It is not necessary to show that the host served additional liquor to a minor who was already intoxicated. This court followed and applied Congini in Douglas v.Schwenk, 330 Pa. Super. 392, 479 A.2d 608 (1984). We held that "[a] complaint joining the additional defendants [who were social hosts] on the grounds that they . . . `furnished' [a minor] alcoholic beverages knowing she was underage, would be driving and would not be able to operate said motor vehicle in a safe manner was sufficient to state a cause of action for which relief could be granted," 330 Pa.Super. at 397, 479 A.2d at 611.
Congini treats third party recovery as an a fortiori case, 470 A.2d at 518 ("we see no valid distinction which would warrant a limitation on the action to third parties alone"), and this "extension" of Congini has been recognized and applied without comment in the decisions of the Pennsylvania appellate courts. See, e.g. Douglas v. Schwenk, 330 Pa. Super. 392, 479 A.2d 608 (1984). Thus we can conclude from the Pennsylvania cases which have dealt with this subject, that whereas adult guests and those third parties whom they have injured have no cause of action against their social (non-licensed) host, minors who are served liquor and who in turn injure others are regarded and treated differently.
The duty not to serve alcohol to minors extends both to the minors themselves and to third parties whom the intoxicated minors may harm. SeeOrner v. Mallick , 515 Pa. 132, 527 A.2d 521, 523–24 (1987) (reversing lower court dismissal of minor's personal injury claims against social host who served him alcohol); Douglas v. Schwenk , 330 Pa.Super. 392, 479 A.2d 608, 610–12 (1984) (holding estate of passenger killed in accident with intoxicated minor driver could sue party who served minor alcohol). "The social host doctrine is a general phrase used to designate a claim in negligence against a person (the host) who provides alcoholic beverages to another (the guest), without remuneration, where the guest then sustains injuries, or causes injury to a third person as a result of his intoxicated condition."
(Though court held in companion case that ordinarily there exists no liability on the part of a social host, an action does lie where the server provides alcohol to a minor.) Douglas v. Schwenk, 330 Pa. Super. 392, 479 A.2d 608 (1984). (Following Congini, court held that "Defendants were more than mere social hosts furnishing liquor, they were knowledgeable persons providing alcohol to a minor. . . .")
III. Does the complaint's cause of action entitled "punitive damages" state a claim upon which relief can be granted? In reviewing an order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, it is necessary for this court to accept as true all well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and only sustain the demurrer if it is certain that no recovery is permitted. Douglas v. Schwenk, 330 Pa. Super. 392, 479 A.2d 608 (1984). Regarding Count I of the underlying complaint, appellants argue that the trial court erred in concluding that Niagara properly refused the request for a defense since the federal complaint did not involve Mr. Humphreys' status as an attorney and did not allege any malpractice on the part of Mr. Humphreys. Appellants maintain that the federal complaint does pertain to Mr. Humphreys as an attorney and concerns legal work which he performed.
Gentile v. WestAmerican Insurance Exchange, 367 Pa. Super. 99, 532 A.2d 472 (1987). A demurrer can be sustained only if it is certain no recovery is permitted. Douglas v. Schwenk, 330 Pa. Super. 392, 479 A.2d 608 (1984). I believe thorough examination of the pleadings coupled with a conclusive review of the pertinent provisions of the Harleysville insurance policy, applied subject to these standards, reveal appellant is not an insured under the Harleysville policy, and therefore, she should not recover against Harleysville.
Any doubt must be resolved against sustaining the demurrer." Douglas v. Schwenk, 330 Pa. Super. 392, 394, 479 A.2d 608, 609 (1984) (citations omitted). Accepting as true appellant's well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom, we find that, because appellant would not be entitled to any recovery, the demurrers were properly sustained.
Any doubt must be resolved against sustaining the demurrer." Douglas v. Schwenk, 330 Pa. Super. 392, 393, 479 A.2d 608, 609 (1984) (citations omitted). The principal inquiry of this appeal is whether the estate of a stillborn child may recover in a civil action at law for damages which occur as a result of negligent pre-natal care.
I cannot agree that the only rational interpretation of the defendants' letters is to view them as innocuous and nondefamatory expressions of opinion. Giving appellant the benefit of reasonable inferences from well-pleaded facts to which he is entitled on appeal from a demurrer, see Douglas v.Schwenk, 330 Pa. Super. 392, 479 A.2d 608 (1984), I find the letters to be capable of a defamatory meaning. I deem it appropriate to consider, however, whether the trial court's dismissal of counts 1-5 of the complaint might be sustained on the basis of privilege.
Id. 504 Pa. at ---, 470 A.2d at 518, n. 3. See also Douglas v. Schwenk, --- Pa.Super. ---, 479 A.2d 608 (1984). The court in Congini had before it a completely different set of facts and theory of liability than those in the instant case.