Summary
noting that subpoenas "may not be used . . . as means to engage in discovery after the discovery deadline has passed."
Summary of this case from Wood v. Mut. Redevelopment Houses, Inc.Opinion
02 Civ. 9270 (KMW) (AP).
November 29, 2005
OPINION AND ORDER
Presently before the Court is plaintiff Dodson's "Motion for Contempt Court Order to Enforce Court Issued Subpoena." (Dkt. No. 82.) The motion is DENIED in all respects.
FACTS
Discovery in this case ended in late 2003, and in June 2004 I recommended that defendants' summary judgment motion should be granted in part and denied in part. Dodson v. CBS, 02 Civ. 9270, 2004 WL 1336231 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2004) (Peck, M.J.). Judge Wood affirmed my Report and Recommendation on August 31, 2004. (Dkt. No. 55.) The parties thereafter were to file their Pretrial Order, and the case is trial ready, although no trial date has yet been set.
On or about October 5, 2005, Dodson served a subpoena duces tecum on Bettina Plevan, counsel of record for defendants, returnable at Dodson's home in New Jersey, seeking 10 categories of documents.
On or about October 18, 2005, defendants objected to the subpoena.
On or about November 7, 2005, Dodson filed the instant motion for contempt and to enforce the subpoena (Dkt. No. 82), and on November 22, 2005, defendants filed their opposition papers (Dkt. Nos. 84-85).
ANALYSIS
Dodson's motion is procedurally defective in at least two ways: (a) He did not request a pre-motion conference, as required by Judge Wood's rules (Judge Wood's Individual Practices ¶ 2.A; see also S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 37.2); and (b) The motion is not accompanied by a Memorandum of Law, as required by S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 7.1.
Furthermore, even aside from the procedural defects, Dodson's motion lacks merit.
Contempt is not available since defendants responded to the subpoena by serving objections. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(2)(B). When objections to a subpoena have been made, the correct procedure is a motion to compel, not a motion for contempt. Id.
As to the portion of Dodson's motion that seeks to compel compliance with the subpoena: Discovery closed long ago. Dodson's subpoena clearly seeks discovery, as is apparent from his having the subpoena returnable to his address in New Jersey at the present time, instead of to Judge Wood's courtroom at the time of trial. Moreover, the scope of the request is broad and clearly is designed for discovery, not last-minute trial needs (such as for originals of documents where copies were produced in discovery and there is a need for the original at trial). While Rule 45 can be used to subpoena documents to be introduced at trial as trial exhibits, the need to do so should be limited because of the liberal federal pretrial discovery rules. Dodson here had ample discovery.
Rule 45 "[t]rial subpoenas [duces tecum] may not be used, however, as means to engage in discovery after the discovery deadline has passed." Puritan Inv. Corp. v. ASLL Corp., No. Civ. A. 97-1580, 1997 WL 793569 at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 1997) ( cases cited therein); accord, e.g., 9 Moore's Federal Practice, § 45.02 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2005) ("Several courts have concluded that after the discovery deadline a party may not use a subpoena to obtain materials from third parties that could have been produced during discovery.") (citing cases); Playboy Enter. Int'l Inc. v. OnLine Entm't, Inc., No. 00-Civ.-6618, 2003 WL 1567120 at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2003); Mortgage Info. Servs., Inc. v. Kitchens, 210 F.R.D. 562, 566-68 n. 2 (W.D.N.C. 2002) ("After reviewing the relevant case law on both sides of this issue, the Court adopts the rule followed by the majority of jurisdictions and holds that a Rule 45 subpoena does in fact constitute discovery.") (citing cases authorities);Dreyer v. GACS Inc., 204 F.R.D. 120, 122-23 (N.D. Ind. 2001) ("Rule 45 subpoenas constitute `discovery' within the meaning of Rules 26 and 34. . . . [T]his Court, like Rice, does not believe `that a party should be allowed to employ a subpoena after a discovery deadline to obtain materials from third parties that could have been produced during discovery.'"); Grant v.Otis Elevator Co., 199 F.R.D. 673, 675 (N.D. Okla. 2001) ("Litigants may not use the subpoena power of the court to conduct discovery after the discovery deadline."); Alper v.United States, 190 F.R.D. 281, 283-84 (D. Mass. 2000); Rice v. United States, 164 F.R.D. 556, 558 n. 1 (N.D. Okla. 1995);BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., No. 86 C 5602, 1992 WL 24076 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 1992) (Trial subpoenas "may not be used as a means to engage in further discovery. . . . Here, discovery has been closed for almost eleven months, and the court will not allow the parties to engage in discovery through trial subpoenas. Furthermore, the court's policy of requiring parties to submit a pretrial order detailing those documents which it may use at trial is rendered nugatory if a trial subpoena may issue demanding documents not previously produced or identified.");Stockwell v. Am. Allsafe Co., No. CIV-84-1179, 1986 WL 13941 at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1986); Windsor Comme'ns Group, Inc. v.Price Waterhouse, No. Civ. A 85-4119, 1986 WL 9888 at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1986); Pitter v. American Express Co., 82 Civ. 7451, 1984 WL 1272 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1984); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Ctr. Inc., 27 F.R.D. 513, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Here, it is clear from the scope of Dodson's subpoena (and its return time and place) that it is for discovery purposes. As such, it is quashed and Dodson's motion is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Dodson's motion for contempt and to enforce the subpoena duces tecum (Dkt. No. 82) isDENIED.SO ORDERED.