Opinion
C. A. 9:22-cv-01641-BHH-MHC
06-26-2024
Christopher Allen Dontell, Plaintiff, v. Susan Safford, Cpl. Gray, Cpl. Gause, Cpl. Shover, Officer Lewis, Officer Hollywood, Officer Ray, Officer Davis, Officer Dahl, Officer Wortham, Officer Cyr, Officer Browning, Officer Sanders, Officer Dillon, F. Smalls, Cpl. Vermeer, Officer Steblinksi, Officer Sweet, Cpl. Collier and Officer Powers, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MOLLY H. CHERRY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Christopher Allen Dontell (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this civil action asserting claims for violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) and (e) (D.S.C.).
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief. ECF No. 191. Defendants Susan Safford (“Maj. Safford”), Cpl. Joni Curcio, Cpl. Gray, Cpl. Gause, Sgt. Shover, Officer Lewis, Officer Hollywood, Officer Ray, Officer Perry (misidentified as “Officer Davis”), Officer Dahl, Officer Wortham, Officer Cyr, Officer Browning, Officer Sanders, Officer Dillon, F. Smalls, Cpl. Vermeer, Officer Steblinski, Officer Sweet, and Cpl. Collier (together, “HCSO Defendants”) filed a Response in Opposition. ECF No. 192. The Motion is ripe for review. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Motion be denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee housed at the J. Reuben Long Detention Center (“Detention Center”) in Horry County, South Carolina, filed this civil rights action on May 24, 2022. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed his first Amended Complaint on November 3, 2022, ECF No. 15, and a Second Amended Complaint on April 11, 2023, ECF No. 51.
Plaintiff is currently detained on charges for which he was arrested on November 11, 2020, and booked into the Detention Center. See Horry County Public Index, Case Nos. 2020A2610700958 (criminal conspiracy charge) and 2020A2610202359 (murder charge), available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Horry/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx and by searching the above case numbers (last visited May 21, 2024). On November 20, 2020, Plaintiff posted bond and was released from the Detention Center. Id. On September 9, 2021, Plaintiff's bond was revoked, and he was booked again at the Detention Center, where he currently remains. See https://www.horrycountysc.gov/departments/sheriffsoffice/detention-center/booking-releases/ by searching Plaintiff's last name (last visited May 21, 2024)).
Plaintiff's claims against HCSO Defendants are related to three issues: (1) his dietary needs at the Detention Center, ECF No. 51 at 38-69, 74-95; (2) a heart issue in 2022, alleging interference with Plaintiff's use of a heart monitor prescribed by an outside cardiologist, ECF No. 51 at 59-60, 95-98; and (3) an alleged inmate assault in December of 2021, ECF No. 51 at 52-54, 79-80. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges HCSO Defendants Officer Hollywood and Cpl. Shover have threatened him with retaliation. ECF No. 51 at 60-61.
In his Motion, Plaintiff contends he was moved to “lock up” on May 18, 2024, by Defendant Cpl. Shover. ECF No. 191 at 2. Plaintiff's medical records indicate that medical staff at the Detention Center initiated a transfer to isolate Plaintiff from others because of a contagious skin condition after Plaintiff was examined per his sick call request. ECF Nos. 192-1, 192-2, 5/18/24 Special Needs Report. Plaintiff was transferred to the Detention Center's Special Management Unit (“SMU”).
According to Detention Center policy, the SMU “provides housing for . . . inmates who require medical observation as determined by the medical authority.... In all cases, inmates moved to SMU are placed in the SMU to promote their personal safety and security and/or to promote the safety and security of others.” See ECF No. 192-5, Detention Center Policy 305.0 “Special Management Unit.”
Plaintiff's cell in SMU was marked as “Dontell Med Iso.” ECF No. 192-3, Photo of Plaintiff's cell door. Once medical staff notified Detention Center officers on May 28, 2024, that Plaintiff's “med iso [was] completed” (see ECF No. 192-4, 5/28/2024 Special Needs Report), Plaintiff was returned to his normal housing unit, C-1.
While Plaintiff was in SMU, he missed a court hearing on May 22, 2024, regarding a civil case pending in the Horry County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2024-CP-26-00380. In that matter, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in an appeal of an order of the Resolutions of Fee Disputes Board regarding a fee dispute between Plaintiff and his previous criminal counsel. The Horry County Clerk of Court mailed Plaintiff a notice of this hearing on April 18, 2024. ECF No. 192-6, Notice. Plaintiff acknowledges receiving the notice on April 25, 2024. ECF No. 192-7 at 2, 4, Plaintiff's state court affidavit. On May 18, 2024, Plaintiff began reminding HCSO Defendants verbally of his May 22, 2024 hearing. Id. at 4-5; see also ECF No. 192-8, 5/24/24 Incident Report. On May 21, 2024, at 10:23 p.m., Plaintiff notified the Detention Center in writing about this hearing. ECF No. 192-9, Plaintiff's 5/21/2024 Inmate Request.
See Horry County Public Index for Case No. 2024-CP-26-00380, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Horry/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=26&CourtAgency =26002&Casenum=2024CP2600380&CaseType=V&HKey=1011131001086582110536810287 8410412175971086675848847564969671197211498745511657484979734887529048 (last visited June 18, 2024).
The Detention Center's Deputy Director, Defendant Susan Safford, contacted the state court's Clerk of Court and explained Plaintiff had missed the hearing because the Detention Center had not been timely notified of the hearing. ECF No. 192-10, Maj. Safford Grievance Response. The state court ordered the hearing to be rescheduled. ECF Nos. 192-11, 5/28/2024 state court order; 192-7 at 9, 5/31/2024 Clerk of Court letter to Plaintiff confirming hearing would be rescheduled.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 gives courts the authority to grant preliminary injunctions. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Motions seeking “emergency” injunctive relief are treated as motions for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. See Singletary v. Election Sys. & Software, Case No. 2:22-cv-BHH-MGB, 2022 WL 18231597, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 29, 2022) (“Because Plaintiff appears to seek immediate injunctive relief, the undersigned construes his motion as a request for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 155612 (D.S.C. Jan. 11, 2023). The undersigned construes Plaintiff's Motion as seeking either a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order. The substantive standards for granting a request for a temporary restraining order and entering a preliminary injunction are the same. See Virginia v. Kelly, 29 F.3d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying preliminary injunction standard to a request for temporary restraining order).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides for preliminary injunctive relief in litigation regarding prison conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) (1997). This relief must be
The PLRA applies to all “prospective relief in any civil action brought with respect to prison conditions.” Duvall v. Hogan, No. CV ELH-94-2541, 2020 WL 3402301, at *7 (D. Md. June 19, 2020) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (emphasis added)). This includes actions brought by pretrial detainees challenging conditions of their detention. See id. (citing § 3626(g)(3) (defining “prisoner” to include “any person subject to . . . detention . . . who is accused of . . . violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program”).
“narrowly drawn” to correct a harm via “the least intrusive means necessary.” Id. Courts in the Fourth Circuit recognize that preliminary injunctions implicating prison management “should be granted only under exceptional and compelling circumstances.” Sarratt v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., No. 8:16-cv-03486-RBH-JDA, 2017 WL 4048556, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 10, 2017) (citing Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 269 (4th Cir. 1994)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 816CV03486RBHJDA, 2017 WL 4012468 (D.S.C. Sept. 12, 2017). The decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is committed to the equitable discretion of the district court. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007).
DISCUSSION
In the Motion, Plaintiff contends the HCSO Defendants “are purposefully making Plaintiff's life uncomfortable, as they have restricted Plaintiff from using the phone to speak with his wife and children; restricted Plaintiff's visitation privileges and are repeatedly denying Plaintiff time out of his cell. Additionally, the Defendants refused to allow Plaintiff to attend his scheduled court appearance on May 22, 2024 . . . and have refused to allow Plaintiff to contact his attorney or anyone else since putting Plaintiff in lock-up.” ECF No. 191 at 2. He seeks an order “forcing [Defendant Cpl. Shover, and all other HCSO Defendants and their associates] to stop retaliating against Plaintiff immediately and forever; add[ing] Steve Garmen, M.D. as a Defendant in this case; [and awarding] any and all other remedies in favor of Plaintiff as the Court deems appropriate.” Id. at 3.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims - including his injunctive relief claims - are asserted only against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities, as Plaintiff has already dropped his official capacity claims. See ECF No. 51 at 4-14 (Plaintiff striking through “official capacity” as to all HCSO Defendants). However, the individual HCSO Defendants cannot be “liable for the prospective injunctive relief sought in their individual capacities because ‘a plaintiff should not be able to sue a defendant in his individual capacity for an injunction in situations in which the injunction relates only to the officials' job, i.e., his official capacity.'” Ellerbe v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., C. A. No. 6:19-0096-RMG, 2020 WL 3446202, at *2 (D.S.C. June 24, 2020) (quoting Community Mental Health Servs. of Belmont v. Mental Health & Recovery Bd., 150 Fed.Appx. 389, 401 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also Daniels v. City of N. Charleston, C. A. No. 2:12-0319-DCN-BM, 2012 WL 3877710, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2012) (citing Greenwalt v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 397 F.3d 587, 589 (7th Cir. 2005) and recommending dismissal of individual capacity § 1983 injunctive or declaratory relief claims), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3880078 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 2012).
Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown that he can satisfy the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief. A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish all four of the following elements: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A plaintiff must make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. Similarly, he must make a clear showing that he is likely to be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief. Id. at 20-23. Only then may the court consider whether the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff's favor. Finally, the court must pay particular regard to the public consequences of employing the extraordinary relief of injunction. Id. at 24.
First, Plaintiff has not shown he is likely to succeed on the merits of his action. Indeed, the undersigned has recommended that the HCSO Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. ECF No. 193.
The arguments in the Motion appear to relate to Plaintiff's claim for retaliation. However, Plaintiff did not mount any legal argument regarding the claim in his Response in Opposition to the HCSO Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, suggesting he may have abandoned the claim. See ECF No. 164.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff may be seeking relief regarding his transfer to medical isolation or restricted access to use the phone to contact family and counsel, these issues do not implicate any constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Allah v. Burt, Civil Action No. 4:08-1538-TLW-TER, 2010 WL 476016, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2010) (recognizing “[t]here is no constitutional right for a state prisoner or federal prisoner to be housed in a particular institution, at particular custody level, or in a particular portion or unit of a correctional institution” and collecting cases); Williamson v. Rogers, C/A No. 0:15-4755-MGL-PJG, 2017 WL 2703858, at *5 (D.S.C. June 2, 2017) (recommending summarily dismissing § 1983 claim based upon denial of phone access, recognizing “there is no constitutional right to make phone calls in prison” and collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3085761 (D.S.C. July 20, 2017).
Additionally, the evidence before the Court indicates that Plaintiff has been transferred back to his regular housing unit, rendering the housing issue moot. See Moultrie v. S. Health Partners, No. 4:14-337-RMG, 2014 WL 5824759, at *1 (D.S.C. Nov. 10, 2014) (“Claims for injunctive and declaratory relief become moot when a prisoner is no longer subjected to the condition about which he complains.”).
Second, Plaintiff has not shown that he will be irreparably harmed if injunctive relief is not granted. Plaintiff cannot show any irreparable harm from his transfer, as his time in medical isolation was limited to ten days, did not implicate any constitutional concerns, and he was returned to his previous housing unit when it was completed. As to the court hearing Plaintiff missed, the evidence before the Court shows that it will be rescheduled. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot show any irreparable harm regarding the May 22, 2024, hearing.
Plaintiff has not made a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim or that he will be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief, such that the undersigned need not reach whether the balance of the equities tip in his favor or address the public interest concerns. Nevertheless, neither the balance of the equities, nor the public interest, warrant issuance of a preliminary injunction in this instance. Indeed, courts should grant preliminary injunctive relief involving the management of correctional institutions only under exceptional and compelling circumstances, which do not exist here. See Lyles v. Stirling, Civil Action No. 4:18-cv-2935-TMC-TER, 2019 WL 3307433, at *1 (D.S.C. July 3, 2019) (internal citations and quotations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3306063 (D.S.C. July 23, 2019).
Finally, Plaintiff's request to add Dr. Steve Garmen as a defendant in this case is not an appropriate request for injunctive relief, seeks relief the Court has already denied and comes on the heels of the Court's dismissal of the other medical personnel Plaintiff originally sued. Specifically, this Court previously denied Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (ECF No. 150) to add Dr. Steve Garmen as a defendant. ECF No. 162. And, in March of 2024, the Court dismissed the other medical personnel Plaintiff sued. ECF No. 184. Plaintiff has not cited to any rule of civil procedure, legal authority or other basis to support the request to add Dr. Garmen as a defendant.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 191, be DENIED.
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).