Opinion
Civil Action 23-cv-492
07-02-2024
BRANDON R DOMINO #560763 v. JERRY GOODWIN ET AL
SEC P
EDWARDS JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARK L. HORNSBY U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Introduction
Brandon Domino (“Plaintiff”) is a convicted prisoner who, when housed at the Louisiana State Penitentiary, was granted a religious exemption based on his Rastafarian religion. The exemption stated that he was entitled to a vegetarian diet and to wear dreadlocks. Plaintiff alleges that when he was transferred to the David Wade Correctional Center (“DWCC”) Deputy Warden Jake Baird ignored his religious objection and forced him to receive a haircut that removed his dreadlocks. Plaintiff prays for compensatory damages and asks that Baird be dismissed or demoted.
Before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16) filed by Baird, as well as Warden Jerry Goodwin and Secretary James LeBlanc who are also named as defendants. The motion was noticed for briefing, but Plaintiff did not file any timely response. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the motion be granted.
Relevant Facts
Plaintiff was housed at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in 2021 when a chaplain approved his request for a religious exemption based on being an adherent of the Rastafarian religion. The exemption noted that Plaintiff was a Rastafarian and was entitled to a diet that included no meat and to wear his hair in a style consistent with his religion. The approval stated: “Dreadlocks allowed (loosely worn). Hair must be groomed in a manner which does not pose a threat to security, or present the ability to conceal contraband.”
Plaintiff was transferred to DWCC and arrived in intake on September 27, 2022. He alleged in his complaint, by incorporation of an administrative grievance, that a prison official asked him where he was from and, upon saying New Orleans, Deputy Warden Baird stated, “You from New Orleans, you not a Rasta, you faking you have to cut that.” Plaintiff alleged that he told Baird that he had all of his paperwork to show a religious exemption, but Baird said that he did not care, grabbed Plaintiff by the arm while Plaintiff was in full restraints, and forced him into a barber chair where his dreadlocks were removed by an inmate barber.
Deputy Warden Baird offers an affidavit that contests some of the allegations in the complaint. He testifies that he was thoroughly familiar with the Department of Corrections' grooming policy, which he attached as an exhibit. The policy states that an offender's hair shall be groomed in such a manner as to prevent the concealment of contraband and to limit the offender's ability to change his appearance both in prison and in the event of an escape. Hair length is limited to the top of the eyebrow in front, the top of the shirt collar in back, and the top of the ear on the sides. The policy allows that an offender's request for a religious exemption may be made pursuant to another department regulation.
Baird testifies that the grooming policy does not allow the general inmate population to wear dreadlocks, but it did in 2022 and does currently fully recognize Rastafarian religious beliefs and respects exemptions from the grooming policy to allow the growing of dreadlocks by Rastafarian inmates. Baird testifies that he was not aware of the religious affiliation information contained in Plaintiff's master prison record when Plaintiff arrived at DWCC, but he was familiar with what he believed were basic tenets of the Rastafarian religion regarding the growth of dreadlocks. He believed that followers were not allowed to cut any part of their hair so as to remove or prevent the growth of dreadlocks. When Plaintiff arrived, he had an “undercut” hairstyle, meaning the hair on the sides of his head were cut, with no dreadlocks there. Baird testifies that he believed this hairstyle was “out of context with the Rastafarian religion” and not consistent with the dreadlocks hairstyle worn by members of the faith.
Baird testifies that Plaintiff told him that he had “paperwork” to prove his affiliation with the Rastafarian religion that allowed him to wear dreadlocks. Baird states: “[Plaintiff] did not present me with any such ‘paperwork,' and because I believed his ‘undercut' hairstyle was not consistent with Rastafarian beliefs-and that [Plaintiff] was not, in fact, a Rastafarian-[Plaintiff's] hair was cut so as to be compliant with the Facility's Grooming Policy.” Baird states that it was confirmed shortly after the haircut that Plaintiff was a member of the Rastafarian religion and had been given a religious exemption to allow him to wear dreadlocks at the prison. Accordingly, Plaintiff has been allowed to grow and wear dreadlocks after the intake haircut.
Melvin Ray Anderson, a chaplain at DWCC, offers an affidavit that addresses Plaintiff's religion status. He testifies that Plaintiff's records document that he changed his religious affiliation in 2020 from Islam to Rastafarian, and he was granted a religious exemption in 2021 that allows him to grow dreadlocks in accordance with his Rastafarian religious beliefs. That information was in Plaintiff's master prison record. Anderson testifies that, although Plaintiff's hair was cut on the day of his arrival, his hair has not been cut since that day, and he has been allowed to grow dreadlocks. Anderson testifies that Plaintiff will be allowed to grow his dreadlocks for as long as he remains at DWCC and at any other state facility to which he may be transferred in the future.
Defendants took Plaintiff's deposition. Plaintiff testified about the change in his religious affiliation and the tenets of his Rastafarian religion regarding his hairstyle. He said that the hairstyle depends on which Rastafarian “sector” a member follows. Some, he said, have no hair at all, and others never cut their hair. Plaintiff said that he was a Free Rastafarian, with the option to participate in being vegan or vegetarian and with the choice to have his hair cut or not. He said that his dreadlocks represented wisdom but cutting them off did not stop him from being a Rastafarian or practicing his religion. He agreed that he had experienced no trouble regarding his hair since the initial haircut.
Plaintiff testified about the day he arrived. He said Warden Baird approached him about his hair and told Plaintiff that his hair was “out of context.” Plaintiff said that he was a Rastafarian and that his haircut was consistent with that belief system. Baird said that, based on what he knew, it was out of context and had to be cut. Plaintiff described his hairstyle on arrival as trimmed only on the sides because “that's how I started growing it.” He said that when he arrived at DWCC he had long dreadlocks on top, but not on the sides of his head, with the sides in the style of a fade or undercut. He had long dreadlocks on top. Plaintiff testified that Baird “told me I wasn't a real Rastafarian; I wasn't practicing the beliefs; and I was faking.” But Baird told him immediately after the haircut that if he grew it “the right way” he would have no problem.
RFRA
Plaintiff's complaint invokes the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), which broadly prohibited both the federal government and the states from substantially burdening a person's religious exercise. The Supreme Court invalidated the Act “as applied to the states and their subdivisions.” Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 289 (5th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff does not target any federal legislation or name any federal actors as defendants, so there is no basis for a RFRA claim against the state-employed defendants.
RLUIPA
Rastafarian prisoner Christopher Ware was facing a transfer to a state prison that had a grooming policy that did not permit his dreadlocks and did not allow for any religious exemption. Ware filed suit against the DOC and its secretary and asked for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). The Fifth Circuit concluded that the DOC failed to meet its burden under RLUIPA of showing that its grooming policies serve a compelling interest and that they are the least restrictive means of serving any such interest. The Court entered judgment granting Ware's request for a declaration that the grooming policies violated RLUIPA and enjoining the DOC from enforcing the policies against him. Ware v. Louisiana Dep't of Corr., 866 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff does not seek declaratory or injunctive relief, and the evidence does not indicate that injunctive relief would be appropriate. The uncontested summary judgment evidence reflects that plaintiff has not been threatened with a haircut since the intake incident, and the chaplain assures that Plaintiff will be allowed to retain his dreadlocks at DWCC and at any other state facility. When the facts that gave rise to a challenged condition are no longer present, there is no basis for injunctive relief. See Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001) (claims for injunctive and declaratory relief based on exposure to asbestos were mooted by transfer to another prison).
Plaintiff's primary request is for compensatory damages. Paragraph VI of his form complaint asked him to state the relief he requested from the court. Plaintiff asked that the court award him $200,000 for the loss of his hair, $150,000 for pain and suffering, and $150,000 for mental anguish. He also asked that the court “dismiss or demote Warden Jake Baird.”
The Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed an earlier holding “that RLUIPA does not permit suits against officers in their individual capacities, which, in turn, means claimants cannot recover monetary damages.” Landor v. Louisiana Dep't of Corr., 82 F.4th 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2023) (affirming dismissal of damages suit by Rastafarian inmate against a guard who threw the prisoner's copy of Ware in the trash and ordered the prisoner's head to be shaved). The Landor decision requires the dismissal of Plaintiff's RLUIPA claims against the state prison officials, which are plainly individual capacity claims for money damages. As for Plaintiff's request that the court dismiss or demote Deputy Warden Baird, the court lacks the authority to discipline state corrections officers. Meeks v. DeBouse, 2024 WL 1862187, *4 (N.D. Tex. 2024) (collecting cases). Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted with respect to all claims brought under RLUIPA.
First Amendment
A. Limited Relief Available
Plaintiff's complaint invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action against a state actor who violates a federal constitutional right. Plaintiff points to the First Amendment, enforceable against state officials through the Fourteenth Amendment. As noted above, Plaintiff seeks only compensatory damages.
Plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)'s provision that no federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner for mental or emotional injury without a prior showing of physical injury. This requirement applies to all federal civil actions in which a prisoner alleges a constitutional violation, including First Amendment claims that are not usually accompanied by physical injury. Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374-75 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Section 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions in which a prisoner alleges a constitutional violation, making compensatory damages for mental or emotional injuries non-recoverable, absent physical injury.”).
The only forms of relief available to Plaintiff, if he prevails on the merits, are nominal and punitive damages. They are not barred by the physical injury requirement. Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 197-98 (5th Cir. 2007); Boyd v. Driver, 495 Fed.Appx. 518, 524 (5th Cir. 2012). Nominal damages are typically $1. Punitive damages are available in a Section 1983 case only “when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 103 S.Ct. 1625 (1983); Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1015 (5th Cir. 2003).
B. The Merits
Deputy Warden Baird testifies that he ordered the haircut as enforcement of the grooming policy as he understood it. When a prison policy or practice is challenged under the First Amendment, it will not be found unconstitutional if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective of the facility. Hay v. Waldron, 834 F.2d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 1987). This principle was applied in Scott v. Mississippi Dep't of Corr., 961 F.2d 77, 82 (5th Cir. 1992), which held that a policy requiring short hair did not violate Rastafarian prisoners' rights to freely exercise their religion while incarcerated. The Court noted the important goals of having a clear and easily identifiable photograph of a prisoner upon his admission and the risk posed by a prisoner with long hair that could be restyled or cut to modify appearance.
A hair and beard grooming regulation also withstood First Amendment challenge in Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22 (5th Cir. 1995), which held that a grooming regulation that requires a prisoner cut his hair and beard is rationally related to the achievement of valid penological goals such as security and inmate identification. The district court in Landor cited these decisions in dismissing the Rastafarian plaintiff's lawsuit that alleged he was forced to have his head shaved. Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, 2022 WL 4593085, *2 (M.D. La. 2022). They were also applied to dismiss the First Amendment claims of a Rastafarian Muslim who received a forced haircut in Deramus v. Claiborne Parish Detention Center, 2021 WL 6427047, *3-4 (W.D. La. 2021) (McClusky, M.J.), adopted, 2022 WL 110274 (W.D. La. 2022) (Doughty, J.).
Deputy Warden Baird applied the facility's grooming policy as he understood, apparently mistakenly, it applied to Plaintiff's long hair. The grooming policy that he applied is similar to those upheld over First Amendment challenges in the cases cited above. Baird is entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment claim.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that both the First and Eighth Amendments were violated by his forced haircut. The complaint does not allege the degree of force or the infliction of conditions that would make out a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, “[i]n a federal civil rights action under § 1983, when a claim arises under multiple constitutional provisions, a court should analyze the claim under the most applicable constitutional provision.” Pittman-Bey v. Celum, 557 Fed.Appx. 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2014). Pittman-Bey's claims concerned his right to a religious diet, so the First Amendment standard governed rather than the Eighth Amendment. The same is true in this case. Landor, 2022 WL 4593085, *3 (holding the same with respect to a Rastafarian inmate who received a forced haircut).
C. Supervisory Officials
Plaintiff directed his allegations at Deputy Warden Baird, but he also listed as defendants (former) DWCC Warden Jerry Goodwin and DOC Secretary James Leblanc. The original complaint included no allegations against either man. An amended complaint (Doc. 5) alleged that Goodwin was the “overseer” of DWCC and did not do anything about Baird's actions. It alleged that LeBlanc was the “overseer” of the DOC, Goodwin, and Baird, knew the applicable laws, and “did not do anything.”
“Under section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.” Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987). Thus, a prisoner must show that a warden or other supervisor was personally involved in the acts that deprived the prisoner of his constitutional rights. Thompson v. Upshire County, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001). Goodwin and LeBlanc are entitled to summary judgment because there are no allegations that either man was involved in the haircut decision or had any awareness of Baird's actions until after the haircut took place. Furthermore, the lack of any viable underlying claim against Baird entitles them to summary judgment. Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 311 (5th Cir. 2019) (an underlying constitutional violation is required to impose liability on a supervisor).
Accordingly, It is recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16) be granted and that all claims against all defendants be dismissed with prejudice.
Objections
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an extension of time is granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Counsel are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the District Judge at the time of filing.
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation set forth above, within 14 days after being served with a copy, shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See Douglass v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
THUS DONE AND SIGNED.