Opinion
No. TSR CV11-4004073
May 19, 2011
Order of Dismissal
The latest petition filed by the petitioner represents a gross abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. It comes less than six months after the court denied his last petition, the decision in which is still pending on appeal. In that decision, which consumes fifteen pages of the transcript, the court noted that the petition before the court was the petitioner's "third [state] habeas attack on his conviction for a murder that occurred in 1987." Dontigney v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. TSR CV07-4001811 (December 3, 2010, Schuman, J.), appeal filed, Docket No. AC 33054 (December 28, 2010). See also Dontigney v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Conn.App. 681, 867 A.2d 93 (2005); Dontigney v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV92 1370 (October 21, 1994, Sferrazza, J.), appeal dismissed, 42 Conn.App. 304, 679 A.2d 55, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 918, 682 A.2d 999 (1996); State v. Dontigney, 215 Conn. 646, 577 A.2d 646 (1990). The court also noted that the petitioner has filed several federal habeas petitions.
In his newest filing, the petitioner fails to respond to a request on the petition form to identify the docket or case numbers of his prior petitions. The petition then simply lists some eleven issues with no supporting facts. Among these issues are "trial conspiracies at trial" and "perjury 5 counts by attorneys — judge — police — medical people." In the absence of any indication that there are any truly new or nonfrivolous claims, the petition could be dismissed under Practice Book § 23-29(2) and (3) for failure to state a claim and for presenting the same ground as prior previously denied petitions.
The petition also alleges "IAC Habeas Attorney," but does not specify which attorney. The petitioner has had several. The undersigned recently finished presiding over the petitioner's last habeas trial. It is inconceivable that the petitioner has any good faith basis to attack his latest habeas attorney, who the undersigned observed to have done an excellent job with a most difficult client.
The court can dismiss a petition "upon its own motion" if it determines that: "1) the court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the petition, or a count thereof, fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted; (3) the petition presents the same ground as a prior petition previously denied and fails to state new facts or to proffer new evidence not reasonably available at the time of the prior petition; (4) the claims asserted in the petition are moot or premature; (5) any other legally sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition exists." Practice Book § 23-29.
But doing so would simply obscure the damage that petitions like the present one do to our system of justice. The writ of habeas corpus was intended to serve as a "bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bunkley v. Commissioner of Correction, 222 Conn. 444, 460-61, 610 A.2d 598 (1992). This noble purpose has been degraded by petitioners like the present one who apparently regard a habeas petition as merely a standard form to fill out or, at worst, a game that prisoners can play with authorities.
Fortunately, "[n]othing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, to entertain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Negron v. Warden, 180 Conn. 153, 166 n. 6, 429 A.2d 841 (1980). "Habeas corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles . . . Among them is the principle that a suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may disentitle him to the relief he seeks . . . [ Id.] Indeed, the ability to bring a habeas corpus petition at any time is limited by the equitable doctrine of abuse of the writ based on unnecessary successive petitions. See Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397, 641 A.2d 1356 (1994)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dickinson v. Mullaney, 92 Conn.App. 689, 694 n. 5, 887 A.2d 390 (2005), reversed on other grounds, 284 Conn. 673, 937 A.2d 667 (2007).
The petitioner has had numerous opportunities to challenge his 1989 conviction. At some point, we must recognize society's "need for finality of convictions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Commissioner of Correction, 104 Conn.App. 188, 192, 932 A.2d 467 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 907, 942 A.2d 416 (2008). It is now time to recognize that need and label the petitioner's latest petition with its true title: an abuse of the writ. See Sherbo v. Manson, 21 Conn.App. 172, 175, 572 A.2d 378, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 808, 576 A.2d 539 (1990) ("Decisions concerning abuse of the writ are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Theirs is the major responsibility for the just and sound administration of . . . collateral remedies, and theirs must be the judgment as to whether a second or successive application shall be denied without consideration of the merits"). (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
The petition is dismissed.
It is so ordered.