Summary
stating that plaintiff's knowledge of condition of floor goes only to "the issue of plaintiff's comparative negligence"
Summary of this case from Reichmann v. Whirlpool Corp.Opinion
1192 CA 17-00684.
11-09-2017
Kristina DOLINAR, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. KALEIDA HEALTH, Defendant–Appellant.
Gibson, McAskill & Crosby, LLP, Buffalo (Michael J. Willett of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Law Office of Mark H. Cantor, LLC, Buffalo (David J. Wolff, Jr. of Counsel), for Plaintiff–Respondent.
Gibson, McAskill & Crosby, LLP, Buffalo (Michael J. Willett of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.
Law Office of Mark H. Cantor, LLC, Buffalo (David J. Wolff, Jr. of Counsel), for Plaintiff–Respondent.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, DeJOSEPH, NEMOYER, AND CURRAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:Plaintiff commenced this action seeking to recover damages for injuries she sustained when she allegedly slipped and fell in a puddle in a hallway that had just been mopped in a building owned and maintained by defendant. We conclude that Supreme Court properly denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Defendant had the initial burden on the motion of establishing that it did not create the allegedly dangerous condition and that it did not have actual or constructive notice thereof (see Depczynski v. Mermigas, 149 A.D.3d 1511, 1511–1512, 52 N.Y.S.3d 776 [4th Dept.2017] ). We conclude that defendant failed to meet that burden. We agree with the court, specifically, that defendant failed to establish that it did not create the allegedly dangerous condition by negligently mopping the area and leaving excess water on the floor sufficient to create a puddle, and thus there is an issue of fact with respect thereto (see Brown v. Simone Dev. Co., L.L.C., 83 A.D.3d 544, 544–545, 922 N.Y.S.2d 21 [1st Dept.2011] ; Leone v. County of Monroe, 284 A.D.2d 975, 975, 726 N.Y.S.2d 900 [4th Dept.2001] ; see generally Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718 [1980] ).
We reject defendant's contention that the court should have granted the motion because the wet condition of the floor was readily observable and plaintiff was aware that the floor was wet. That contention concerns only "the issue of plaintiff's comparative negligence" and does "not negate defendant's duty to keep the premises reasonably safe" ( Steenwerth v. United Ref. Co. of Pa., 273 A.D.2d 878, 878, 710 N.Y.S.2d 270 [4th Dept.2000] ; see Francis v. 107–145 W. 135th St. Assoc., Ltd. Partnership, 70 A.D.3d 599, 600, 895 N.Y.S.2d 400 [1st Dept.2010] ), and thus it does not establish defendant's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and conclude that they are lacking in merit.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.