SeeJeff Taylor, 358 S.W.3d at 864 (concluding that, because amount of payment fluctuated based on other events, payment terms remained open). Lastly, we note that Kaldis cites the following four cases for the proposition that a cause of action for debt based on breach of contract accrues from the date that a debtor first misses a payment: Dodeka, L.L.C. v. Campos, 377 S.W.3d 726, 730 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.); Colvin v. Tex. Dow Emps. Credit Union, No. 01–11–00342–CV, 2012 WL 5544950, at *9 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (mem.op.); Bicknell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11–08–00203–CV, 2010 WL 1635832, at *2 (Tex.App.—Beaumont Apr. 22, 2010, no pet.) (mem.op.); and Williams v. Unifund CCR Partners Assignee of Citibank, 264 S.W.3d 231 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). However, of these cases, only Dodeka discusses the issue of whether the suit, for limitations purposes, had been brought as a suit on open account or as a claim for debt based on breach of contract. Dodeka, 377 S.W.3d at 730.
Rather, as other courts have recognized, Abrego's method of corroborating third-party business records is compatible with other methods of achieving the same task. See id.; see alsoDodeka, LLC v. Campos, 377 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2012, no pet.). For example, the Dodeka court acknowledged our holding that, generally, "documents received from another entity are not admissible under Rule 803(6), if the sponsoring witness is not qualified to testify about the other entity's record keeping," but went on to note that other methods may be used to solve a third-party record problem.
Business records are admissible if accompanied by an affidavit that satisfies the requirements of Rule 902(10). Dodeka, L.L.C. v. Campos, 377 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.); TEX. R. EVID. 902(10).
When the trial court makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, we may review the findings of fact for legal and factual sufficiency. Dodeka, L.L.C. v. Campos , 377 S.W.3d 726, 729 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.). "We review de novo the trial court's legal conclusions based on the findings of fact to determine their correctness."
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004(a)(3) (person must bring suit on action for debt not later than four years after day cause of action accrues); Dodeka, L.L.C. v. Campos, 377 S.W.3d 726, 730 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (statute of limitations on claim for debt based on breach of contract is four years after day cause of action accrues).
The statute of limitations on a claim for debt based on breach of contract is four years after the date the cause of action accrues. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004; Dodeka, L.L.C. v. Campos, 377 S.W.3d 726, 730 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.). A claim for breach of contract based on credit card debt accrues on the date the last payment on the account is made.
Marshall argues that Crown's claims did not accrue on that date but instead accrued earlier, when she stopped making payments on the credit card. To support this position, Marshall relies on Dodeka, L.L.C. v. Campos, 377 S.W.3d 726, 731 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.). In Dodeka, the San Antonio court held that a creditor's claim for breach of contract accrued on the date that the debtor stopped making payments on her credit card.
"We will uphold the trial court's ruling on the exclusion of evidence if there is any legitimate basis for the ruling." Dodeka, L.L.C. v. Campos, 377 S.W.3d 726, 731 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (citing Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998)). Hearsay, which is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted," TEX. R. EVID.
The Texas Court of Appeals has observed numerous times that a bank's “failure to keep accurate records” may lead to liability under Section 392.304(a)(8). See Dodeka, L.L.C. v. Campos, 377 S.W.3d 726, 733 (Tex.App.2012) ; Simien v. Unifund CCR Partners, 321 S.W.3d 235, 244 (Tex.App.2010) ; accord Levy v. Cach, L.L.C., No. 14–12–00905–CV, 2013 WL 6237273, at *3 (Tex.App. Dec. 3, 2013) (unpublished) (“[A] failure by the Bank to keep accurate records of its customers' credit-card debt could result in ... civil penalties.”) (citing Tex. Fin. Cod. § 392.304(a)(8) ); Ainsworth v. CACH, LLC, No. 14–11–00502–CV, 2012 WL 1205525, at *5 (Tex.App. Apr. 10, 2012) (unpublished) (same). Additionally, imposition of an intent requirement is inconsistent with Section 392.401, which provides as an affirmative defense that the TDCA is not violated “if the action complained of resulted from a bona fide error that occurred notwithstanding the use of reasonable procedures adopted to avoid the error.”
t a sponsoring witness with knowledge of how documents were made and kept was not required to have personally assembled the proffered record); State v. Fitzwater, 122 Hawai'i 354, 367-68, 227 P.3d 520, 533-34 (2010) (holding that third-party records "are admissible as business records of the incorporating entity provided that it relies on the records, there are other indicia of reliability, and the requirements of [the Hawaii business records exception] are otherwise satisfied " (emphasis added)) ; Alloway v. RT Capital, Inc. , 2008 WY 123, ¶¶ 15-17, 193 P.3d 713, 718 (2008) (similar); Great Seneca Financial v. Felty , 170 Ohio App. 3d 737, 742, 869 N.E.2d 30, 33-34 (2006) (permitting admission of third-party records where a witness from the proponent's business established that the "essential elements" of the Ohio business records exception were met).Other state court cases that plaintiff cites do not persuasively analyze the wording of the state's business records exception, e.g. , Dodeka, L.L.C. v. Campos , 377 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tex. App. 2012), or involve business records exceptions that are worded very differently than OEC 803(6), e.g. , Beal Bank, SSB v. Eurich , 444 Mass. 813, 815, 831 N.E.2d 909, 911 (2005) (applying the Massachusetts business records exception, which does not require testimony from a custodian or other qualified witness, or that the proffered record was made by, or from a person with knowledge). Before addressing whether plaintiff's foundation for the documents it received from Discover satisfied the requirements of OEC 803(6), we pause to address plaintiff's contention that we should review the trial court's ruling regarding admissibility of the documents for abuse of discretion.