Opinion
13-P-1284
11-19-2014
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 7937 v. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff appeals from a Superior Court judgment affirming the decision of the Sex Offender Registry Board (board) classifying him as a level three sex offender. He contends that the board erred in denying his request for expert witness fees. We affirm.
The plaintiff is a convicted sex offender, having committed multiple sexual offenses from 1997 until his incarceration in 1999. Thereafter, in February, 2005, he was adjudicated a sexually dangerous person. In June, 2009, the board notified the plaintiff that it recommended his classification as a level three sex offender. Prior to his classification hearing, the plaintiff filed a motion for expert funds. His motion was denied and the hearing examiner ordered him to register as a level three sex offender. A judge of the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the board.
"When a sex offender seeks to obtain expert witness funds, the burden will be on him 'to identify and articulate the reason or reasons, connected to a condition or circumstance special to him, that he needs to retain a particular type of expert.'" Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 27914 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 610, 617 (2012), quoting from Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 89230 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 452 Mass. 764, 775 (2008) (Doe No. 89230). The plaintiff argues that expert funds should have been granted to him as a matter of constitutional law and that the failure to do so violated his right to due process and equal protection and placed him at a disadvantage in preparing his case. He does not argue that the hearing examiner abused her discretion.
This case is controlled in all material respects by Doe No. 89230. As in that case, the plaintiff's constitutional arguments here need not be reached. See id. at 770. Instead, the issue before us is whether the hearing examiner abused her discretion when she concluded that the plaintiff had not met his burden of articulating "the reason or reasons, connected to a condition or circumstance special to him, that he needs to retain a particular type of expert." Id. at 775. The hearing examiner found that the plaintiff did not describe any condition or circumstance special to him as required by Doe No. 89230. Rather, the plaintiff submitted a general motion for funds, without more. The hearing examiner did not abuse her discretion in denying the plaintiff's request for expert funds.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Cohen, Wolohojian & Blake, JJ.), Clerk Entered: November 19, 2014.