Opinion
A-13168
11-03-2021
CURTIS JIM DOBSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Michael Horowitz, Law Office of Michael Horowitz, Kingsley, Michigan, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a). Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Trial Court No. 3KN-16-00920 CR Kenai, Martin C. Fallon, Magistrate Judge.
Michael Horowitz, Law Office of Michael Horowitz, Kingsley, Michigan, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Curtis Jim Dobson was charged with driving under the influence after he crashed his three-wheeler, seriously injuring himself. Dobson was hospitalized following the crash. Dobson's treating physician suspected Dobson was suffering from acute alcohol intoxication. In order to assist her neurological and other examinations, 1 the physician ordered a blood-alcohol test. The test showed that Dobson's blood-alcohol level was almost three times the legal limit.
AS 28.35.030(a)(2).
The State later obtained a search warrant for Dobson's medical records and used the result of the medical blood test against Dobson at his trial for driving under the influence. Dobson's attorney challenged the reliability of the medical blood test because it was not conducted in accordance with 13 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 63.110, the regulation setting forth the necessary procedures for when a forensic blood test is administered by the State as part of a driving under the influence investigation. Dobson's attorney also proposed a jury instruction listing factors the jury could rely on when considering the reliability of the blood test - factors based on the requirements for forensic blood tests in 13 AAC 63.110.
The district court denied the request, noting that 13 AAC 63.110 does not apply to medical blood tests like the one conducted on Dobson. But the court said it would allow Dobson's attorney to discuss the requirements for forensic blood tests during closing argument, as long as the attorney did not argue these requirements applied to medical blood tests. The jury later convicted Dobson of driving under the influence.
Dobson now appeals his conviction, arguing that the district court erred when it declined to give his proposed jury instruction. In support of this argument, Dobson cites Moberg v. Anchorage. In Moberg, we held that blood testing conducted by medical care providers for medical purposes is not subject to the requirements of 13 AAC 63.110. However, we also emphasized that "the defendant is still free to argue to the jury that a hospital's failure to comply with the procedures listed in 13 AAC 63.110 might constitute a reason for doubting the trustworthiness of the blood 2 test result." Dobson acknowledges that he was allowed to argue this to the jury. But he claims that the court's failure to give his proposed jury instruction undercuts this argument.
Moberg v. Anchorage, 152 P.3d 1170, 1172-79 (Alaska App. 2007).
Id. at 1176-77.
Id. at 1179.
We review a trial judge's ruling on a requested jury instruction for abuse of discretion. As long as the existing jury instructions adequately explain the law, a trial judge has broad discretion to give or withhold special instructions on the parties' theories of the case. We find no abuse of discretion here, given that Dobson was able to argue his theory to the jury under the existing jury instructions.
Dere v. State, AAA P.3d 204, 225 (Alaska App. 2019).
Id.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 3