This the Legislature had the authority to do under Sections 16 and 17 of Article V, Constitution of Missouri 1945. Downey v. Schrader, 182 S.W.2d 320, 353 Mo. 40; Ussery v. Haynes, 127 S.W.2d 410, 344 Mo. 530; Van Loo v. Osage County, 141 S.W.2d 805, 346 Mo. 358; State ex rel. v. Montgomery, 186 S.W.2d 553. (22) In the absence of any statute regulating the procedure, the rule always followed is that the chancery or probate court of the residence of a supposed lunatic is the proper forum to conduct an inquiry as to his mental state. 44 C.J.S., pp. 57-59, sec. 10; State ex rel. Taylor, Public Admr., v. Wurdeman, 108 S.W. 144, 129 Mo. App. 263; Ex parte Zorn, 145 S.W. 62, 241 Mo. 267; Peck v. Fillingham's Estate, 202 S.W. 465, 199 Mo. App. 277; In re Elliott's Estate v. Wilson, 27 Mo. App. 218.
(5) In the year 1909 the General Assembly adopted the wrong way to amend the Constitution of 1875 by enacting 90 sections of statutes (see Laws 1909, pp. 572-592), insofar as they attempted to divest "all jurisdiction over matters" of insanity and invest the same in the Jackson County Court. Redmond v. Railroad Co., 225 Mo. 721; Secs. 9321-9359, R.S. 1939; Downey v. Schrader, 182 S.W.2d 320; Cooley, Const. Lim. (9 Ed.) 431; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. l.c. 174, 34 S.W. 782, 29 L.R.A. 257, 50 Am. St. Rep. 443. (6) The county court used to have all jurisdiction over the insane, but the "county court statutes" have been stripped of most of their jurisdiction during the last 75 years. State ex rel. Moser v. Montgomery, 186 S.W.2d 555. (7) Under Sec. 450, R.S. 1939, which has been on the statutes of Missouri since 1835, the county judges of Jackson County were bereft of jurisdiction.
State ex rel. Gehrig v. Medley, 28 S.W.2d 1040; State ex rel. Gehner v. Thompson, 293 S.W. 391; State ex rel. v. Hires, 217 S.W.2d 577. (3) The provisions of Sec. 311.220 RSMo 1949, are ambiguous in that it is not clear from the reading of said statute whether or not the county court has been granted authority to issue a county license. If portion of statute is not clear and is ambiguous the whole act, including title to the act, may be used as a guide or clue to intention of the Legislature. State ex rel. v. Vienup, 147 S.W.2d 627; Straughan v. Meyers, 187 S.W. 1159; State ex rel. v. Wipke, 133 S.W.2d 354. (4) When an act is amended title to the amended act, or old act, becomes a part of the title to the amended act, or new act. Downey v. Schrader, 182 S.W.2d 320; State ex rel. Mueller Baking Co. v. Calvird, 92 S.W.2d 184. (5) County courts have discretionary power to determine the qualifications of applicant for license to sell intoxicating liquor, and may reach their own conclusions and are not bound by the findings of the State Supervisor of Liquor Control. Liquor Control Act, Laws 1935, p. 267; Chap. 311, Secs. 311.060, 311.200, 311.220, RSMo. 1949; Mangieracina v. Haney, Director of Liquor Control of Kansas City, 141 S.W.2d 89; State ex rel. v. Thornhill, 160 S.W. 558; State ex rel. Hawkins v. Harris, 239 S.W. 564; Id. 263 S.W. 807; State ex rel. v. Noel, Supervisor of Liquor Control, 140 S.W.2d 57. (6) Deposit of fee with treasurer of county is not compliance with the law. State v. Skinner, 119 S.W. 82; State ex rel. Kemerling v. Peterson, 214 S.W.2d 739; Liquor Control Act, Laws 1935, p. 267.
In these circumstances, the title of the 1945 Act continued to be the title of the amended 1947 Act, and the constitutionality of the latter is to be adjudged thereby. Sherrill [214] v. Brantley, 334 Mo. 497, 502(1), 66 S.W.2d 529, 530(1); Downey v. Schrader, 353 Mo. 40, 41(1), 182 S.W.2d 320, 321(1). 50 Am. Jur., p. 167, Sec. 188; 59 C.J., p. 1090, Sec. 641(c); State v. Ward, 328 Mo. 658, 665(3), 40 S.W.2d 1074, 1076(3).
An announcement of the general subject matter is sufficient to give notice of the bill's content. Downey v. Schrader, 353 Mo. 40, 182 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. banc 1944); Edwards v. B.M.A., 350 Mo. 666, 168 S.W.2d 82 (1942). The purpose of the "one subject" mandate is to give interested persons notice of the area of regulation to prevent deception through use of misleading titles, and to maintain the concept of germaneness.
It is apparent the language of the title to the 1971 act refers to and incorporates the title of its 1959 predecessor. Under such circumstances, as held in State ex rel. Mueller Baking Co. v. Calvird, 338 Mo. 601, 92 S.W.2d 184 (1936) and Downey v. Schrader, 353 Mo. 40, 182 S.W.2d 320 (banc 1944), when construing the title of a statute repealing another, the title of the original statute is controlling. In this case the title of the earlier statute broadly includes mandatory jail time credit for those sentenced to a term in county jail or city workhouse and not just those sentenced to serve in the custody of the division of corrections.
This court has heretofore stated the general rule that "[m]atters of probate business, as commonly understood and under all the authorities, pertain to the proving of wills, the appointment of guardians and curators, and the administration and settlement of estates of decedents, incompetents and the like." Downey v. Schrader, 353 Mo. 40, 182 S.W.2d 320, 323. It is our view that the scope of matters which may be included in the phrase, "probate matters," will not be fully and completely determined until various questions in that regard are, from time to time, presented to the appellate courts for judicial decision.
It is apparent that the thread of jurisdiction in these typical cases concerning "equity matters" is tied to what is necessary and practicable in the exercise of the probate court's powers in matters pertaining to probate business, i. e., the collection and marshaling of assets, including disputed claims as to what is or is not an asset, the allowance of claims, or demands and the proper distribution of the remainder of the estate to the persons entitled thereto. See Downey v. Schrader, 353 Mo. 40, 182 S.W.2d 320 where this court said, "Matters of probate business, as commonly understood and under all the authorities, pertain to the proving of wills, the appointment of guardians and curators, and the administration and settlement of the estates of decedents, incompetents and the like." See also State ex rel. Kowats v. Arnold, 356 Mo. 661, 204 S.W.2d 254, 257; North v. Hawkinson, Mo., 324 S.W.2d 733, 745 [11].
V, Constitution of 1945; McKay v. Snider, 354 Mo. 674, 140 S.W.2d 886; In re Sheldon's Estate, 354 Mo. 232, 189 S.W.2d 235; Phillips v. Phoenix Trust Co., 332 Mo. 327, 58 S.W.2d 318; 1 Woerner, The American Law of Administration, pp. 324-330; Ross v. Pitcairn, 179 S.W.2d 35; Robbins v. Boulware, 190 Mo. 33, 88 S.W. 674; Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250; Jones v. Peterson, 335 Mo. 242, 72 S.W.2d l.c. 84; Linville v. Repley, 347 Mo. 95, 146 S.W.2d 581; Scanland v. Walters, 324 Mo. 1084, 26 S.W.2d 603; Viehmann v. Viehmann, 298 Mo. 356, 250 S.W. 565; Orchard v. Store Co., 225 Mo. 414, 125 S.W. 486; Wright v. Hetterlin, 277 Mo. 99, 209 S.W. 871; Horter v. Petty, 266 Mo. 296, 181 S.W. 39; State ex rel. Ellsworth v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 235 Mo. App. 850, 147 S.W. 131. (4) It has plenary original jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to probate business. Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank, 355 Mo. 1136, 199 S.W.2d 917; Downey v. Schrader, 353 Mo. 40, 182 S.W.2d 320; State ex rel. Kowats v. Arnold, 356 Mo. 681, 204 S.W.2d l.c. 257; Smith v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 340 Mo. 979, 104 S.W.2d 341; Campbell v. Campbell, 165 S.W.2d 851; State ex rel. Stetina v. Reynolds, 286 Mo. 120, 227 S.W. 47; Hoffman v. Hoffman's Executor, 126 Mo. 486, 29 S.W. 603; In re Lietman's Estate, 149 Mo. 112, 50 S.W. 307; Gentry v. Gentry, 122 Mo. 202, 26 S.W. 1090; Green v. Strother, 201 Mo. App. 418, 212 S.W. 399; Davis v. Roberts, 206 Mo. App. 125, 226 S.W. 662; Collins v. Truman, 14 S.W.2d 526; In re Helm's Estate, 136 S.W.2d 421. (5) The probate court has jurisdiction and power independent of statute to authorize and approve such contracts. Its jurisdiction includes inherent implied and incidental powers.
The title of the original act is the title of the amendatory law. State ex rel. McMonigle v. Spears, 358 Mo. 23, 213 S.W.2d 210; Downey v. Schrader, 353 Mo. 40, 182 S.W.2d 320; Sherrill v. Brantley, 334 Mo. 497, 66 S.W.2d 529; State v. Ward, 328 Mo. 658, 40 S.W.2d 1074; State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. No. 3 v. Miller, 326 Mo. 830, 33 S.W.2d 122; State v. Mulinix, 301 Mo. 385, 257 S.W. 121; State ex rel. Dickason v. County Court of Marion County, 128 Mo. 427, 30 S.W. 103, 31 S.W. 23. (5) The title of the 1931 school law amended by the 1947 act is sufficient to cover the amendatory act whether such title be the title appearing in the 1931 Session Laws or whether it be "1931 School Law," being the title of Art. 4, Chap. 72, R.S. 1939. The words "1931 School Law" constitute the official title of the article and said words became the title of the law amended by the 1947 act.