Douglas Cty. Light Water v. C.I.R

13 Citing cases

  1. Callan v. Westover

    116 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1953)   Cited 4 times

    Thus the statutory limitation that a deductible loss is not sustained if "compensated for by insurance or otherwise" places every reasonable possibility of recoupment among the "pertinent facts and circumstances." United States v. S.S. White Dental Co., supra, 274 U.S. at pages 402-403, 47 S.Ct. at page 598; First Nat. Corp. v. Commissioner, supra, 147 F.2d at page 464; Cahn v. Commissioner, supra, 92 F.2d at page 676; Douglas County L. W. Co. v. Commissioner, 9 Cir., 1930, 43 F.2d 904, 905; see Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Harwick, 5 Cir., 1950, 184 F.2d 835; Boston Consol. Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 1 Cir., 1942, 128 F.2d 473, 476-477 (concurring opinion); H.D. Lee Mercantile Co. v. Commissioner, 10 Cir., 1935, 79 F.2d 391; Louisville Trust Co. v. Glenn, D.C.W.D.Ky. 1940, 33 F. Supp. 403, 408, affirmed 6 Cir., 1942, 124 F.2d 418; Still, Inc., v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1072 (1953); Whitney v. Commissioner, supra, 13 T.C. at page 901; Paul and Mertons, 3 Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 26.54 (1934). Contra: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Highway Trailer Co., supra, 72 F.2d at page 915.

  2. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. v. United States

    348 F.2d 492 (Fed. Cir. 1965)   Cited 7 times

    In that case, plaintiff was unable to collect for equipment furnished as a subcontractor to a Government supplier. Although the contract made no provision for payment to plaintiff therein under the particular circumstances, the court stated (on the same page) "* * * the law would imply a stipulation for payment on demand or within a reasonable time." See also Hamlen v. Welch, 116 F.2d 413 (1st Cir. 1940); Shiman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1932); Douglas County Light Water Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 43 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1930); Martin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 38 T.C. 188 (1962); Stamos v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2 T.C. 885 (1954); Aftergood v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 22 T.C. 60 (1953); Sherman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 18 T.C. 746 (1952); Trimble v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 T.C. 1231 (1946). Defendant contends that the judgment is based upon an act of embezzlement and that "the embezzlement of funds does not create a debt owing by the embezzler to the defrauded party and the loss suffered in connection therewith is a loss and not a bad debt," citing Burnet v. Huff, 288 U.S. 156, 53 S.Ct. 330, 77 L.Ed. 670 (1933).

  3. United States v. Public Service Co.

    143 F.2d 79 (10th Cir. 1944)   Cited 11 times
    In United States v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 10 Cir., 143 F.2d 79, the court reached a conclusion opposite to the decision herein.

    This regulation, while it stands, has the force and effect of law unless it is in conflict with an express statutory provision. Douglas County, etc., v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 9 Cir., 43 F.2d 904; Williams v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 8 Cir., 44 F.2d 467; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 31 S.Ct. 480, 55 L.Ed. 563; Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 40 S.Ct. 155, 64 L.Ed. 297; Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 50 S.Ct. 115, 74 L.Ed. 457; Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 51 S.Ct. 144, 75 L.Ed. 397. The regulation does not conflict with the express terms of the statute unless it may be said that processing is a commercial transaction as the term is used in the Act.

  4. Boston Consol. Gas Co. v. Commissioner

    128 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1942)   Cited 20 times
    In Boston Consolidated Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 1 Cir., 128 F.2d 473, the Gas Company had collected numerous deposits over a period of years, which were refundable to the depositors on demand, but, no demand having been made over some considerable period, the Gas Company treated these deposits as income.

    " If at the time of the embezzlement the wrongdoer makes no gain, because of the offsetting obligation, it seems logical to hold that the person whose money is taken does not at that time sustain a loss. Cf. Douglas County Light Water Co. v. Commissioner, 9 Cir., 1930, 43 F.2d 904. Logic here coincides with practical convenience, because, as pointed out by Judge Woodbury, if the Government's view is accepted, the wronged party will often be deprived unjustly of a tax deduction through inability to prove the specific amounts embezzled in any particular year.

  5. Pacific Nat. Bank v. Commr. of Internal Revenue

    91 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1937)   Cited 14 times

    It has, therefore, the force and effect of law. Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349, 40 S.Ct. 155, 157, 64 L.Ed. 297; Crocker v. Lucas (C.C.A.9) 37 F.2d 275, 277; Douglas County Light Water Co. v. Commissioner (C.C.A.9) 43 F.2d 904, 905; Commissioner v. Van Vorst (C.C.A. 9) 59 F.2d 677, 679. At the hearing before the Board, petitioner showed by uncontradicted evidence that the charge-off of $11,209.08 above referred to was made in obedience to the specific orders of a national bank examiner and the Comptroller of the Currency.

  6. Dayton Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

    90 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1937)   Cited 12 times

    If the loss is from a definite act of some person, such act is the "identifiable event" and the doing thereof is a "fixation" of such event. Instances of this are: Embezzlement [First National Bank of Sharon, Pa., v. Heiner, Collector, 66 F.2d 925 (C.C.A.3)], unless changed by circumstances [Douglas County L. W. Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 904 (C.C.A.9); Ledger Co. v. United States, 37 F.2d 775 (Ct.Cl.); John H. Farish Co. v. Commissioner, 31 F.2d 79 (C.C.A.8)], or theft (Lewellyn v. Electric Reduction Co., 275 U.S. 243, 247, 48 S.Ct. 63, 64, 72 L.Ed. 262, unless there are qualifying conditions, see Allied Furriers Corporation v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 457). If the loss is from a contract, the "identifiable event" is the occurrence which establishes the definite existence of the loss and the happening of such occurrence is the "fixation" of such event. Instances of this are: bankruptcy of the debtor [Jeffery v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 661 (C.C.A.6)], liquidation of the debtor [Gowen v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 923 (C.C.A.6), certiorari denied 290 U.S. 687, 54 S.Ct. 123, 78 L.Ed. 592], foreclosure of mortgage [Little v. Helvering, 75 F.2d 436 (C.C.A.8)], and whether the contract is entire or divisible [Commissioner v. R.J. Darnell, Inc., 60 F.2d 82 (C.C.A.6)]. If the loss is uncertain or contingent, the "identifiable event" is

  7. Lauriston Inv. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

    89 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1937)   Cited 4 times

    Treasury Regulations 74, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1928, Art. 191, which have the force of law, provides among other things: Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 20 S.Ct. 701, 44 L.Ed. 846; Maryland Cas. Co. v. U.S., 251 U.S. 342, 40 S.Ct. 155, 64 L.Ed. 297; Stegall v. Thurman (D.C.) 175 F. 813; Douglas County L. W. Co. v. Com'r (C.C.A.) 43 F.2d 904; Williams v. Commissioner (C.C.A.) 44 F.2d 467; Francisco Sugar Co. v. Com'r (C.C.A.) 47 F.2d 555. "Where the surrounding circumstances indicate that a debt is worthless and uncollectible and that legal action to enforce payment would in all probability not result in the satisfaction of execution on a judgment, a showing of these facts will be sufficient evidence of the worthlessness of the debt for the purpose of deduction. * * *"

  8. Commissioner of Int. Revenue v. Highway Trailer

    72 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1934)   Cited 15 times
    In Commissioner v. Highway Trailer Co., 72 F.2d 913, certiorari denied 293 U.S. 626, rehearing denied 294 U.S. 731, the taxpayer suffered a fire in 1921 which resulted in a loss amounting to approximately $166,000 in excess of the insurance coverage.

    '" In the Lewellyn Case, the Court refused to allow a buyer who had paid in advance for certain goods which in fact were never delivered, to deduct for its loss in the year in which the payment was made where it continued to carry the item on its books in its bills receivable account until the outcome of litigation which indicated that it would not be able to recover from the seller or a guarantor, whereupon it sought to amend its return for the year in which the prepayment was made and sued to recover an alleged overpayment of its tax for that year. See Douglas County Light and Water Co. v. Commissioner (C.C.A.) 43 F.2d 904; Central Trust Co. v. Burnet, 60 App. D.C. 4, 45 F.2d 922; Darling v. Commissioner (C.C.A.) 49 F.2d 111; Ferguson v. Commissioner (C.C.A.) 59 F.2d 893; First National Bank of Sharon, Pennsylvania v. Heiner (C.C.A.) 66 F.2d 925; Ledger Co. v. United States (Ct.Cl.) 37 F.2d 775; Dresser v. United States (Ct.Cl.

  9. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Van Vorst

    59 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1932)   Cited 33 times

    The effect of the decision in the Taplin Case was to hold that the regulation was without force to impose a tax liability on a shareholder of a corporation who merely purchased from it property for an amount substantially less than its fair market value, the statutes controlling not being broad enough to support such provision of the regulation. This court, in Douglas County Light Water Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 904, 905, said: "A treasury regulation has the force and effect of law unless it is in conflict with an express statutory provision. Ardsley Club v. Durey (D.C.) 40 F.2d 293; Union Bed Spring Company v. Springer (C.C.A.) 39 F.2d 383. And in case of doubt statutes levying taxes are construed most strictly against the government.

  10. First Nat. Bank of Sharon v. Heiner

    2 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Pa. 1932)   Cited 2 times

    It is admitted in the opinion that, had there been no such agreement, and had the securities embezzled been the property of the taxpayer, the shortage would have been a loss under the statute, and as such deductible only in the return for the year of the embezzlement. Douglas County Light Water Co. v. Commissioner (C.C.A.) 43 F.2d 904, and Ledger Co. v. United States (Ct.Cl.) 37 F. 2d 775, were also cited for the same purpose as was the case last mentioned.