action is automatically converted to a petitory action, and the defendant is considered as having judicially confessed the plaintiff's possession in the possessory action. See La.C.C.P. art. 3657. Because Full Gospel asserted its ownership of Lot 22 in its answer, it judicially confessed the Drago family's possession and converted the Drago family's possessory action into a petitory action. See Lemoine v. Couvillon, 321 So.2d 37, 41 (La. App. 3rd Cir.), writ refused, 323 So.2d 471 (La. 1975). Full Gospel thus became the plaintiff in the petitory action. See Carmody v. Land, 207 La. 625, 634-35, 21 So.2d 764, 767 (La. 1945). Accordingly, it was not necessary for the trial court to have ordered Full Gospel to institute a petitory action pursuant to La.C.C.P. art. 3662(2), and its fifth assignment of error has no merit.
As the plaintiff in the petitory action, Full Gospel bore the burden of proving title to Lot 22. See La.C.C. art. 531, Revision Comments — 1979, (a). A petitory action is one brought by a person claiming the ownership of immovable property, but who is not in possession of it, against another in possession or claiming adverse ownership, for the purpose of obtaining judgment recognizing the plaintiff's ownership. See La.C.C.P. art. 3651.
The party found out of possession bears the burden of proof in the petitory action. See La.C.C. art. 531 and La.C.C.P. art. 3653. In order to prevail against a party in possession, the party claiming ownership must prove "title good against the world." Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 So.2d 797, 799 (La. 1974); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Bergeron, 551 So.2d 746, 749 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 553 So.2d 465 (La. 1989).
Full Gospel contends that the trial court erred in rendering judgment reforming the act of sale's legal description of the property sold (the Southwest Corner Lot), while also rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in their possessory action for Lot 22, arguing that the action seeking reformation of the act of sale and the possessory action were "mutually exclusive." Full Gospel characterizes the plaintiffs' action seeking reformation of the act of sale as an action seeking a declaration of ownership of Lot 22, or the functional equivalent of a petitory action. Thus, according to Full Gospel, the plaintiffs' petition ran afoul of La.C.C.P. art. 3657, which prohibits the cumulation of the petitory and the possessory actions. We disagree.
It is clear from a reading of the petition that the plaintiffs did not initially seek judgment recognizing their ownership of Lot 22 but rather only judgment maintaining their possession of Lot 22, and therefore they properly asserted the possessory action only with regard to Lot 22. Their cumulated action seeking reformation of the act of sale merely sought to clarify the legal description and identity of the property sold as excluding Lot 22, and thus related only to the mutual intent of that contract, without seeking a declaration of ownership of Lot 22. In short, the possessory action dealt with Lot 22, and the action for reformation addressed the identification of the property actually sold to Full Gospel in the act of sale, which was determined to be the Southwest Corner Lot. Ownership of the Southwest Corner Lot, the actual property sold, as opposed to ownership of Lot 22, was never placed at issue. The issue of title ownership to Lot 22 was not raised by the plaintiffs; it was raised by Full Gospel in its answer. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' actions were neither legally inconsistent nor improperly cumulated under La.C.C.P. art. 3657, as they addressed different legal issues relating to what were ultimately determined to be two different pieces of property.
Additionally, as emphasized by the plaintiffs, there is no procedural bar to the plaintiff in a possessory action cumulating that action with an action for declaratory judgment of ownership under La.C.C.P. art. 3654. The latter action is a separate type of action that, unlike the petitory action, can be brought by a plaintiff in possession of the property, to raise issues of possession and ownership in the same action. Lafourche Realty Co., Inc. v. Duard Eymard Co., Inc., 93-1278, p. 3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/24/94), 638 So.2d 1138, 1139. At any rate, Full Gospel's failure to raise the objection of improper cumulation of actions in a dilatory exception operates as a waiver of that objection. La.C.C.P. art. 926(B). Thus, Full Gospel cannot properly raise that procedural objection now. Full Gospel's fourth assignment of error has no merit.
The only basis for Full Gospel's claim to ownership of Lot 22 was the legal description of the property contained in the original act of sale of March 29, 2000 and its claimed acts of possession subsequent to its execution. Because the trial court found that the property description did not accurately convey the mutual intent of the parties regarding the actual property sold, consisting of the Southwest Corner Lot only, the trial court rendered judgment reforming the description to exclude Lot 22 from the description. There being no other factual basis for its assertion of title ownership of Lot 22 after reformation of the act of sale, Full Gospel plainly failed to prove any title to Lot 22, let alone better title than the plaintiffs or title good against the world. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, presented evidence that not only established their possession of Lot 22 as owners, but also better title (and, after reformation was granted, the only title) to Lot 22.
Although the plaintiffs' possessory action was converted into a petitory action by Full Gospel, the trial court did not err in rendering judgment declaring the plaintiffs to be both the lawful possessors and owners of Lot 22. The plaintiffs originally sought to be declared possessors of Lot 22, Full Gospel judicially confessed their possession, and the clear preponderance of the evidence at trial established their possession. Similarly, the evidence supporting the plaintiffs' title to and ownership of Lot 22 was, in a word, overwhelming in its weight. The plaintiffs were clearly entitled to a declaration of their ownership of the property, even though such was not expressly prayed for in their petition. See La.C.C.P. art. 862 and Clayton v. Langston, 311 So.2d 74, 79-80 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1975).
But cf. 2 A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Property § 270 (4th ed. 2001).
Attorney Fees
Full Gospel contests the trial court's award of $12,000.00 in attorney fees to the plaintiffs. We agree that the award is not supported by law.
It is well settled that attorney fees are not recoverable unless expressly authorized by statute or by a contract between the parties. See Huddleston v. Bossier Bank and Trust Co., 475 So.2d 1082, 1085 (La. 1985); In re Mashburn Marital Trusts, 10-0278, p. 8 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/22/10), 52 So.3d 1136, 1141. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs attorney fees under the stated authority of La.C.C.P. art. 3662(3). That codal article provides that "[a] judgment rendered for the plaintiff in a possessory action shall . . . [a]ward him the damages to which he is entitled and which he has prayed for." (Emphasis added.) Attorney fees are not included in the "damages" recoverable under this article. Starmount # 1 v. Klein, 396 So.2d 397, 399 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1981).
The plaintiffs contend that the award of attorney fees was authorized by the terms of the purchase agreement, which provided:
Time is of the essence in this contract. In the event of default by either party, the non-defaulting party shall have the right to demand and sue for specific performance and/or damages. The defaulting party under this contract shall also be liable for the REALTOR's fees and all attorney's fees and other costs incurred in the enforcement of any and all rights under this contract. (Emphasis added.)
The contract referred to in the foregoing language is the purchase agreement. This type of agreement, also known as a bilateral promise of sale or a contract to sell, is separate and distinct from the actual sale of property. See La.C.C. art. 2623. We agree with Full Gospel that the plaintiffs have failed to prove any default on its part relating to the execution of the purchase agreement, and that the foregoing provision does not contractually authorize the award of attorney fees as to this dispute regarding the act of sale and ownership of Lot 22. The plaintiffs having failed to demonstrate any other legal authority for the award, we must reverse the judgment in part to vacate the award.
Post-Trial Memoranda
Full Gospel contends that the trial court erred in not allowing it to file a supplemental post-trial memorandum for the purpose of traversing an alternate theory for attorney fees advanced by the plaintiffs in their post-trial memorandum. The trial court has the power to require that trial proceedings be conducted in an orderly and expeditious manner and to control the trial proceedings, so that justice is done. See La.C.C.P. art. 1631(A). The trial court also has the discretion to vary the normal order of trial when the circumstances justify it. See La.C.C.P. art. 1632. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in limiting the parties' closing arguments to post-trial memoranda, nor in its decision requiring that the parties' post-trial memoranda be submitted at the same time. Full Gospel's seventh assignment of error has no merit.
The Answer to the Appeal
In their answer to the appeal, the plaintiffs seek damages for frivolous appeal under La.C.C.P. art. 2164 and Rule 2-19 of the Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal. The imposition of sanctions under these procedural rules is discretionary. Damages for frivolous appeal will not be awarded unless it appears that the appeal was taken solely for the purpose of delay or that the appellant's counsel does not seriously believe in the position advocated. Guarantee Sys. Constr. Restoration, Inc. v. Anthony, 97-1877, p. 13 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/25/98), 728 So.2d 398, 405, writ denied, 98-2701 (La. 12/18/98), 734 So.2d 636.
The sheer weight of the evidence in favor of the plaintiffs strongly suggests that this appeal might border on the frivolous, at least with regard to the substantive issues relating to the property description and the possession and ownership of Lot 22. Ultimately, however, we cannot conclude that the foregoing criteria exist with regard to this appeal, especially in light of the merit in the assignment of error relating to attorney fees. Full Gospel's arguments in support of its other assignments of error were unquestionably weak and without merit, but we cannot conclude on the record that they rise (or, more accurately, descend) to the status of being legally frivolous for purposes of imposition of sanctions. We accordingly deny the plaintiffs' claim for damages for frivolous appeal in the answer to the appeal. For the reasons previously expressed, we also deny the plaintiffs' claim for an increase in the attorney fees awarded by the trial court.
Finally, as to the plaintiffs' request that we amend the trial court's judgment to grant a permanent injunction, we deny that request as well. The plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must establish that the conduct sought to be enjoined will cause him "irreparable injury, loss, or damage." La.C.C.P. art. 3601. The trial court's decision regarding the issuance of a permanent injunction is reviewed under the manifest error standard. Parish of East Feliciana ex rel. East Feliciana Parish Police Jury v. Guidry, 04-1197, pp. 14-15 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/10/05), 923 So.2d 45, 53, writ denied, 05-2288 (La. 3/10/06), 925 So.2d 515. Based upon our review of the record and considering the nature of the relief granted by the trial court, we find no manifest error in its implicit decision that the injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs was not warranted under the law. We therefore deny the answer to the appeal in its entirety.
DECREE
The judgment of the trial court is reversed in part to vacate the award of attorney fees to the plaintiffs-appellees, Vincent Drago, et al. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The answer of the plaintiffs-appellees to the appeal is denied. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the defendant-appellant, Full Gospel United Pentecostal Church.