Insofar as no disciplinary proceeding has been instituted against the Attorney General as a result of the informal advisory opinion, any decision on the merits of ODC's position on Rule 8.4(d) and Rule 1.7(b) would result in an advisory ruling by this Court. The issue of a petitioner seeking an advisory opinion through a petition for a writ of prohibition was addressed in Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994). In Dougan, an attorney filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with the Arkansas Supreme Court, seeking to prevent a probate court from holding him in contempt.
Insofar as no disciplinary proceeding has been instituted against the Attorney General as a result of the informal advisory opinion, any decision on the merits of ODC's position on Rule 8.4(d) and Rule 1.7(b) would result in an advisory ruling by this Court. The issue of a petitioner seeking an advisory opinion through a petition for a writ of prohibition was addressed in Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994). In Dougan, an attorney filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with the Arkansas Supreme Court, seeking to prevent a probate court from holding him in contempt.
Insofar as no disciplinary proceeding has been instituted against the Attorney General as a result of the informal advisory opinion, any decision on the merits of ODC's position on Rule 8.4(d) and Rule 1.7(b) would result in an advisory ruling by this Court. The issue of a petitioner seeking an advisory opinion through a petition for a writ of prohibition was addressed in Dougan v. Gray, 884 S.W.2d 239 (Ark. 1994). In Dougan, an attorney filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with the Arkansas Supreme Court, seeking to prevent a probate court from holding him in contempt.
We have stated that a writ of prohibition is never issued to prohibit an inferior court from erroneously exercising its jurisdiction. Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 17, 884 S.W.2d 239, 242 (1994). In the case before us, writ-of-prohibition relief is not available because appellant's remedy is one of appeal from the trial court's contempt order.
Because Arkansas Code Annotated section 27–37–703 applies only to the driver and the front seat passengers, it is inapplicable to the factual situation that confronted the district court. Accordingly, the majority's opinion regarding the provision of section 27–37–703 can have no practical effect on the outcome of Ms. Mendoza's case. Thus this court's musings are purely advisory or the answer to an academic question, tasks which this court has repeatedly said it would not undertake. Woodrome v. Daniels, 2010 Ark. 244, 370 S.W.3d 190 ; Saunders v. Neuse, 320 Ark. 547, 898 S.W.2d 43 (1995) ; Walker v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 508, 886 S.W.2d 577 (1994) ; Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994) ; Gladden v. Bucy, 299 Ark. 523, 772 S.W.2d 612 (1989) ; Neeley v. Barber, 288 Ark. 384, 706 S.W.2d 358 (1986).Under these circumstances, this court must remain true to its rules and well-established practices and decline to answer this certified question.
Id. Additionally, we have consistently held that statutory provisions involving the adoption of minors are strictly construed and applied. See In re Adoption of Tompkins, 341 Ark. 949, 20 S.W.3d 385 (2000); Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994); Swaffar v. Swaffar, 309 Ark. 73, 827 S.W.2d 140 (1992); In re Adoption of Parsons, 302 Ark. 427, 791 S.W.2d 691 (1990). Parental rights and the integrity of the family unit have always been a concern of this state and their protection regarded as a proper function of the courts.
This court has carefully guarded against any action that would "open the flood gates to judge shopping." Patterson v. Isom, 338 Ark. 234, 992 S.W.2d 792 (1999); Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994). [5, 6] The logical conclusion that arises from the above noted facts is that Valley concluded that he would be better served by a judge other than Judge Simes. The facts show Valley wanted a judge other than Judge Simes. The desire for a different judge does not support disqualification of a judge.
Throughout its long and storied history, this court has steadfastly refused to issue advisory opinions or answer purely academic questions. See, e.g., Harris v. City of Little Rock, 344 Ark. 95, 40 S.W.3d 214 (2001); Benton v. Bradley, 344 Ark. 24, 37 S.W.3d 640 (2001); Villines v. Harris, 340 Ark. 319, 11 S.W.3d 516 (2000); Stilley v. McBride, 332 Ark. 306, 965 S.W.2d 125 (1998); Wilson v. Pulaski Ass'n of Classroom Teachers, 330 Ark. 298, 954 S.W.2d 221 (1997); Almond v. Cigna Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 322 Ark. 268, 908 S.W.2d 93 (1995); Smedley v. Smedley, 319 Ark. 421, 892 S.W.2d 273 (1995); Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994); McCuen v. McGee, 315 Ark. 561, 868 S.W.2d 503 (1994); Johnson v. State, 314 Ark. 471, 863 S.W.2d 305 (1993); Jenkins v. Goldsby, 307 Ark. 558, 822 S.W.2d 842 [ 822 S.W.2d 843] (1992); City of Springdale v. Jones, 295 Ark. 129, 747 S.W.2d 98 (1988); Long v. Henderson, 249 Ark. 367, 459 S.W.2d 542 (1970); Catlett v. Republican Party of Arkansas, 242 Ark. 283, 413 S.W.2d 651 (1967); Countz v. Roe, 231 Ark. 108, 328 S.W.2d 353 (1959); Hogan v. Bright, 214 Ark. 691, 218 S.W.2d 80 (1949); Barbee v. Kolb, 207 Ark. 227, 179 S.W.2d 701 (1944). It escapes me why the majority has chosen to disregard the foregoing precedents in this case.
It has been well settled that this court does not render advisory opinions nor answer academic questions. See, Saunders v. Neuse, 320 Ark. 547, 898 S.W.2d 43 (1995); Walker v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 508, 886 S.W.2d 577 (1994); Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994) ; Gladden v. Bucy, 299 Ark. 523, 772 S.W.2d 612 (1989); and Neeley v. Barber, 288 Ark. 384, 706 S.W.2d 358 (1986). By embarking upon a path of writing advisory opinions declaring statutes unconstitutional in a response to a petition for declaratory judgment without requiring that a justiciable controversy be presented, we step away from our responsibilities in the judicial branch and act as a superlegislative body with an assumed authority to correct mistakes that the court from time to time may believe have been made by our General Assembly.
We have stated that a writ of prohibition is never issued to prohibit an inferior court from erroneously exercising its jurisdiction. Young v. Smith, supra; Dougan v. Gray, 318 Ark. 6, 884 S.W.2d 239 (1994); Lupo v. Lineberger, 313 Ark. 315, 855 S.W.2d 293 (1993). Prohibition lies to the circuit court and not to the individual judge.