Opinion
2:22-cv-01841 WBS CKD
11-17-2022
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, Plaintiffs, v. ANTONY J. BLINKEN, in his official capacity as U.S. Secretary of State; JULIE M. STUFFT, in her official capacity as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary and Managing Director for Visa Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs; JONATHAN WEBSTER, in his official capacity as Consul General the U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi; and UR MENDOZA JADDOU, in her official capacity as Director USCIS, Defendants.
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO PROCEED UNDER PSEUDONYM AND REQUEST TO SEAL
WILLIAM B. SHUBB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This mandamus action seeks to compel defendants to issue a decision on plaintiff Jane Doe's derivative asylum application. Plaintiffs now move unopposed to proceed under pseudonyms and request to seal a document inadvertently filed with an unredacted name. (Docket Nos. 2, 7.)
Rule 10 (a) provides that “the complaint must name all the parties.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a). “The normal presumption in litigation is that parties must use their real names.” Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010). However, a party may proceed under pseudonym “in special circumstances when the party's need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public's interest in knowing the party's identity,” including when necessary to “‘protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment.'” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1012 (9th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiffs argue that it is necessary to proceed under pseudonyms because Jane Doe and their families face a risk of religious persecution In Iran if their real names are used. (Def.'s Mem. (Docket No. 2-1) at 2.) Plaintiff John Doe is a lawful permanent resident of the United States. (Decl. of John Doe (“Doe Decl.”) (Docket No. 2-2) ¶ 1.) He is a native of Iran who converted to Christianity and was granted asylum in 2016 due to a risk of religious persecution if he returned to Iran. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 7, 9-10.) However, plaintiff Jane Doe, John Doe's wife, currently resides in Iran because her derivative asylum application is pending. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs “are very secretive” about John Doe's religious conversion and asylum, “even to [their] family members because of the consequences to [Jane Doe]. ” (Id. ¶ 21.) It is “illegal in Iran for a Muslim woman to be married to a non-Muslim man.” (Id. ¶ 20.) As such, if Jane Doe's family were to learn of her husband's religious conversion, she would “very likely . . . be forced to divorce [him] under Iranian Law.” (Id. ¶ 23.) Further, if the Iranian government were to learn of John Doe's conversion, his wife and both plaintiffs' families residing in Iran would be at risk of religious persecution, including “house raids, physical violence, harassment, and arrests.” (Id. ¶ 24.)
The court finds that the risk of religious persecution to Jane Doe in Iran, outweighs the public's interest in knowing the parties' identities. See Does I thru XXIII, 214 F.3d at 1067-68. Plaintiffs' fear of persecution is reasonable based on their membership in a vulnerable religious minority and the severity of the potential harm, which includes possible harassment and physical violence. See Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1069 (The court “conclude[s], based on the extreme nature of the retaliation threatened against plaintiffs coupled with their highly vulnerable status, that plaintiffs reasonably fear severe retaliation, and that this fear outweighs the interests in favor of open judicial proceedings.”)
The government has found this threat of persecution to be credible, as it granted John Doe asylum. (See Doe Decl. ¶¶ 9 10.) The risk to plaintiffs' family members living in Iran also weighs in favor of granting plaintiffs' request. See id. at 1070 (finding that district court abused discretion in denying motion to proceed under pseudonym where plaintiffs feared reprisal against family members living in China).
Plaintiffs have expressed willingness to disclose their true identities to the court and opposing counsel under seal, and do not otherwise request that court filings be sealed. (See Def.'s Mem. at 2.) Party anonymity therefore will “not significantly obstruct the public's view of issues . . . or the court's performance in resolving them.'” Doe v. Ayers, 789 F.3d 944, 946 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068) (alterations adopted). There also does not appear to be any risk of prejudice to the defendants, who have not opposed the motion and would be privy to plaintiffs' true identities.
In light of the foregoing, “[n]o factors weigh against concealing plaintiffs' identities.” See Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1069. See also Doe v. Risch, 398 F.Supp.3d 647, 647 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (noting that the court had previously granted permission to proceed under pseudonyms for Christians and other religious minorities from Iran); Jane Doe 1 v. Nielsen, 357 F.Supp.3d 972, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (same); Doe v. Dordoni, 806 Fed.Appx. 417, 418 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that the district court allowed Christian plaintiff from Saudi Arabia to proceed under pseudonym due to fear of religious persecution). Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion will be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for leave to proceed under pseudonym (Docket No. 2) and request to seal (Docket No. 7) be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED. Pursuant to Local Rule 141, the unredacted Exhibit B (Docket No. 1-2) shall be SEALED until further order of this Court.