Opinion
5:23-CV-33-FL
05-03-2023
TULISHA DOCTOR, Plaintiff, v. CUMBERLAND COUNTY SCHOOLS, Defendant.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION
KIMBERLY A. SWANK, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This pro se case is before the court on the application [DE #1] by Plaintiff Tulisha Doctor to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and for frivolity review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the matter having been referred to the undersigned by United States District Judge Louise W. Flanagan. For the reasons set forth below, the court allows Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis and recommends that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
IFP MOTION
The standard for determining in forma pauperis status is whether “one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). Based on the information contained in the application, Plaintiff's application to proceed without prepayment of costs is ALLOWED.
DISCUSSION
I. Background
Plaintiff sues Defendant for race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). (Compl. [DE #5] at 3-5.) Plaintiff has alleged the following:
I am an African American woman. I began working at Alderman Road Elementary in 2021. I taught third grade and I have sixteen years of teaching experience. There were two African American teachers at the school at the time, including myself. I had a meeting with Stephanie Matarese, the principal (white) in January 2022. The principal asked me to observe other teachers, which I did, and to make changes to my lessons. I made the changes. I followed all of the principal's instructions. The principal spoke to me with a lot of hostility and a negative attitude.
Despite following all of the principal's instructions, the principal decided not to renew my contract for the next school year.(Id. at 5.) Plaintiff has also attached the right-to-sue letter she received from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (IFP Appl., Right-to-Sue Letter [DE #1-2].)
II. Standard for Frivolity Review
Notwithstanding the determination that Plaintiff is entitled to IFP status, the court is required to dismiss all or part of an action found to be frivolous or malicious, which fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or which seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Michau v. Charleston County, 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Pro se complaints are entitled to a more liberal treatment than pleadings drafted by lawyers. See White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1989). However, the court is not required to accept a pro se plaintiff's contentions as true. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). The court is permitted to “pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. In making the “inherently elastic” frivolity determination, Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004), the court may “apply common sense,” Nasim v. Warden., Md. House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to give a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The statement must give a defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint is insufficient if it offers merely “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff must offer more detail . . . than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001); see also White, 886 F.2d at 723 (affirming district court's dismissal of suit as frivolous where complaint “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support [plaintiff's] bare assertion”). The complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. While the court must read the complaint carefully to determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support her claims, White, 886 F.2d at 724, the court is not required to act as the pro se plaintiff's advocate or to parse through volumes of documents or discursive arguments in an attempt to discern the plaintiff's unexpressed intent, Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 2013).
III. Analysis
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff can establish a Title VII discrimination violation by demonstrating through direct evidence that illegal discrimination motivated an employer's adverse employment action or by proceeding under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Cherry v. Elizabeth City State Univ., 147 F.Supp.3d 414, 421 (E.D. N.C. 2015) (citing Hill v. LockheedMartin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). “Direct evidence is evidence from which no inference [of discrimination] is required.” Cherry, 147 F.Supp.3d at 421. “Absent direct evidence, the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2004)).
Plaintiff's complaint contains no factual allegations from which it could plausibly be inferred that Defendants failed to renew Plaintiff's contract because of Plaintiff's race. Plaintiff has simply alleged that she is an African American teacher whose contract was not renewed by a white principal. While Plaintiff has alleged membership in a protected class, an adverse employment action, and satisfactory job performance sufficient for purposes of frivolity review, she has made no factual allegations as to how she was treated differently from similarly situated employees outside the protected class. Nor has she alleged any direct evidence of discrimination under Title VII.
Plaintiff's allegation that the principal spoke to Plaintiff with hostility and a negative attitude, standing alone, is not sufficient to state a hostile environment claim. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Title VII does not create a “general civility code,” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)), and “rude or boorish treatment are not sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim,” Iskander v. Dept of Navy, 116 F.Supp.3d 669, 675-76 (E.D. N.C. 2015) (citing cases). “Title VII . . . only proscribe[s] behavior that is ‘so objectively offensive so as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment.'” Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81).
To survive frivolity review on a hostile work environment claim, a complaint must allege facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that workplace hostility was “(1) unwelcome, (2) because of [membership in a protected class], (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive atmosphere, and (4) imputable to the employer.” E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d 306, 313-14 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gilliam v. S.C. Dept Juvenile Justice, 474 F.3d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 2007)). Plaintiff's allegation of hostile treatment does not rise to this level.
Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts from which it may reasonably be inferred that she was discriminated against based upon her race. Accordingly, her complaint should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis [DE #1] is ALLOWED and it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff. Plaintiff is hereby advised as follows:
You shall have until May 22, 2023, to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b) (E.D. N.C. Dec. 2019).
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline may bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).