The Supreme Court of Georgia answered the three certified questions on June 22, 2022. Doc. 69; Domingue v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Ga. 59, 875 S.E.2d 720 (2022). The Supreme Court of Georgia answered the first two questions “no” and the third question “yes.”
In Domingue v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Ga. 59 (875 S.E.2d 720) (2022), the Supreme Court of Georgia stated that "the statutory restrictions in OCGA § 40-8-76.1 are all predicated on the 'failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a safety belt.'" Domingue, 314 Ga. at 63 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted).
. Cf. Domingue v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Ga. 59, 64 (875 S.E.2d 720) (2022) (concluding that because the plain text of a statute did "not mention, let alone expressly restrict," the admission of certain evidence at trial, the statute did not preclude the admission of such evidence). And even if it did, the plaintiffs' claims that the City's excessive charges for utilities services constituted an "illegal tax" do not
Notably, this tool of construction is available only where the legal text at issue allows for competing plausible interpretations. See Domingue v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Ga. 59, 68 n.8, 875 S.E.2d 720 (2022) (explaining that where there are not " ‘competing plausible interpretations of [the] statutory text,’ the canon of constitutional doubt does not apply" (citation omitted)); Crowder v. State, 309 Ga. 66, 73 n.8, 844 S.E.2d 806 (2020) ("[W]e cannot rely on th[e] canon [of constitutional doubt] to avoid the potential constitutional issue implicated by OCGA § 9-16-12 (b) (3), because we can identify only one plausible interpretation of that statute.").
Moreover, to the extent that the County is asserting that under the canon of constitutional doubt we should construe OCGA § 36-70-24 (3) (A) to avoid a potential conflict with the Uniformity Clause, that canon does not apply to a statute that we have determined to be unambiguous. See Domingue v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Ga. 59, 68 (2) (c), 875 S.E.2d 720 (2022) (courts cannot rely on the canon of constitutional doubt where the legal text "is clear and is not susceptible of more than one meaning"); Crowder v. State, 309 Ga. 66, 73 (2) (d) n.8, 844 S.E.2d 806 (2020) (explaining that the canon of constitutional doubt cannot be relied upon to avoid a "potential constitutional issue" when "we can identify only one plausible interpretation of [a] statute" (citation and punctuation omitted)). [10] The County also argues against our plain reading of the text of OCGA § 36-70-24 (3) (A), which requires an analysis of whether the service primarily benefits the unincorporated area of the county-not simply a consideration of who uses the service-because it contradicts the interpretation of the Act set out in the publication Charting a Course for Cooperation and Collaboration - An Introduction to the Service Delivery Strategy Act for Local Governments.
(citation and punctuation omitted)). "But the fact that an application of clear statutory text produces results that [a litigant or others] may think are unfair or unreasonable does not render the statute non-sensical or ‘absurd.’ " Domingue v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Ga. 59, 67 (2) (c) n.7, 875 S.E.2d 720 (2022). And although "this Court may construe statutes to avoid absurd results, … we do not have the authority to rewrite statutes," Riley v. State, 305 Ga. 163, 168 (3), 824 S.E.2d 249 (2019), so when the text is plain, we must follow it,
United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 481 (III) (D), 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) ("We will not rewrite a law to conform it to constitutional requirements, for doing so would constitute a serious invasion of the legislative domain[.]" (citations and punctuation omitted)). See also Domingue v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Ga. 59, 68 (2) (c) n.10, 875 S.E.2d 720 (2022) ("Under our system of separation of powers this Court does not have the authority to rewrite statutes." (citation and punctuation omitted)).
In construing this provision, "we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would." Domingue v. Ford Motor Co. , 314 Ga. 59, 61 (2), 875 S.E.2d 720 (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). "When looking for the commonly understood meaning of a word in statutory text, we generally look to dictionaries and, if relevant, legal dictionaries from the time the statute was passed."
"[T]he fact that an application of clear statutory text produces results that [State Farm] or others may think are unfair or unreasonable does not render the statute nonsensical or ‘absurd.’ " Domingue v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Ga. 59, 67 (2) (c), n. 7, 875 S.E.2d 720 (2022).