Opinion
A163733
03-29-2023
DARIA DOGALAKOVA, Respondent, v. IVAN DAVCHEV, Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. FDV-21-815634)
Markman, J. [*]
This case concerns the family court's jurisdiction to hear and decide a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) while the litigants were also pursuing competing child custody and visitation orders in courts in California and in Texas. Appellant Ivan Davchev contends that the family court in San Francisco abused its discretion by issuing a restraining order after hearing (ROAH) protecting respondent Daria Dogalakova and the parties' infant son (Minor) after a Texas court had already made an initial child custody determination. The family court found that Dogalakova proved her claim of domestic violence against Davchev under the Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) by at least a preponderance of the evidence. Among other things, the court found that Davchev had choked Dogalakova while she was holding Minor. According to Davchev, we should either vacate the ROAH in its entirety, or strike its inclusion of Minor as a protected party, because the family court lacked jurisdiction to issue it under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (§ 3400 et seq.) (UCCJEA).
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
We disagree and will affirm. We are aware of no authority suggesting that the UCCJEA restricts the court's authority under the DVPA to make orders protecting a parent from their co-parent in appropriate circumstances, which is what happened here. Rather, the UCCJEA sets out uniform procedures to avoid jurisdictional competition between states concerning child custody and visitation orders, while safeguarding principles of full faith and credit. (Kumar v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 689, 695.)
The California court followed the UCCJEA to the extent it made orders relating to child custody and visitation. First, the family court had temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to issue an initial temporary restraining order (TRO) that included temporary child custody orders, even if substantially all of Davchev's alleged acts of abuse took place outside of California. (Hogue v. Hogue (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 833, 839 (Hogue); § 3424, subd. (a).)
Second, after issuing the TRO and learning of the pending Texas child custody case, the California court followed the procedures described by the UCCJEA to confer with its counterpart in Texas. At that point, the California court had temporary emergency jurisdiction to issue interim custody orders, including visitation for Davchev, pending the hearing on the restraining order.
Third, after hearing the restraining order case, the California court expressly vacated its earlier child custody and visitation orders in the ROAH so that the Texas court could assume jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Minor was a protected party under the ROAH, but only with respect to the personal conduct orders in it. The ROAH did not include a child custody determination, and so it is not somehow invalid under the UCCJEA.
Finally, Davchev observes that the California court re-issued its TRO while the restraining order hearing was ongoing, but after the Texas court had issued its own written custody orders and Minor had returned to Davchev in Texas. Doing so was intended to preserve the status quo at a time when the California court was mid-way through its evidentiary hearing and the Texas court had not attempted to confer with the California court. As such, we decline to find that the California court exceeded its jurisdiction. Even if re-issuing the temporary custody orders with the TRO before the final day of the DVRO hearing was error, the error was harmless.
We note that the courts in California and Texas both might have avoided some of the confusion in this case by remaining in more frequent contact-particularly before the Texas court went forward with its June 2021 child custody hearing. Doing so might have avoided a perception that either court was deviating from the decisions they previously made together during their earlier UCCJEA discussions.
BACKGROUND
A. UCCJEA
Davchev focuses his appeal on the application of the UCCJEA by the family court, and so we begin there. "The UCCJEA is the exclusive method for determining subject matter jurisdiction for child custody proceedings in California." (In re C.W. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 835, 859.) It was enacted "for the stated purposes of avoiding jurisdictional competition and conflict, promoting interstate cooperation, litigating custody where child and family have closest connections, discouraging continuing conflict over custody, deterring abductions and unilateral removals of children, avoiding relitigation of another state's custody decisions, and promoting exchange of information and other mutual assistance between courts of sister states." (Kumar v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 695.)
The UCCJEA achieves these objectives by setting out the process to determine when a California court may make an initial custody determination or modify a custody determination made by a court of another state. (See §§ 3421, 3423, 3424.) A" 'Child custody determination' means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. The term does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual." (§ 3402, subd. (c).) A" 'Child custody proceeding' means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation of the parties, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear." (§ 3402, subd. (d).)
"The UCCJEA takes a strict 'first in time' approach to jurisdiction." (In re Marriage of Paillier (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 461, 469.) In general, once the court of an "appropriate state" makes an initial child custody determination, that court obtains" 'exclusive, continuing jurisdiction'" over the determination. (Ibid.; § 3422, subd. (a).) Section 3421 sets forth the hierarchy to determine whether a state can appropriately exercise this jurisdiction: "highest possible jurisdictional priority" is given to the "home state," defined to include a state where the child has resided for at least six consecutive months prior to commencement of the custody proceeding. (In re C.W., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 860; § 3402, subd. (g).) If there is no home state, a court may exercise jurisdiction where the child and at least one parent has a "significant connection" to the state. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2).)
Apart from the jurisdiction described above, the UCCJEA also confers temporary emergency jurisdiction on a California court in certain circumstances, including if the child is present in the state and "it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because . . . parent of the child, is subjected to, or threatened with, mistreatment or abuse[.]" (§ 3424, subd. (a).) If a child custody determination has already been made by a court with jurisdiction under section 3421, however, any order issued under temporary emergency jurisdiction must specify a period "adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from [that other] state" and "remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other state within the period specified or the period expires." (§ 3424, subd. (c).)
B. Dogalakova's California DVRO Proceeding
Dogalakova filed her request for a DVRO in San Francisco on March 17, 2021. According to Dogalakova, she resided in California when Minor was born, and lived in Texas with Minor and Davchev only temporarily thereafter, for a six-month period (September 2020 to February 2021). She returned to California with Minor after incidents where Davchev prevented her from leaving his house, and grabbed and squeezed her neck while she was holding Minor.
The California court issued a TRO on March 18, 2021, which protected Dogalakova and Minor. The court set a hearing concerning the restraining order for April 7, 2021. In addition to including personal conduct and "stay away" orders protecting Dogalakova and Minor, the TRO ordered temporary custody of Minor to Dogalakova with no visitation for Davchev pending the hearing.
On March 24, 2021, Dogalakova filed a separate parentage action in the California court. The petition sought "custody and orders issued by San Francisco Superior Court," including joint legal and physical custody of Minor and visitation to Davchev.
On April 5, 2021, Davchev moved to quash and dismiss the DVRO request for lack of jurisdiction and inconvenient forum. Davchev argued that the DVRO request was a "bad-faith maneuver" by Dogalakova to "justify[] her abduction of our son under the false pretense of domestic violence and . . . undermine my parental rights as she has previously threatened to do." The family court continued the DVRO hearing to May 5, 2021 so that all the pending requests and motions could be heard together.
C. Davchev's Texas Custody Proceeding
Davchev filed a petition in the Texas court on February 19, 2021, seeking orders regarding "conservatorship of, possession of, and access to" Minor. Davchev served Dogalakova with the petition on March 16, 2021. Dogalakova subsequently requested that the Texas court dismiss the Texas action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Texas's UCCJEA defines legal custody as "managing conservatorship of a child." (Tex. Fam. Code, § 152.102, subd. (11).)
After an evidentiary hearing on March 29, 2021, the Texas court determined that neither Texas nor California had home state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, but there was enough evidence of a significant connection between the parties, Minor, and Texas for the Texas court to have jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination. The Texas court denied Dogalakova's request to dismiss the case. It also directed the parties to notify the California court of its decision. It further ordered the parties to inform the Texas court if the California court did not dismiss Dogalakova's parentage action, "so that Texas and California may confer on this issue."
D. UCCJEA Conference
The California and Texas courts conducted two UCCJEA conferences in late April 2021. They agreed that the Texas court had jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination pursuant to the UCCJEA. The California court explained that it had "emergency jurisdictional powers under the California Family Code including Family Code section 3044," but that there was "no conflict" with the Texas court's jurisdiction.
The California court was scheduled to hear the motion to quash and DVRO request on May 5, 2021. The California judge explained that the family court would issue a DVRO if there was credible proof of domestic violence, and would also make "temporary custody and visitation orders only until the next Texas custody and visitation hearing." The Texas court agreed to reset its upcoming May 3, 2021 temporary orders hearing "to avoid two hearings in the same week in two separate jurisdictions."
E. The California Court's Continuance
At the May 5, 2021 California court hearing, the parties both expressed a need for a continuance to allow for discovery. The California court granted the continuance. It rescheduled the hearing for July 13 and July 15, and extended the TRO to July 13. The California court also modified its earlier temporary emergency custody and visitation orders, which had not included provisions for Davchev to have visitation with Minor. The family court ordered a temporary visitation schedule for Davchev "pending any orders made in Texas which shall supercede [sic] these orders." The California court also determined that it lacked jurisdiction for Dogalakova's parentage action, and dismissed that action. The California court e-mailed the Texas court to inform it of the continuance.
Dogalakova did not cross-appeal this determination.
F. The Texas Court's Temporary Orders
On June 3, 2021, Dogalakova moved in the Texas case for a continuance of that court's temporary orders hearing, which had been set for June 21, in order to "preserve" the sequencing of the California and Texas matters. Davchev's counsel opposed the motion, and stated: "All that's left in California is a restraining order between the parties, mom versus dad. It has nothing to do with the child." The Texas court denied the continuance.
The Texas court held its temporary child custody hearing on June 21 and 22. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Texas court made an oral ruling appointing Dogalakova and Davchev as joint managing conservators of Minor, and providing two options for visitation schedules. The Texas court also noted that it did not find Dogalakova "credible regarding her domestic violence allegations." The written temporary orders were not issued until almost a month later, on July 16, 2021. It did not include any findings related to Dogalakova's domestic violence allegations.
G. The California Court's Interim Orders
The California court heard Davchev's motion to quash and Dogalakova's DVRO request on July 13, 15, 22, and 23. At the outset of the hearing, the California court heard and denied Davchev's motion in limine to quash the DVRO application. Davchev's counsel argued that Texas had made an oral ruling on June 22 and thus the domestic violence issues had been "heard in Texas already." Dogalakova's counsel responded that the Texas court had a UCCJEA or custody hearing, "not a hearing on domestic violence." The family court proceeded to take evidence concerning the request for a restraining order.
Mid-way through the California restraining order hearing, after the close of testimony on July 15, the parties informed the California court that the Texas court would be entering written temporary orders on custody and visitation the next day. Recall the Texas court had held a hearing to make temporary orders nearly a month earlier, on June 21 and 22. The California court stated it did not understand why there had been any Texas proceedings "when I asked the judge in Texas to not proceed until I was done with this hearing." The California court expressed its view that it had emergency jurisdiction to issue its prior temporary custody and visitation orders, and had intended those orders to stay in place until it made final rulings on the motion to quash and DVRO request. The California court also confirmed that it believed it still had emergency jurisdiction to issue temporary custody and visitation orders. As was standard at the end of each court day during the restraining order hearing, the California court re-issued its TRO "under all of the previous conditions and visitation orders[.]" At the July 22 hearing, the California court again extended the TRO to the next day.
H. The California Court's ROAH
At the conclusion of the restraining order hearing on July 23, 2021, the California court made an oral ruling denying Davchev's motion to quash and granting Dogalakova's request for a ROAH. The family court issued its written ROAH, with attached findings and orders, on August 18, 2021. On the motion to quash, it found Dogalakova did not wrongfully take Minor from Texas for the sole purpose of establishing jurisdiction in California.
On the DVRO request, the family court found that Dogalakova had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Davchev had abused her and Minor under section 6203. It found Dogalakova's testimony and declarations credible, and supported by other evidence, including testimony from a police officer who responded to one of the domestic violence incidents. It found Davchev's testimony was not credible.
The DVPA defines "abuse" to include acts that "intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury" or "place a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another." (§ 6203, subd. (a)(1), (3).)
The court also found Davchev intentionally caused Dogalakova bodily injury by "forcefully grabbing and choking and/or squeezing the back of Mother's neck during an argument while she was holding their baby and trying to get away from him," and that Davchev was trying to take Minor away from Dogalakova against her will during this altercation. It found Davchev "attacked and battered" Dogalakova during this incident, and put Dogalakova in "reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury." It further found Davchev had verbally threatened Dogalakova when he said he was going to take Minor away from her to Bulgaria, and possessed several guns and would walk around his house with them, which caused Dogalakova to be afraid. The family court also found Davchev had taken Dogalakova's car keys in an attempt to keep her and Minor from leaving his home.
Having ruled on the motion to quash and DVRO, the court stated that it "now terminates" its emergency jurisdiction and "vacates the orders previously issued on July 13th, 15th and 22nd of 2021 as it related to custody and visitation only."
The ROAH protects Dogalakova, as well as Minor as an additional protected person; it expires after five years, on July 23, 2026, pursuant to section 6345, subdivision (a). It contains personal conduct orders not to harass or take any action to obtain the addresses of the protected persons. It allows for brief and peaceful contact with Dogalakova and peaceful contact with Minor as required for court-ordered visitation. The ROAH contains a stay away order as to Dogalakova only, and not Minor.
Davchev requested a statement of decision, and the family court issued one on September 7, 2021. Davchev filed two writ petitions: one challenging the denial of his motion to quash and the other challenging entry of the statement of decision. We denied both of them. This appeal followed. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(6).)
DISCUSSION
Davchev asks us to reverse the family court and vacate the ROAH. He contends the California court could not have properly exercised emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to issue the ROAH because the Texas court had already exercised its jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination. Davchev's argument assumes that, in issuing the ROAH, the California court necessarily exercised its jurisdiction exclusively under the UCCJEA. His assumption is incorrect.
At the very outset of the California case, the family court issued a TRO with temporary emergency custody and visitation orders. Dogalakova was given temporary sole legal and physical custody of Minor, and Davchev was not given visitation until the hearing date. At this point, no one appears to dispute that the California court had temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make those orders. (§ 3424, subd. (a).)
The judges in California and Texas subsequently conferred under the UCCJEA, and agreed that the Texas court would ultimately be the decision-maker concerning more permanent custody and visitation orders under the UCCJEA. The California court modified the TRO to provide Davchev with visitation. No one appears to dispute the California court's authority to make that modification to the TRO. (§ 3424, subd. (a).) All indications are that the custody and visitation component of the family court's TRO was a "short-term and limited" exercise of emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1175.)
The continuance of the California court hearing from May to July created major confusion for both courts and the parties. In June 2021, it appears that the Texas court was anxious to move forward despite the litigants' desire to take discovery for use in the California DVRO case. It determined the parties and Minor shared a significant connection to Texas for purposes of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make an initial custody determination. As reflected in its July 16, 2021 temporary orders, it made an initial custody determination by appointing Dogalakova and Davchev as joint managing conservators of Minor. The delay in issuing written orders, however, did not stop the parties from following the Texas court's directive; pursuant to the orders made in Texas at the end of its June hearing, Minor was apparently in Texas with Davchev by the time the California DVRO hearing finally commenced.
Davchev contends that the Texas court order divested California of temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to section 3424, subdivision (a). Notwithstanding the written order issued by the Texas court on July 16, after the second day of the California court's four-day restraining order hearing (July 13, 15, 22, and 23), the California court maintained its standard operating procedure as it moved forward. The California court had expressed concern that the Texas court had moved forward, at one point asking, "[H]ow did this happen?" The California court indicated it would confer further with the Texas court, though that did not appear to have happened. Instead, before the final day of the DVRO hearing, the family court simply re-issued the existing TRO, with its temporary custody and visitation provisions. In doing so, it appears the family court believed it was simply exercising its ongoing emergency jurisdiction under section 3424. When the California court subsequently issued the ROAH, it explicitly vacated its prior child custody and visitation orders, and terminated its emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
We find that the UCCJEA does not provide a legal basis for Davchev to vacate the ROAH (or its related findings and orders) issued on August 10, 2021. Simply put, the ROAH does not make any child custody determination. It includes a stay away order as to Dogalakova only, not Minor. While the ROAH includes a personal conduct order barring Davchev from abusing or harassing Minor, and requiring that he maintain "peaceful contact" with Minor, this is not a custody determination.
The personal conduct orders in the ROAH use the standard language of Judicial Council Forms, form DV-130. It provides that the "person in 2 [Davchev] must not do the following things to the protected people in 1 [Dogalakova] and 3 [Minor]: Harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, destroy personal property, disturb the peace, keep under surveillance, impersonate (on the Internet, electronically or otherwise), or block movements. . . . Take any action, directly or through others, to obtain the addresses or locations of any protected persons." It includes an exception that provides for "[b]rief and peaceful contact with the person in 1 [Davchev], and peaceful contact with children in 3 [Minor], as required for court-ordered visitation of children, is allowed unless a criminal protective order says otherwise."
Davchev provides no authority for his position that the inclusion of Minor as an additional protected party with a personal conduct order somehow transforms the ROAH into a child custody determination under the UCCJEA. (§ 3402, subd. (c).) We have found none. "The UCCJEA ensures that only one state has jurisdiction to make 'child custody determinations.' " (In re Marriage of Fernandez-Abin & Sanchez (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1038 (Fernandez-Abin).) As described above, section 3424 of the UCCJEA provides the framework under which a California court has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination. Section 3423 then sets forth the circumstances under which a California court may modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state.
The ROAH did not include any initial or modified child custody determinations. The ROAH did not make any orders providing for the legal or physical custody of Minor, or any visitation with Minor for either parent.
The March 18, 2021 TRO provides a helpful point of comparison. That TRO contained a "Child Custody and Visitation" section with the box "Granted as follows" checked, and attached form "DV-140 Child Custody and Visitation Order." The court attached a Judicial Council form DV-140, which included orders giving temporary legal and physical custody of Minor to Dogalakova, and no visitation to Davchev pending the hearing. Unlike the TRO, the ROAH did not check any box in the "Child Custody and Visitation" section, nor did it attach a form DV-140 or its equivalent. Instead, the ROAH did exactly the opposite and expressly vacated the court's prior custody and visitation orders. It held, "Having ruled on the issues brough before this court under its emergency jurisdiction, the court now terminates its jurisdiction in this case, and vacates the orders previously issued on July 13th, 15th and 22nd of 2021 as it relates to custody and visitation only."
We agree that the UCCJEA can apply to protective orders made in domestic violence proceedings when they include "child custody determinations" (Fernandez-Abin, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1019-1020), and a hearing concerning whether to issue a domestic violence restraining order can be a "child custody proceeding" under the UCCJEA. (See § 3402, subds. (c)-(d).) But Fernandez-Abin illustrates the difference between those orders and the ROAH granted here. In that case, the trial court granted a DVRO that protected both the mother and children, and also made various findings regarding custody and visitation without regard to the jurisdiction of a family court in Mexico where child custody determinations had already been made. (Id. at p. 1019.) Those findings included the grant of primary legal and physical custody to the mother, and the refusal to order visitation with the father until psychological evaluations of the children were completed. (Id. at p. 1035.) Fernandez-Abin reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to decide whether it had emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to issue such an order and if so, to make appropriate findings based on the parameters of the UCCJEA. (Fernandez-Abin, at p. 1046.) Here, unlike Fernandez-Abin, the ROAH did not include any custody or visitation orders.
Nor are we persuaded by Davchev's reliance on the definition of "child custody proceeding" in section 3402, subdivision (d). A week after Dogalakova filed her DVRO request, she filed a separate parentage action seeking custody and visitation orders. Once the Texas court determined it had jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination, the California court dismissed Dogalakova's parentage action.
Davchev's representations to the Texas court further dispel any understanding that the ROAH proceeding was a "child custody proceeding" under the UCCJEA. His counsel stated, "All that's left in California is a restraining order between the parties, mom versus dad. It has nothing to do with the child." In any event, regardless of how the proceeding may be characterized, the ROAH did not make any custody determination under the UCCJEA.
Finally, we reject Davchev's argument that the ROAH was a custody determination that interfered with Texas's jurisdiction because it observed, "The Texas court now has the benefit of this Court's factual findings and Orders to base new custody orders that are in the best interest of the child and protect child and mother in this domestic violence case." This observation was dicta, unnecessary to the resolution of the ROAH, that may or may not be useful to the Texas court going forward. (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1158.) In sum, we see no basis to support Davchev's claim of jurisdictional error.
In his reply brief, Davchev concedes that he does not challenge the California court's personal jurisdiction. Further, the record here "is devoid of any evidence that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over [Davchev] would be unreasonable. He did not have any apparent difficulty in engaging the services of counsel to appear in opposition to the request for a restraining order [citation], nor would it seem to be an injustice to grant a restraining order against a party eschewing any further contact with this state." (Hogue, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 839.)
Nor does Davchev contend that the California court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the DVPA to resolve Dogalakova's claim. The family court's authority to issue such a restraining order is dispositive here. "[T]he rights provided by the DVPA to persons claiming to be abused are available independently." (Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 335.) "[A]n application for an order under the DVPA to restrain a person for the purpose of preventing the recurrence of domestic violence is . . . itself essentially a' "cause of action"' and "may properly be considered an independent 'lawsuit' [citation]." (Ibid.) The issuance of a ROAH under the DVPA requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The duration of the restraining order cannot exceed five years from the date of judgment unless extended by the court after notice and a hearing. (Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 77, fn. 14; §§ 6361, subd. (b); 6345, subd. (a).)
The fact that the conduct forming the primary basis for Dogalakova's case against Davchev took place in Texas rather than in California does not lead to a different result. "The very existence of the [DVPA] bespeaks California's concern with an exceptional type of conduct that it subjects to special regulation." (Hogue, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 839.) Wrongful acts under the DVPA trigger a "species of specific jurisdiction in which a defendant acting elsewhere causes effects in California of a nature that are' "exceptional"' and subject to' "special regulation"' in this state." (Hogue, at pp. 838-839 [citing cases].)
At most, Davchev has identified harmless error to the extent the California court re-issued its temporary custody and visitation orders when it re-issued the TRO before the final day of the DVRO hearing. To the extent Minor had apparently been returned to Davchev in Texas a few days earlier pursuant to the Texas court's oral orders, the California court appears to have lost emergency jurisdiction. (See § 3424, subd. (a).) Of course, from the California court's perspective, the Texas court was usurping the California court's ongoing temporary emergency jurisdiction right in the middle of its four-day hearing. Given that the California court vacated its earlier child custody and visitation orders in its ROAH (with its attached orders), any error was harmless.
The California court granted a five-year DVRO upon finding that Dogalakova had proved her claim of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. While Davchev appears to take issue with the five-year duration of the ROAH, this challenge is again based on the incorrect assumption that the family court was limited to the scope of temporary emergency jurisdiction to issue temporary orders under section 3424 of the UCCJEA. Davchev does not challenge the court's authority to issue a five-year protective order under the DVPA (§ 6345, subd. (a)) and, based on the existing record, substantial evidence supported its issuance.
Finally, Davchev appears to argue that the various inferences typically drawn from the decision to issue an ROAH ought not to apply to him. He appears particularly concerned with the potential impact of section 3044, which triggers a "rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interests of the child," and the presumption "may only be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence." (§ 3044, subd. (a).) From Davchev's perspective, the California court's finding that he perpetrated domestic violence against Dogalakova and Minor contradicts the Texas court's comments indicating skepticism in Dogalakova's case.
We are unpersuaded. The family court conducted what appears on this record to have been a full and fair hearing on the merits of the restraining order. The judge heard from the parties and from other sworn witnesses, and considered evidence over the course of a four-day hearing. Davchev does not challenge the result of the hearing for lack of substantial evidence, relying instead on his misplaced jurisdictional argument under the UCCJEA. In sum, we conclude that the California court did not commit jurisdictional error in issuing the ROAH.
We also deny Davchev's request for costs on appeal and costs and expenses as the prevailing party pursuant to section 3452.
DISPOSITION
The August 10, 2021 order is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
We concur: Stewart, P.J., Miller, J.
[*] Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.