Much as the state regulates driving through the creation of civil/regulatory speeding laws, see Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146, 148-49 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that speeding laws were civil/regulatory), it regulates building through the creation of civil/regulatory fire codes. See also Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1111, 126 S.Ct. 1909, 164 L.Ed.2d 663 (2006) and 547 U.S. 1111, 126 S.Ct. 1911, 164 L.Ed.2d 663 (2006) (citing Colville for this reasoning and noting that relying on tribal enforcement does not undermine state policy). Although Cabazon recognized that there might exist "exceptional circumstances" justifying a state's "`jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal members'" even when Congress has not expressly consented, 480 U.S. at 214-15, 107 S.Ct. 1083 (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331-32, 103 S.Ct. 2378, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983)), the fire codes do not constitute such an "exceptional circumstance."

The Rooker--Feldman doctrine recognizes that federal courts generally lack subject matter jurisdiction to review state court judgments. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1111, 126 S.Ct. 1909, 164 L.Ed.2d 663 (2006); Fontana Empire Center, LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002). On the other hand, the federal court has jurisdiction over general constitutional challenges that do not require review of a final state court decision in a particular case.