Opinion
A143158
09-25-2018
MINOR DOE 1, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTINE HUBBS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG12619897)
Defendant Christine Hubbs appeals a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Minor Doe 1 on his complaint for damages arising out of defendant's sexual relationship with him when he was 14 years old and she was over 40, for which defendant had already been convicted of multiple felonies and sentenced to prison. Between the filing of the complaint in March 2012 and the discharge of defendant's original attorney in May 2013 because of defendant's inability to pay her attorney fees, the attorney conducted only minimal discovery and failed to designate an expert witness. When defendant obtained new counsel, the court found good cause to continue the trial but refused to extend the discovery deadline to permit the new attorney to depose plaintiff or to designate a defense expert. As a result, defendant went to trial without an expert to counter the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness, a psychiatrist, in a case in which the only contested issue was plaintiff's emotional distress. On appeal defendant contends, among other things, that the court erred in denying her request to reopen discovery for this purpose. We agree that in light of the absence of significant prejudice to plaintiff and the undeniable unfairness that resulted from effectively forcing defendant to trial with her hands tied, the denial of defendant's request to reopen discovery and permit the late designation of an expert when the trial was continued was an abuse of discretion. For this reason, we must reverse the judgment awarding plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages and attorney fees.
Defendant's husband, Timothy Hubbs, was also named as a defendant in this action based on his alleged failure to prevent his wife's conduct. At trial, the court granted his motion for a nonsuit. Timothy Hubbs is not a party to this appeal.
In the event of a retrial, we address two additional arguments raised by defendant. First, we reject defendant's contention that plaintiff's consent was a defense to the causes of action based on defendant's violation of Penal Code sections 288a and 261.5. We also reject defendant's argument that she cannot be held liable for emotional distress caused by the disclosure by others of plaintiff's identity as the victim of her offenses. Several additional contested issues are rendered moot by reversal of the judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
On March 5, 2012, plaintiff filed his complaint against defendant seeking damages for emotional distress suffered as a result of her multiple violations of Penal Code sections 288.4, subdivision (b) [contact of minor with intent to commit sexual offense], 288a, subdivision (b)(2) [oral copulation by a person over 21 years of age with a person who is under 16 years of age], 288, subdivision (c)(1) [lewd or lascivious act with a child of 14 or 15 years old] and 261.5, subdivision (d) [unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of 16]. On September 18, 2012, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding negligence claims against Timothy Hubbs, which as noted above, were dismissed at trial.
At a case management conference on December 10, 2012, the court set the matter for trial on August 5, 2013. On May 14, 2013, the court granted a motion by defendant's attorney to be relieved as counsel. The attorney's declaration indicated that defendant lacked sufficient funds to pay for representation and owed him a significant sum for services already rendered.
On June 28, 2013, defendant, appearing in propria persona, filed a motion to continue the trial and the discovery cutoff. Her declaration explains that her original counsel withdrew after her homeowners' insurance carrier refused to provide her or her husband a defense. Since that time she had not been able to retain new counsel due to financial hardship. She requested a six-month trial continuance, noting that she had contacted an attorney who had expressed interest in representing her and that even if she could retain counsel, it would be impossible to conduct the needed discovery before the discovery cut-off date of July 7, 2013. On July 9, the motion was denied without prejudice to refiling if an attorney was retained and substituted as counsel for defendants.
On July 16, defendant retained counsel and on July 22 the new attorney filed a motion to continue the trial and reopen discovery. The memorandum in support of the motion states that previous counsel conducted only a small amount of written discovery. To adequately prepare for trial, counsel stated he would need to depose plaintiff and plaintiff's expert, obtain plaintiff's medical and school records, and obtain a defense expert. The memorandum indicated that defendant had noticed plaintiff's deposition for July 30, but had been informed by plaintiff's counsel that plaintiff objected to the deposition. Given counsel's schedule and the "extensive discovery" that needed to be completed, defendant requested that the trial be set for January or February 2014. Defendant argued that plaintiff would not be prejudiced by the continuance and indicated that the "trial could be scheduled so as not to conflict with plaintiff's [college] classes and he would not have to attend the entire trial."
Plaintiff opposed the motion for a continuance. He argued that the prior attorney's lack of due diligence in timely scheduling discovery and identifying an expert compelled denial of the continuance and reopening of discovery. He argued that he would be prejudiced if defendant's motion were granted because the trial date had been chosen so that the matter could be resolved before he went to college, and that he "strongly desires to put this painful episode behind him." He elaborated, "Defendants intimate that accommodating plaintiff's class schedule is the primary consideration for whether plaintiff will be prejudiced by continuing the trial date 6 months, without seeming to grasp plaintiff's strong interest in concluding this painful episode prior to leaving home and starting college. If a continuance is granted, plaintiff will have this emotionally challenging matter hanging over his head during his first semester." Plaintiff noted that he was the only party to request and post fees for a jury trial and expressed his willingness to waive a jury and proceed with a bench trial. He explained, "plaintiff expects that the trial can easily be completed in advance of defense counsel's trial schedule. . . . Considering the clear liability issues in this case, and the streamlined process of a bench trial, the case can easily be adjudicated in 5 days or fewer."
On July 25, at an unreported hearing, the court granted defendant's motion to continue the trial and rescheduled it for December 16, 2013, but substantially denied the motion in other respects. The order reads, "The case will proceed as a court trial as both sides have waived the right to a jury trial. [¶] Discovery will remain closed except that expert discovery is reopened to allow the deposition to be taken of plaintiff's expert witness. That expert discovery is reclosed in thirty days."
Defendant filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the trial court's order, which this court denied. In retrospect we have second thoughts over this denial, but we find solace in the observation that "[w]isdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late." (Wolf v. Colorado (1949) 338 U.S. 25, 47 (dis. opn. of Rutledge, J.).)
A two-day bench trial was conducted in December 2013. Defendant admitted that she knowingly had sex with plaintiff 10 to 15 times while he was 14 years old and that she had been convicted of various crimes arising out of their sexual relationship. She claimed that the relationship was consensual and that she did not believe she had caused plaintiff any harm because "he knew what he was doing. He had sexual relations before. I told him it wasn't right. He insisted. It was all mutual."
Plaintiff testified that his reaction to having had sex with defendant was "disbelief." At the time of trial he was still "trying to wrap [his] head around everything." He testified that he felt he was in control at the time of the affair, but now feels that he was completely out of control and was being used. His grades dropped significantly during the relationship. He was embarrassed when people learned of the relationship. It felt like everyone in town knew who he was and people were talking about him at school and judging him. He testified that he still had flashbacks about twice a month, and that the affair affected his relationship with his girlfriend in that he doesn't trust her.
Plaintiff's expert, a psychiatrist whose testimony was received through the introduction of her deposition, opined that plaintiff had suffered "grievous harm from the extensive sexual relationship with [defendant], a mother of one of his friends who was 27 years older than he was." He became depressed, his grades fell, and he felt terrible throughout the entire relationship. She described how, according to his parents, plaintiff's personality changed and he became depressed when the information came out. She opined that his flashbacks indicate that he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the relationship. She added, "Sadly in our country there's the misconstruct that it's advantageous for a young boy of 14 or 15 to have sex with an older woman. Just to talk with him you get an idea of the impact, the horrible impact of this. He describes flashbacks of her straddling him doing sexual things to him, holding him down and forcing him to engage in a whole range of activities that he really was not capable of doing at that age."
Following the short trial, the court filed a tentative decision awarding plaintiff $400,000 in compensatory damages. This amount includes damages for future medical expenses based on therapy once or twice a week, for three years at a cost of $250 per session, and general damages for pain and suffering. The court found further that plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages and, after the presentation of additional evidence, awarded punitive damages of $20,000. The court subsequently awarded plaintiff $53,550 in attorney fees.
Defendant timely filed notices of appeal from the judgment and the attorney fee order.
Discussion
1. The court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to reopen discovery.
Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.050, subdivision (b) provides that, in ruling on a motion to extend discovery, "the court shall take into consideration any matter relevant to the leave requested, including, but not limited to, the following: [¶] (1) The necessity and the reasons for the discovery. [¶] (2) The diligence or lack of diligence of the party seeking the discovery or the hearing of a discovery motion, and the reasons that the discovery was not completed or that the discovery motion was not heard earlier. [¶] (3) Any likelihood that permitting the discovery or hearing the discovery motion will prevent the case from going to trial on the date set, or otherwise interfere with the trial calendar, or result in prejudice to any other party. [¶] (4) The length of time that has elapsed between any date previously set, and the date presently set, for the trial of the action." A motion to extend discovery lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and may be overturned only if it is shown that discretion has been abused. (Hernandez v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246.)
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to extend discovery while granting the motion to continue the trial. She argues that the same factors the trial court found justified a continuance applied with equal force to the reopening of discovery, at least for the limited purpose of designating an expert, if not also of deposing plaintiff and obtaining his school and medical records. (Hernandez v. Superior Court, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1247-1248.)
Defendant also contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit her to request a jury trial when plaintiff withdrew his demand for a jury. It is not clear from the record that defendant moved to be relieved of the default arising from the failure to have timely made such a demand and posted jury fees. In all events, because remand is required, the parties will have the opportunity to request a jury for a retrial.
In Hernandez, the plaintiff's lawyer died of pancreatic cancer several months before the trial was to begin and a month after his supplemental expert witness list was due. The plaintiff sought to continue the trial date and extend discovery, in order to retain new counsel and designate an expert on liability issues. The defendant opposed the motion, contending that he would be "at a disadvantage" due to increased costs if plaintiff were permitted to designate additional experts. (Hernandez v. Superior Court, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1245.) The trial court granted a 30-day continuance but did not extend discovery to allow the petitioner to designate additional experts. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court had abused its discretion in failing to take into account the impact of the lawyer's terminal illness and in relying on the defendant's "conclusional claim," unsupported by evidence, that an extension of the discovery cutoff date and a trial continuance would prejudice him. The court concluded that when a trial court finds good cause for granting a continuance of a trial date, "[t]he same circumstances should generally constitute good cause to reopen discovery after a trial date has been continued." (Id. at pp. 1247-1248, italics added.)
Plaintiff contends the court's ruling here is supported by defendant's lack of diligence, but the absence of a reporter's transcript makes it impossible to determine what weight, if any, the trial court placed on this factor. In Hernandez the court excused any lack of diligence by the prior attorney's terminal illness. While there was no such extreme excuse in the present case, the record reflects that the efforts of defendants' original attorney were directed to the unsuccessful attempt to obtain insurance coverage for the defense of Christine's husband, who was sued on a negligence theory. The carrier felt unable to determine coverage without interviewing both defendants and found it impractical to interview Catherine until she was released from prison on March 7, 2013. In all events, the failure to have pursued discovery more diligently at the outset can hardly be attributed personally to defendant, who was imprisoned and without funds. As soon as she procured new counsel, the attorney immediately noticed plaintiff's deposition and moved for a trial continuance and extension of the discovery cutoff. Even assuming defendant may be charged with some lack of diligence, that is but one factor to be considered. "[D]ecisions about whether to grant a continuance or extend discovery 'must be made in an atmosphere of substantial justice. When the two policies collide head-on, the strong public policy favoring disposition on the merits outweighs the competing policy favoring judicial efficiency.' [Citation.] What is required is balance." (Hernandez v. Superior Court, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246; accord, Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1396; Bahl v. Bank of America (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 389, 398; Estate of Meeker (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1105-1106.)
Defendant asserts that the prejudice of forcing her to trial without the benefit of an expert to controvert the testimony of plaintiff's expert, much less without the opportunity to depose plaintiff or to obtain the medical and school records bearing on his emotional injury claim, resulted in a one-sided and unfair trial. In contrast, she argues, there would have been no significant prejudice to plaintiff had her counsel been permitted to utilize the time provided by the continuance to designate an expert witness and pursue the limited discovery she requested. Plaintiff argues that he was about to enter college in Nevada and that "permitting the discovery requested by Christine would have prejudiced [him] by causing the trial to further intrude into his college education instead of providing closure to a painful episode in his life, and this intrusion would have been detrimental to [him]."
There is no dispute that defendant's new attorney acted diligently by immediately moving to reopen discovery. While the court was understandably concerned about plaintiff's welfare, the court appropriately determined that his interest in promptly resolving his claim for damages was insufficient to outweigh defendant's need for a continuance. Having granted the continuance, plaintiff's anxiety would not have been exacerbated by permitting the defense to make use of the additional time to prepare a meaningful defense. Defendant attempted to schedule plaintiff's deposition for a date before he was scheduled to leave for college. Obtaining plaintiff's school and medical records would not have required his personal involvement. And, most importantly, the designation of a defense expert, and the expert's likely deposition by plaintiff's counsel, would not necessarily have impacted plaintiff. The court might have denied the request for a mental examination of plaintiff under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.310 or imposed appropriate conditions on such an examination.
Contrary to plaintiff's argument, defendant undoubtedly was severely prejudiced by the lack of adequate discovery and the inability to present a defense expert. There was no dispute that defendant had unlawfully engaged in sexual conduct with plaintiff; the only issue at trial was how this relationship had affected plaintiff's state of mind and mental health. As the result of defendant's inability to reopen discovery, the trial consisted of a one-sided presentation on this critical issue. Defendant was unable to offer expert testimony to rebut the opinion of plaintiff's psychiatric expert that plaintiff suffered grievous emotional harm as a result of the relationship. Nor had she been able to depose plaintiff regarding the depths of his emotional distress or to gain access to documents that would substantiate or dispel aspects of plaintiff's testimony. Although the trial court has broad discretion in weighing the competing considerations bearing on a motion to reopen discovery, we must conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. As in Hernandez, "The balance [was] missing here." (Hernandez v. Superior Court, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247.)
2. Consent is not a defense to civil liability premised on defendant's violation of Penal Code sections 261 .5 and 288a .
A "[v]iolation of a criminal statute embodying a public policy is generally actionable even though no specific civil remedy is provided in the criminal statute." (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1224.) "Any injured member of the public for whose benefit the statute is enacted may bring an action." (Ibid.) In Angie M., the court held that a victim of a violation of Penal Code sections 261.5 or 288a has a private right of action for damages against the perpetrator. (Id. at p. 1225.) The court reasoned that these Penal Code sections "evidenced a long-standing and consistent history of specifically protecting minors from sexual exploitation and predation" and that "[t]here can be no doubt as to the strong public policy that underlies the Legislature's enactment of the multiple statutes directed at protecting minors from sexual exploitation." (Ibid.) Contrary to defendant's argument, the right of action exists irrespective of the gender of the two persons.
Civil Code section 3515 sets forth the general rule that "He who consents to an act is not wronged by it." "Consent ordinarily bars recovery for intentional interferences with person or property. It is not, strictly speaking, a privilege, or even a defense, but goes to negative the existence of any tort in the first instance." (Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 18, p. 112, fns. omitted.) However, consent is not a defense to an illegal act which is prohibited for the protection of a particular class. (Hudson v. Craft (1949) 33 Cal.2d 654, 657.) In Hudson, the Supreme Court held that consent is not a defense to a civil action arising out of alleged violations of the Penal Code and Business and Professions Code relating to boxing exhibitions. (Id. at pp. 656, 660.) The court applied section 61 of the Restatement of Torts, which provides: " 'Where it is a crime to inflict a particular invasion of interest of personality upon a particular class of persons, irrespective of their assent, and the policy of the law is primarily to protect the interests of such a class of persons from their inability to appreciate the consequences of such an invasion, and it is not solely to protect the interests of the public, the assent of such a person to such an invasion is not a consent thereto.' " (Id. at p. 657.) The court reasoned that because "one of the main purposes of the statutes is to protect a class (combatants) of which plaintiff is a member," the defenses of consent and assumption to risk are inapplicable. (Id. at p. 660.) Penal Code sections 261.5 and 288a criminalize various acts of sexual conduct with minors irrespective of consent. These provisions were enacted to protect minors from sexual predation and exploitation. Therefore, consent is not a defense to civil actions brought pursuant to these statutes. (Angie M. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1225 [distinguishing cause of action for battery from cause of action based on statutory violations; "[i]ntent to cause offensive or harmful contact, offensive contact and lack of consent are not elements of the statutory violations alleged"]; see also Civ. Code, § 1708.5.5 ["Notwithstanding Section 3515, consent shall not be a defense in any civil action under [Civil Code] Section 1708.5 [sexual battery] if the person who commits the sexual battery is an adult who is in a position of authority over the minor."].)
Defendant's reliance on Donaldson v. Department of Real Estate (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 948, 950 and County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathanial J. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 842 is misplaced.
In Donaldson, the issue was whether the Department of Real Estate had the authority to revoke a real estate license under a regulation that authorized revocation if a licensee is convicted of a sex crime involving a "non-consenting participant." In that case, the plaintiff had been convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under Penal Code section 261.5 and the department found that the victim was non-consenting solely because she was "under the age of legal consent." (Donaldson v. Department of Real Estate, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 956-957.) In the plaintiff's action to set aside the revocation of his license, the court held that the determination of whether the minor victim was a "non-consenting participant" could not be based solely on the presumption that her age rendered her categorically incapable of giving "legal consent" to the conduct. The court reasoned that there was no statutory basis for the presumption that minors are incapable of giving consent. (Id. at pp. 961-962; see also People v. Tobias (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327, 333-334 [The Legislature has "abrogate[ed] the rule that a girl under 18 is in all cases incapable of giving such legal consent."].) As discussed above, unlike the real estate licensing rule that required a "non-consenting participant," a civil action based on violation of Penal Code sections does not require the plaintiff to have been non-consenting.
County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathanial J., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 842 is similarly inapposite. In that case, the father was 15 and the mother 34 when their consensual sexual relations resulted in the birth of a child. The mother was convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor and the father then claimed that he was not required to pay child support because "public policy protects him from the effects of sexual exploitation by an adult." (Id. at p. 844.) The court rejected this claim. The court explained that California law provides that every child has a right to support from both parents and that the law should not except father from this responsibility because he is not an innocent victim of mother's criminal acts. (Id. at p. 845.) The court explained, " '[T]here is an important distinction between a party who is injured through no fault of his or her own and an injured party who willingly participated in the offense about which a complaint is made.' [Citation.] One who is injured as a result of criminal conduct in which he willingly participated is not a typical crime victim. [Citation.] It does not necessarily follow that a minor over the age of 14 who voluntarily engages in sexual intercourse is a victim of sexual abuse." (Ibid.) There are, quite obviously, very different considerations in determining whether a child should be entitled to support from a father who was underage at the time of insemination and whether a minor victim of sexual abuse should be entitled to recover damages from the perpetrator of the offense.
Defendant's reliance on Doe v. Starbucks, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009) 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 118878, is entirely misplaced. In that case, the federal district court denied a defendant's motion for summary judgment of plaintiff's claim for sexual battery on the ground that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the 16-year-old plaintiff had consented to the sexual relationship with the 24-year-old defendant. (Id. at pp. *43-*44.) In so ruling, the court acknowledged, consistent with Angie M. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1225, that "persons under 18 may, in some cases, have capacity to consent to sex with persons over 18." (Id. at p. 20.) Nothing in the federal decision challenges or even addresses the relevant question of whether consent is a defense to a civil claim based on violations of sections 261.5 and 288a. --------
Accordingly, under Angie M. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, plaintiff may recover under a cause of action based on defendant's statutory violations and his consent is not a defense thereto.
3. Plaintiff is entitled to seek damages based on the embarrassment he felt when the crime was disclosed.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of damages allegedly caused by the disclosure of plaintiff's identity. She argued that plaintiff's amended complaint did not allege a "cause of action for damages caused by the alleged publicizing of plaintiff's identity as one of the minors who had been sexually involved with Christine" and she is not responsible for the wrongful acts of the third parties who disclosed plaintiff's identity. The court denied the motion, explaining that such damages are recoverable if it was foreseeable that plaintiff would suffer injury if their relationship was exposed.
In its statement of decision, the court found that defendant was "responsible for damages related to embarrassment that plaintiff . . . suffered when parties other than she exposed the relationship to the public" because the plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by defendant's knowing participation in a criminal relationship with plaintiff and because defendant knew at the time that her conduct was despicable and that it would subject plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship. The court found further that exposure by others was reasonably foreseeable so that their conduct did not sever defendant's proximate causation of plaintiff's injuries.
On appeal, defendant reasserts her argument that embarrassment and damage to reputation caused by the publicizing of plaintiff's identity is not an element of damages of the torts alleged. She suggests that while such damages might be recoverable under a claim that "resembles" a claim for invasion of privacy,"[t]here is no published case authority in California where the court approved an action for damages for embarrassment and publicity due to disclosure of a private fact in which the defendant sued was not the individual who disclosed the private fact." We disagree that plaintiff was required to allege a separate privacy-based tort. As the court explained, such damages were recoverable if plaintiff established that the injuries he suffered as a result of publicity surrounding the crime was proximately caused by defendant's conduct.
If a cause of action is otherwise established, recovery is " 'sanctioned for emotional distress which could be said naturally to ensue from an act which invaded an interest protected by an established tort.' " (Gonzales v. Personal Storage, Inc. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 464, 472.) A cause of an injury is something that is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. (South Coast Framing, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 291, 298.) To be actionable, however, a cause need not be the sole factor contributing to the damages sustained. (Espinosa v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1318 [Where a defendant's conduct is "a concurring cause of an injury, the law regards it as a legal cause of the injury, regardless of the extent to which it contributes to the injury."].) A third party's intervening act or conduct that is the immediate cause of an injury may relieve a defendant of liability if, among other things, the third person's conduct, or the risk of harm, was not reasonably foreseeable. (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1016-1017 [" '[F]or an intervening act properly to be considered a superseding cause, the act must have produced 'harm of a kind and degree so far beyond the risk the original tortfeasor should have foreseen that the law deems it unfair to hold him responsible." ' "].)
The parties dispute whether a third party's intervening act or conduct supersedes defendant's liability for an intentional tort. (Compare United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. American Employer's Ins. Co. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 277, 285 [" 'independent intervening cause has no place in the law of intentional torts, so long as there is a factual chain of causation' "], disapproved on other grounds in J. C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M. K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1019, fn. 8 with Brewer v. Teano (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1036 [While "the doctrine of superseding cause is less likely to cut off the chain of events put in motion" by one who commits an intentional tort, "even the 'but for' consequences of an intentional tort are not without limitation."].) We need not resolve this dispute because the court reasonably found that plaintiff's embarrassment was caused by defendant's conduct and was entirely foreseeable. That others may also be responsible for plaintiff's embarrassment does not absolve defendant for responsibility for her conduct.
Disposition
The judgement and postjudgment order awarding attorney fees are reversed. The parties shall bear their respective costs on appeal.
Pollak, J. We concur: Siggins, P.J.
Jenkins, J.