Opinion
No. FA 01-034 25 74 S
May 9, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is an action for dissolution of marriage and other relief brought to the judicial district of Danbury. The plaintiff and defendant appeared, through counsel, and the plaintiff proceeded on his complaint dated April 17, 2001, as amended May 31, 2002. The court heard this matter on April 1, 2, 3 and 4, 2003. The court makes the following findings and orders.
The plaintiff has been a resident of the state of Connecticut for at least twelve months prior to bringing this action. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant have been the recipients of state or local assistance. The parties have one minor child issue of this marriage, Kendall Long Downend, born February 9, 1999. No other children have been born to the parties since the date of the marriage and the defendant is not currently pregnant.
The plaintiff and defendant met on a blind date in early 1997. They were engaged to marry in the summer of 1997. The plaintiff presented the defendant with a $15,000 two-carat diamond engagement ring from Lux, Bond Green. Despite the fact the defendant testified that the ring was "beautiful" and she was "flabbergasted," she promptly had the plaintiff return it, because she was "looking for something a little different." The defendant thereafter, on her own, selected a new ring and, sent the bill to the plaintiff for payment. In hindsight, it is clear that this inaugural mis-synapse would foreshadow a continuous failure of the parties to ever connect in any meaningful way.
The parties "eloped" on October 11, 1997 to Nantucket, Massachusetts and were married. After the weekend nuptials, the parties returned to their respective residences; the plaintiff in Bloomfield, and the defendant in Katonah, New York. For the next five months, the parties essentially visited each other on weekends.
The parties planned to buy a home together. The plaintiff, whose company was located in Farmington, preferred to reside in the Hartford area. The defendant refused to look in the Hartford area because she apparently didn't have a "good experience" there. Additionally, the defendant wanted to reside closer to her mother, who lived in Westchester County, New York. It bears noting that the defendant's employment was home based.
The defendant won this disagreement and the parties settled on property located at 336 Wilton Road West, Ridgefield, Connecticut, despite the fact this location was well over an hour away from the plaintiff's place of employment.
The parties had a disagreement over their respective contributions to the downpayment for the purchase of this property. Ultimately, the plaintiff contributed $80,000 toward the downpayment and the defendant contributed, at most, $14,500. The purchase price was $465,000. The closing took place on March 25, 1998. Throughout their brief ownership of this property, issues continually arose regarding the titleholder and mortgage responsibility. The defendant refused to be obligated on the mortgage and never was so. The plaintiff always held title, but at various points in time, title was held by both parties.
The parties moved into the home shortly after closing, which would be the first time that the plaintiff and defendant lived together. This cohabitation did not last long. Both parties moved out of the property in July 2001, never to reside together again.
The court cannot help but notice that the length of time that the case of Downend v. Long, FA01-0342574S, dwelled in Danbury Superior Court rivals the length of time that the plaintiff and defendant dwelled together as husband and wife.
It was further clear from the testimony of the parties that despite the brevity of their cohabitation, much occurred during this time period. The parties undertook a major renovation of the home. The total cost of renovation was over $650,000. The renovation required the parties to vacate the residence from approximately February 1999 through to March 2000, during which time the parties resided at a nearby condominium, which they rented.
Also during this time, the defendant became pregnant and gave birth to their child, Kendall, born February 9, 1999.
Sometime in early 2000, the defendant became pregnant again. The plaintiff knew that the defendant was pregnant. He arrived home one day and found a letter from the defendant which made some derogatory references toward the plaintiff and much to the plaintiff's shock, indicated that the defendant was at Greenwich Hospital having an abortion.
The parties moved back into the newly renovated marital residence in approximately March 2000. Shortly thereafter, the defendant filed an action for dissolution of marriage and asked that the plaintiff vacate the property. This first action was ultimately withdrawn in October 2000, at which time the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to participate in marriage counseling. For the first time, they established a joint bank account, and the real estate was, again, put in joint names. Despite these mostly superficial efforts, problems persisted. The plaintiff testified that "80 to 85 percent of the time was tough sledding."
Other incidents which contributed to the demise of this relationship would include the defendant giving the plaintiff little or no prior notice that their child was being baptized; the plaintiff coming home to the residence and finding the defendant's sister's furniture present in the house as a prelude to her stay with the parties; the defendant giving the plaintiff little or no notice about a family trip to Florida, of which the plaintiff was not included; the defendant throwing at the plaintiff, in dissatisfaction, a check for $5,000 which the plaintiff gave her to purchase a new automobile, saying, "Is that all?"; the plaintiff's occasional abuse of alcohol; the parties' continual and consistent disagreements over their respective monetary contributions toward marital expenses, or lack thereof.
It was difficult for the court to glean from the testimony provided any sense of context or commonality to this marriage. The only time the testimony even approached evidence of an endearing moment shared between the parties was the testimony about the plaintiff assisting the defendant with the burial of her dead pet chicken. Even this, though, the defendant dismissed as insignificant. When asked if she had any good things to say about the plaintiff, the defendant replied that it was "admirable" that the plaintiff created CIT from "nothing"; that the plaintiff was "a good golfer" and "dresses nicely."
To say that the parties' problem was "poor communication" is a gross understatement and misses the point that this is clearly a marriage that never got off the ground. It is beyond obvious that this marriage has broken down irretrievably with no hope of any reconciliation.
The plaintiff is 42 years old and testifies to be in good health. He is a 1978 graduate of Simsbury High School. In 1983 he entered a certificate program for computer operation. Thereafter, he took a six-month program at the Computer Processing Institute. The plaintiff took additional courses at Hartford Community College on a full-time basis for approximately two years. He thereafter attended the University of Hartford for three years as an evening student, ultimately graduating from this institution in 1989. The plaintiff worked during the entire time he was pursuing his college degree. Additionally, the plaintiff paid for his education on his own.
In 1989, the plaintiff was employed by Keene Incorporated, which was an information technology consulting firm in Boston. He was a computer programming consultant.
In approximately 1990, the plaintiff left Keene Incorporated and started his own company called "Corporation Information Services." The plaintiff was a sole proprietor, working as an independent contractor for hire. The plaintiff started off with no employees and was essentially living off savings.
The plaintiff testified that 1993 was a critical year for his business. It was at this time that he had approximately six to seven employees and reliable clients. He rented a small office space in Farmington, Connecticut. He was working approximately eighty to ninety hours per week.
The company was incorporated in Connecticut in 1993 as a C-Corp. The plaintiff changed the name of the company at that time to Corporate Information Technology, Incorporated, hereinafter referred to as "CIT." The plaintiff is the president and 100 percent shareholder of CIT. CIT offers staff augmentation to corporate technical departments for maintenance and development of their computer information systems.
During the next several years, CIT grew aggressively. By the fall of 1997, the plaintiff had approximately sixty employees. This significant growth did not go unnoticed in the community. CIT was counted among Deloitte Touche's "Fast 50," a prestigious award for the fastest growing companies in Connecticut, in 1997 and placed second in 1998. The evidence is clear that CIT was well established prior in time to the parties' marriage.
Currently, the company employs approximately seventy individuals and leases approximately 3,700 square feet of office space in Farmington, Connecticut.
CIT's recent gross sales are as follows:
1998 $ 5,467,233.00
1999 $ 7,380,896.00
2000 $ 6,242,461.00
2001 $10,241,416.00
At the time of trial, CIT had yet to file its 2002 tax return. This figure is based upon CIT's 2002 cash receipts ledger, Plaintiff's Exhibit 30.
Despite the plaintiff's characterization of the business as "mature and declining," gross sales clearly indicate otherwise.
CIT's taxable income, after all deductions, including plaintiff's compensation (line 28 from IRS form 1120), is as follows:
1998 $ 35,437.00
1999 $ 331,486.00
2000 $ 458,193.00
From this amount, a net operating loss, carried over from the prior year of $91,270, was deducted.
The retained earnings of the corporation varied greatly from 1998 to 2001. The retained earnings are as follows:
1998 $ 142,486.00
1999 $ 819,883.00
2000 $ 499,161.00
2001 $ 966,436.00
The corporation had approximately $988,000 in various corporate bank accounts at year end 2002.
This amount includes $59,000 in an "Insurex" account.
The parties jointly retained Myers and Harrison, LLC, certified public accountants and consultants, to perform an evaluation of the plaintiff's interest in CIT. That evaluation was provided to the parties by way of a letter dated November 26, 2002, authored by Mark I. Harrison.
Mr. Harrison testified at the time of trial as to his credentials, work and analysis. Mr. Harrison is both a lawyer and certified public accountant, specializing in business valuations, forensic accounting and litigation support. He's performed over one hundred evaluations in domestic cases and has testified several times in court. The court finds Mr. Harrison's evaluation thorough and his testimony credible.
Mr. Harrison's analysis values the corporation as of June 30, 2001. There was no testimony disputing Mr. Harrison's evaluation, and the analysis reflected in Mr. Harrison's report is the same which the plaintiff provides by way of his current financial affidavit.
The court finds the value of the plaintiff's interest in CIT is $1.2 million. In the event the court were to include the loan receivable, then the fair market of plaintiff's interest would increase to $1.6 million. The court does not include the loan receivable in the value of plaintiff's interest in CIT.
The plaintiff's compensation indicated on schedule E of IRS form 1120 indicates the following:
1998 $ 200,755.00
1999 $ 178,550.00
2000 $ 105,278.00
2001 $ 217,434.00
The plaintiff's W-2 earnings (line 7 on IRS form 1040) are as follows:
1998 $ 187,801.32
1999 $ 165,204.44
2000 $ 95,215.99
2001 $ 206,934.35
Plaintiff's financial affidavit submitted in connection with this trial indicates gross wages from employment to be $198,000 per year and net weekly income of $2,567.50. As of the date of trial, the plaintiff had not filed his 2002 federal or state tax return.
The plaintiff testified that his salary is based upon whatever he thinks "the company can afford." For the years 2001 and 2002, the plaintiff was paid $148,000 in salary and $50,000 in bonus. It strikes the court as curious that the plaintiff paid himself the same amount in 2002 as he did in 2001, when CIT's sales increased by $2 million in 2002 and there was close to $1 million cash on hand by year end 2002. The court finds that the plaintiff has unlimited discretion over what CIT pays him.
Even using only the net weekly income of the plaintiff as disclosed on his financial affidavit, $2,567.65, said amount exceeds the child support guidelines. "When the parents' combined net weekly income exceeds $2,500, child support awards shall be determined on a case-by-case basis and the current support prescribed at the $2,500 net weekly income level shall be the minimum presumptive amount." That minimum amount pursuant to the guidelines is $383 per week. The court finds that the child support guidelines schedule of basic child support obligations is not applicable to this case.
See child support and arrearage guidelines regulations adopted by the commission on child support guidelines pursuant to C.G.S. § 46b-215a, effective August 1, 1999, at page 5.
In addition to his salary and bonus, the plaintiff is also provided with significant perquisites and benefits as a result of his position as president and sole shareholder of CIT.
For example, the lease for plaintiff's automobile, a 2002 or 2003 Range Rover, including taxes and insurance, is paid for by the company. The plaintiff testified that this sum is approximately $1,100 per month.
The plaintiff is also provided with country club privileges. CIT paid the $8,500 initiation fee to the Farmington Country Club and all monthly expenses, although the plaintiff testified that he reimburses CIT for all personal expenses.
The plaintiff is also provided with $200,000 worth of life insurance and also has the benefit of a cafeteria plan, which enables the plaintiff to use pre-tax dollars to pay for a minimal portion of the medical and dental insurance provided to him at the company's expense. The company also contributes to a 401k on the plaintiff's behalf, again by way of the cafeteria plan, using pre-tax dollars.
The plaintiff also has use and possession of a 1991 Mercedes Benz 300SL Roadster, which is owned by CIT, but held in plaintiff's name.
Further, in September 2001, the plaintiff withdrew $100,000 from a CIT bank account and invested the money in the stock market via plaintiff's personal brokerage account. When plaintiff realized that he was prohibited from personally investing corporate moneys, he returned the money to CIT. The plaintiff personally owes CIT $50,000 as a result of these transactions. This amount has been applied to plaintiff's corporate loan account. Nonetheless, this demonstrates the plaintiff's uninhibited access to CIT's capital.
As mentioned above, the plaintiff has a "corporate loan account" with CIT. The testimony is clear that the plaintiff, at will and solely at his discretion, can "borrow" from the company almost unlimited funds. By way of example, when the parties were renovating the marital residence, the plaintiff borrowed, from February 1998 through November 1999, $204,000 from the corporation. Some twenty-four checks were drawn from CIT's accounts to various contractors and suppliers, on plaintiff's and defendant's behalf, for as little as $1,340 or as much as $24,798. Despite the fact this property has been sold and years have passed, this "loan" remains unpaid.
The plaintiff further testified that he borrowed from CIT: $5,000 for attorneys fees; $4,000 to install an electronic gate at his residence; and approximately $20,000 as a deposit on his new home.
The current balance of the loans owed by the plaintiff to CIT is approximately $403,156.00. In May 2002, $254,935 of plaintiff's loan obligation to CIT was reclassified as a long-term loan, as evidenced by a promissory note bearing 8 percent interest. The plaintiff has made payments against these loans, almost on a monthly basis, in greatly varying amounts. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear that CIT provides the plaintiff with regular and easy access to limitless funds, with very flexible payback requirements, if any at all, as randomly set by the plaintiff himself.
IRS form 1120 indicates CIT's total loans to shareholders, of which the plaintiff is the only one, by year end at line 7 of schedule L as follows:
1998 $ 241,374.00
1999 $ 387,856.00
2000 $ 254,935.00
2001 $ 558,377.00
The plaintiff also has the benefit of the company paying all of his travel expenses, a portion of which the plaintiff claims is personal, and he reimburses the corporation. By way of example, in February 2002, the plaintiff and his brother went to the Doral Resort in Miami, Florida. The total charges were approximately $6,500, and CIT paid for it. The plaintiff indicated that approximately half the time he and his brother "worked on a business document together." In December 2002, the plaintiff visited the Breakers in Palm Beach, Florida for five days. The same was paid for by CIT. The Ritz Carlton in Naples, Florida, in October 2002, for three days was paid for by CIT. In November 2002, the plaintiff accompanied his top salesperson on a rewards vacation to the Princess Hotel in Hamilton, Bermuda, at CIT's expense. A trip to the St. Regis in Washington D.C. "for business development" was paid for by CIT.
The plaintiff's brother, Aaron Downend, is secretary/treasurer of CIT. He owns no stock in CIT.
The plaintiff argues that none of these perquisites should be included as income to him, but for a small portion of his auto expense. The defendant argues that the value of all of these perquisites should be included in the plaintiff's income.
Our courts have recognized that "perks" received by a litigant in a dissolution action can be included as income; Vandal v. Vandal, 31 Conn. App. 561 (1993); Misiorski v. Misiorski, 11 Conn. App. 463 (1987); although neither a specific formula nor guidelines have been promulgated. Further, the child support guidelines specifically lists as an inclusion to gross income "employment perquisites." Additionally, the parties themselves requested that Mr. Harrison evaluate this very issue. Mr. Harrison opined that these perquisites add to the plaintiff's earnings.
More specifically, Mr. Harrison was asked to determine the average annual benefit received by the plaintiff from the corporation. Mr. Harrison opined that the "average benefit received" by the plaintiff from the company, which would include salary, various insurance and disability premiums as well as the loans taken from the company and approximately $20,000 per year in non-business portion of automobile and meal expenses, approximates $270,000 per year. This analysis was based upon an average from 1998, 1999, 2000 and the six-month period ending June 30, 2001. Of this total, Mr. Harrison attributed approximately $80,000 of income to the plaintiff resulting from the plaintiff's loan account with CIT.
The court agrees with Mr. Harrison that the average annual benefit received by the plaintiff for non-business related expenses, including meals, automobile, travel, 401k, and phone, amount to approximately $20,000.
The court also agrees with Mr. Harrison that "loans" taken from CIT by the plaintiff are a monetary benefit to the plaintiff. As mentioned above, the testimony was clear that the plaintiff regularly received money from CIT, by way of a "loan," and also regularly paid portions of the loan back. It is not lost on the court that the plaintiff is the sole owner of CIT. What the plaintiff takes from CIT is his and what he pays back to CIT is his. It is all from the same "pot," so to speak, and the plaintiff owns the "pot." So, in essence, the plaintiff has unlimited access to whatever excess cash is available at CIT, to take and then later repay the funds to CIT or, in essence, to himself. There was no evidence or testimony provided that would indicate that the plaintiff was prohibited from taking these sums outright as additional salary or bonus.
Using the same mathematical procedure utilized by Mr. Harrison in determining the value of the loan benefit to the plaintiff as of June 30, 2001, the court finds that the current annual benefit the plaintiff receives by way of his "loan account" amounts to $108,614.88.
This amount includes the average of the loans as set forth in CIT's tax returns for 1998-2001 and the loan amount for 2002 as set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit 39.
The court finds the plaintiff's gross annual income is $335,420.35 and his net annual income is approximately $206,329.35.
This figure is derived from $206,805.47 in W-2 earnings; $20,000 in non-business related expenses; and $108,614.88 in "loans."
This figure is derived from deducting the following from plaintiff's gross income: federal tax — $102,180; social security $5,252; medicare tax — $4,888; state of Connecticut — $16,771.
The plaintiff also formed a component company of CIT, "Centrax." Centrax is a corporation which sells a database with group health insurance information. Individuals and companies "subscribe" to the "Centrax" database and use the information for comparison of insurance rates. Due to some legislation in April of 2002, Centrax was "carved out" of CIT and renamed "Insurex." This company essentially functions the same, selling a monthly data subscription service. Gross sales for Insurex in 2001 were $206,934, and in 2002 were $206,805.47. The plaintiff claims to derive no income or benefits from Insurex and there was no evidence or testimony contrary to this. There was no evidence introduced regarding the value of plaintiff's interest in this corporation.
The defendant is 40 years old and in good health. This is her second marriage. She graduated high school from Rye Country Day School in 1980. In 1984, she earned a bachelor of arts degree in history from Dartmouth University. After college, she was first employed by IBM in Hartford for approximately two years. Thereafter, she was employed by Aetna for approximately ten years as a marketing associate. When she left Aetna in 1995/96, the defendant was earning $50,000 per year. After leaving Aetna, she joined Allmerica in Massachusetts. She was there for approximately a year earning approximately $60,000 per year. The defendant then took a sales and marketing position with Corporate Child Care for approximately 1-1 1/2 years. Her salary was $50,000 at the time of her departure. When this company merged with a new company, the defendant was laid off.
The defendant thereafter started her own marketing and communications consulting firm which went by the name of "Long Term Consulting." She was earning approximately $15,000 — $20,000 per year in her consulting business. The defendant currently derives no income from her consulting business.
In approximately 1998, the defendant joined with her mother in forming "All Creatures Great and Small." This company provides live animals of all kinds to the marketing and advertising industry. In company literature, the defendant describes herself as follows: "animal specialist, naturalist, trainer, handler and consultant with many years experience, author, hands-on experience in advertising and marketing industries." The company's "partial client list" includes such international corporations as the Disney Channel, American Express, Levis, Coke, ATT, GTE, Newsweek, Saab, Ralph Lauren, Tommy Hilfiger and Revlon, among many other high profile clients.
Gross sales for All Creatures Great and Small of New York, LTD are as follows:
1999 $ 138,933.00
2000 $ 155,660.00
2001 $ 129,585.00
2002 $ 97,527.00
The defendant's wages from All Creatures Great and Small are as follows:
2000 $ 59,400.00
2001 $ 51,300.00
2002 $ 32,400.00
In addition to her employment with All Creatures Great and Small, the defendant also works for Bedford Discovery School. The defendant testified that she has been working there for the last nine months as a substitute teacher, averaging approximately 15-20 hours per week. The parties' minor child has been enrolled in the school since the fall of 2001. The defendant has yet to be paid for the services she has rendered to the Discovery School. The defendant was very vague as to the payment arrangements and simply stated that "it will be worked out" after the litigation. The court finds this testimony suspect.
The defendant testified that she works approximately forty hours per week for All Creatures Great and Small and twenty hours for Discovery School, for a total of sixty hours per week. The defendant further testified that she always intended on working.
The defendant's financial affidavit indicates a gross weekly income of $615 and a net weekly income of $482. This income does not reflect any earnings from the 15-20 hours per week that the defendant works as a substitute teacher at the Discovery School.
The court finds the defendant to be well educated, ambitious, industrious and self-sufficient. Her current income does not reflect her full earning potential.
The parties own no jointly held assets. As mentioned above, the parties sold their only occasionally joint asset, the marital residence, in July 2001, for $1,155,000.
The parties purchased this real estate on March 25, 1998 for $465,000. The plaintiff contributed $80,000 toward the purchase, and the defendant contributed $14,500 toward the purchase. The remaining $372,000 was financed. At the time of the renovation, the plaintiff took out a construction loan of $570,000, of which $372,945 was used to pay off the original mortgage, leaving a balance for actual renovations of $197,055. In addition to this, the plaintiff took out an equity loan of $100,000 and borrowed from CIT a total of $204,000. Also, the plaintiff contributed approximately $152,503 in cash. The total construction costs were approximately $653,758. The total cost of this house, purchase price plus renovations, was $1,026,703. The plaintiff's actual contributions are as follows: $80,000 (deposit); $152,503 (additional cash); $204,000 (money owed to CIT); total: $436,503. The defendant's actual contribution is $14,500. The parties sold this property in July 2001 for $1,155,000.
The plaintiff also acted as general contractor for the renovation project.
On July 11, 2001, the parties entered into a stipulated agreement which addressed the distribution of the cash received at closing, $423,509.45. Of this amount, the plaintiff received $227,259.45 and the defendant received $196,250. The parties' stipulation of July 11, 2001 further provides, "The disposition provided for herein is a preliminary division for the convenience of the parties during the pendency of this action and expressly without prejudice to the equitable distribution claims and defenses of both parties. Nothing contained in this stipulation shall constitute an agreement or waiver by either party with respect to the ultimate equitable distribution of any asset (including without limitation the aforesaid marital residence) or liability of the parties."
It would appear to this court that this distribution was wildly out of proportion when one considers that the plaintiff contributed $436,503 and received in return $227,259.45, compared to the defendant's contribution of $14,500 and return of $196,250.
This amount includes the $204,000 loan from CIT, which remains unpaid and outstanding.
The plaintiff lists on his financial affidavit two pieces of real estate. 283 Main Street, Ridgefield, Connecticut is the plaintiff's residence. This property was purchased after the sale of the marital residence and while this case was pending. The fair market value of this property is $700,000. There is a $509,000 mortgage on the property, thus leaving a net equity of $191,000.
Additionally, the plaintiff owns a condominium at 22 Main Street, Tariffville, Connecticut, with a fair market value of $58,000. This property is also encumbered by a mortgage in the amount of $23,000, thus leaving a net equity of $35,000. The plaintiff rents this condominium to his brother for $650 per month. This property was owned by the plaintiff prior to the marriage.
The plaintiff has a 401k with Guardian, with a current balance of $67,742.83, plus miscellaneous personal accounts with minimal balances.
By far, the plaintiff's largest asset is his interest in CIT. The plaintiff's value of his interest is consistent with the expert opinion of Mr. Harrison. The court finds the value of CIT to be $1.2 million.
The defendant attempted to convince the court that she somehow contributed to the success of CIT. This court was not convinced.
The defendant owns two pieces of real estate. 47 Meadows Lane, Katonah, New York, where the defendant and minor child reside, was purchased by the defendant with the proceeds she received from the sale of the former marital residence. The fair market value of this property is $355,000 and there is a mortgage in the amount of $279,132 against the property. The defendant also owns a condominium at 222 Williams Street, Glastonbury, Connecticut. The fair market value of this property is $60,000 and there is a mortgage of $50,499 against the property. The defendant rents this property. The current rent does not cover the expenses and there is a deficit of approximately $26 per month. This property was owned by the defendant prior to the marriage.
The defendant has stocks, bonds and mutual funds totaling $141,897; deferred compensation accounts totaling $115,401; a Paine-Webber cash account of $49,893; and miscellaneous bank accounts of $2,829. The defendant attributes no value to All Creatures Great Small of New York, Ltd. The defendant also owns a 1999 Lexus RX300, for which the plaintiff gave her $5,000 to purchase in early 2000. The current equity is $9,501.
Thankfully, for their daughter's sake, there is one thing the parties can agree on and that is custody and visitation, with some very minor, surmountable issues. The parties' testimony was consistent that their daughter is college bound.
This court has considered the provisions of § 46b-82 regarding alimony, the provisions of § 46b-81 (c) regarding property division, § 46b-56 regarding custody and visitation, § 46b-84 regarding the issue of child support and the child support guidelines, § 46b-62 regarding attorneys fees and Public Act No. 02-128 regarding post-majority payment of college expenses. The court enters the following orders:
ORDERS
A. BY WAY OF DISSOLUTION
1. The marriage of the parties is dissolved and each party is declared to be single and unmarried.
B. REGARDING THE MINOR CHILD
1. The parties shall share joint legal custody of the minor child, Kendall. The child shall reside primarily with the defendant, and the plaintiff shall have reasonable, liberal and flexible rights of visitation with the child including, but not limited to, the following: Every other weekend from Friday at 6 p.m. until Sunday at 6 p.m. while the child is in school, and 7:30 p.m. when the child is not in school; and every Wednesday from noon to 7 p.m. When the child attends school full-time, the Wednesday visit shall be from after school until Thursday morning, at which time the plaintiff shall bring the child to school when school is in session, or to the defendant by 9 a.m. when school is not in session.
2. In addition, both parties shall have vacation time with the child up to four weeks per year, one of which shall be non-summertime, and may include the child's spring recess. No more than two weeks shall be consecutive. Unless by agreement, neither party shall have the child for two consecutive spring recesses. Each party shall provide the other with thirty (30) days written notice as to which weeks he or she will be taking.
3. The parties shall alternate the minor child's birthday, with the plaintiff having the child for at least four hours on her birthday in even numbered years. The plaintiff shall have time with the child within one week of her birthday in odd numbered years.
4. The parties shall alternate Thanksgiving and Easter, with the plaintiff having Thanksgiving in odd numbered years from 11 a.m.-5 p.m., and Easter in even numbered years from 11 a.m.-5 p.m.
5. The plaintiff shall have parenting time with the child on Christmas Eve at 4 p.m. until Christmas Day at noon in even numbered years, and from Christmas Day at noon until December 26th at noon in odd numbered years.
6. Monday or Friday holidays shall attach to each parent's weekend. In this regard, the weekend shall commence on Thursday at 6 p.m. for Friday holidays, or end on Monday at 7 p.m. for Monday holidays.
7. Both parties shall have the right to enjoy Halloween with the minor child, with the minor child selecting the neighborhood in which she wants to "trick or treat." In any year, regardless of which neighborhood the child selects, both parties shall have the right to accompany their daughter, and will conduct themselves in an adult-like manner.
8. The plaintiff shall transport the minor child to and from weekday and weekend scheduled parenting time.
9. The defendant shall give the plaintiff ninety (90) days written notice if she intends to relocate with the minor child from her current residence, and shall not relocate without written agreement of the parties or further court order.
10. The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant child support in the amount of $800 per week until the child reaches the age of 18 years or, if still a full-time high school student, then until the child completes high school or reaches the age of 19 years, whichever first occurs. The defendant shall pay all daycare costs. The plaintiff and defendant shall share 50%/50% the cost of any of the minor child's extracurricular activities, including music lessons and sports.
11. The plaintiff shall provide medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor child as the same is available to him through his place of employment. The defendant shall pay 100 percent of any unreimbursed medical, dental, orthodontia, optic, psychiatric and psychological expenses up to $750 per year. Any amount in excess of $750 per year shall be divided between the parties 50%/50%.
12. The plaintiff shall provide $200,000 of life insurance for the benefit of the minor child until the child attains the age of 23 years.
13. The child's name shall not be changed from Kendall Long Downend.
14. The defendant shall be entitled to claim the minor child as a dependent for IRS purposes.
C. BY WAY OF ALIMONY
1. There shall be no award of periodic alimony to either party.
2. As lump sum alimony, the court will incorporate the defendant's award of $196,250, and the same shall be hers exclusively. Further, as additional lump sum alimony, the court orders the plaintiff to assume and hold the defendant harmless from the $204,000 loan to CIT relative to the parties' acquisition and renovation of the former marital residence.
D. BY WAY OF DEBTS
1. Each party shall be responsible for the debts as listed on their respective financial affidavits submitted to court in conjunction with this action, and hold the other party harmless thereon.
E. BY WAY OF ASSETS
1. Each party shall retain the assets as reflected on their respective financial affidavits submitted to court in conjunction with this action.
F. EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT ORDER
1. The court will retain jurisdiction over the issue of educational support pursuant to the provisions of Public Act No. 02-128 of the state of Connecticut.
G. BY WAY OF ATTORNEYS FEES
1. The plaintiff shall contribute to the defendant's legal fees the sum of $10,000.
H. MISCELLANEOUS
1. Mr. Mark Harrison is owed $1,137.50 for his testimony given at trial. The plaintiff and defendant shall share this cost evenly and pay to Mr. Harrison each the sum of $568.75.
2. The plaintiff shall pay the cost of the defendant's COBRA medical insurance benefits premiums for a period not to exceed thirty-six (36) months from the date of dissolution.
Bozzuto, J.