Dobbs v. McDowell Cnty. Circuit Court

Full title: JODY DOBBS, Plaintiff, v. MCDOWELL COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, Defendant.

Court: United States District Court, Southern District of West Virginia

Date published: Jun 17, 2020

Civil Action 1:19-00735 (S.D.W. Va. Jun. 17, 2020)

Opinion

Civil Action 1:19-00735

06-17-2020

JODY DOBBS, Plaintiff, v. MCDOWELL COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, Defendant.

Omar J. Aboulhosn United States Magistrate Judge

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

Omar J. Aboulhosn United States Magistrate Judge

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees or Costs (Document No. 1), filed on October 10, 2019. Having examined Plaintiff's Complaint, the undersigned has concluded that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted in this matter and therefore respectfully recommends that Plaintiff's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees be denied and this matter be dismissed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 10, 2019, Plaintiff, acting pro se and in confinement at Stevens Correctional Center in Welch, West Virginia, filed his Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and a Complaint claiming entitlement to relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983.¹ (Document Nos. 1 and 2.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff names the McDowell County Circuit Court as the sole Defendant. (Document No. 2, p. 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated during criminal proceedings in McDowell County Circuit Court. (Id.) Specially, Plaintiff states as follows:

1 Because Plaintiff is acting pro se, the documents which he has filed in this case are held to a less stringent standard than if they were prepared by a lawyer and therefore, they are construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

On July 11, 2007, the [Plaintiff] was convicted for an October 7, 2007 incident and subsequently incarcerated. West Virginia Code 62-12-26, which provides for additional supervision of sexual offenders, took effect in 2003. West Virginia Code 62-12-26 is clearly and unmistakably punitive in nature and all persons subject thereto have experienced what amounts to a de facto termination of constitutionally protected civil liberties. The McDowell County Circuit Court has retroactively applied West Virginia Code 62-12-26 to the [Plaintiff] in clear violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution, Article 3, Section 4 of the West Virginia Constitution, and informative case law, West Virginia v. Jerry Deel, 600237 W.Va. 600.

(Id., pp. 4 - 5.) As relief, Plaintiff requests “this Court to nullify and make void the order of supervised release which has been retroactively applied to the [Plaintiff].” (Id., p. 5.)

THE STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to screen each case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. On screening, the Court must recommend dismissal of the case if the complaint is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A “frivolous” complaint is one which is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). A “frivolous” claim lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id., 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id., 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. A complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted factually when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.

This Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents, holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (1978). Liberal construction, however, “does not require courts to construct arguments or theories for a pro se plaintiff because this would place a court in the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Miller v. Jack, 2007 WL 2050409, at * 3 (N.D.W.Va. 2007)(citing Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.1978)). Further, liberal construction does not require the “courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4^th Cir. 1985). In other words, a court may not construct legal argument for a plaintiff. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993). Finally, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.1990)). Where a pro se Complaint can be remedied by an amendment, however, the District Court may not dismiss the Complaint with prejudice, but must permit the amendment. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1734, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992); also see Goode v. Central Va. Legal Aide Society, Inc., 807 F.3d 619 (4^th Cir. 2015).

ANALYSIS

“[F]ederal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of all “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].” Thus, Section 1983 provides a “broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights.” Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 685, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Generally speaking, to state and prevail upon a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Plaintiff must prove that (1) a person acting under color of State law (2) committed an act which deprived him of an alleged right, privilege or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

1. Improper Party:

As stated above, to state and prevail upon a claim under Section 1983, a Plaintiff must prove that (1) a person acting under color of State law (2) committed an act which deprived him of an alleged right, privilege or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. In Monell, the Supreme Court recognized that municipalities and municipal officials sued in an official capacity are suitable “persons” for such purposes. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2035. The Supreme Court, however, later clarified that states, state agencies, or state officials sued in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages under Section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2309, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)(suits against a state or state agencies for monetary damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. West Virginia Dept. of Highways, 845 F.2d 468, 470 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 855, 109 S.Ct. 143, 102 L.Ed.2d 116 (1988); but also see Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)(Municipalities are “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983); Gilco v. Logan County Commission, 2012 WL 3580056, * 6 (S.D.W.Va. Aug. 17, 2012)(J. Copenhaver)(“Municipalities, such as the County Commission, are ‘persons' subject to suit under section 1983.”) Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the McDowell County Circuit Court must be dismissed because it is not a “person” as required by Section 1983. See Preval v. Reno, 203 F.3d 821 (4^th Cir. 2000)(unpublished)(finding that the Piedmont Regional Jail is not a “person” under Section 1983); Redman v. Jackson County Magistrate Court, 2011 WL 6372339 (S.D.W.Va. Dec. 20, 2011)(J. Johnston)(finding that “Plaintiff cannot state a claim against the Jackson County Magistrate Court because that party is not a ‘person' subject to liability under § 1983”); Roach v. Burch, 825 F.Supp. 116, 117 (N.D.W.Va. 1993)(stating that the West Virginia Regional Jail Authority is not a “person” under Section 1983); Webb v. Parsons, 2011 WL 2076419 (S.D.W.Va. May 6, 2011)(finding that the West Virginia Regional Jail Authority, an agency of the State of West Virginia, is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the undersigned will briefly consider Plaintiff's claim.

2. Heck:

Plaintiff appears to allege that his constitutional rights were violated during the course of his criminal proceedings in the Circuit Court of McDowell County. Specifically, Plaintiff challenges the validity of his sentence.² Plaintiff alleges that the Circuit Court's application of the Sex Offender Registration Act violated the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution and the West Virginia Constitution. Given the nature of Plaintiff's allegations, it appears that Plaintiff is implying that his sentence is invalid as a result of constitutional violations during criminal proceedings in the Circuit Court of McDowell County, West Virginia. Consequently, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim under Section 1983 pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that:

2 The proper means for Plaintiff to challenge the validity of his conviction or sentence in federal court is to file an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The undersigned has directed the Clerk to provide Plaintiff with a form Section 2254 Petition. To the extent Plaintiff wishes to challenge his conviction or sentence in federal court, Plaintiff should complete and return the Section 2254 Petition form.

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing the relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Id. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2372.See also Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842 (4^th Cir. 2003)(holding that an arrestee's Section 1983 claim was not cognizable against state trooper, alleging unreasonable search and seizure, under Heck, since judgment in arrestee's favor would have implied the invalidity of conviction). Plaintiff does not indicate that he has been successful in a direct appeal or in habeas proceedings. The undersigned, therefore, finds that because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his criminal conviction or sentence has been invalidated, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim is not cognizable pursuant to Heck. Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the above claims be dismissed.

3. Judicial Immunity:

To the extent Plaintiff is alleging claims against the Circuit Court Judge of McDowell County, the undersigned will consider his claim. “Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, __ S.Ct., 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872).” Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 419, 96 S.Ct. 984, 990, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Judicial immunity does not attach when a judicial officer acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4^th Cir. 1987). The doctrine ofjudicial immunity, however, “attaches even if the act in question was in excess of [the judge's] authority.” Jackson v. Houck, 181 Fed. App'x 372, 372 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12-13, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991)). “This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it ‘is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.” Id. (adopting doctrine of absolute judicial immunity in Section 1983 actions) (internal citation omitted). Based upon the allegations contained in the Complaint, the undersigned finds that the Circuit Court Judge of McDowell County is absolutely immune from suit. Plaintiff appears to argue that the Circuit Court Judge allowed his constitutional rights to be violated during his criminal proceedings. As stated above, judges have absolute immunity for their judicial acts even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly. To the extent Plaintiff is asserting a claim again the Circuit Court Judge of McDowell County, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff's claim be dismissed.

PROPOSAL AND RECOMMENDATION

The undersigned therefore respectfully PROPOSES that the District Court confirm and accept the foregoing findings and RECOMMENDS that the District Court DENY Plaintiff's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees or Costs (Document No. 1), DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint (Document No. 2) and remove this matter from the Court's docket.

The Plaintiff is hereby notified that this “Proposed Findings and Recommendation” is hereby FILED, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable United States District Judge David A. Faber. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Rule 6(d) and 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days (filing of objections) and three (3) days (if received by mail) from the date of filing of this Findings and Recommendation within which to file with the Clerk of this Court specific written objections identifying the portions of the Findings and Recommendation to which objection is made and the basis of such objection. Extension of this time period may be granted for good cause.

Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984). Copies of such objections shall be served on opposing parties, District Judge Faber and this Magistrate Judge.

The Clerk is requested to send a copy of this Proposed Findings and Recommendation to Plaintiff, who is acting pro se. The Clerk is further directed to send Plaintiff a copy of a form Section 2254 Petition.